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Pleasant Grove v. Summum
07-665
Ruling Below: Summum v. Pleasant Grove, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007), cert granted,
Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2995 (2008).
Summum, a religious organization, requested to place a monument in a Pleasant Grove city park.
The monument would display the beliefs of the Summum, known as the "Seven Aphorisms."
The park already contained monuments including one of the Ten Commandments donated by the
Fraternal Order of Eagles. The city denied the request and codified its policy regarding
monuments to be displayed in parks. Summum brought suit claiming that the city's policy
violated the First Amendment. The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief because
Summum could not prove that it would prevail on First Amendment grounds. The Tenth Circuit
reversed and ordered the city to immediately erect and display the "Seven Aphorisms"
monument.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether a monument donated to a city park remains protected speech
of the donor, even though the monument is displayed and controlled by the municipality. (2) Is a
municipal park a public forum under the First Amendment for erection and permanent display of
monuments proposed by private parties? (3) Did the Tenth Circuit err by ordering the
immediate erection and display of the plaintiff s monument?
SUMMUM, a corporate sole and church, Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
PLEASANT GROVE CITY, Defendant-Apellee
Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit
Filed April 17, 2007
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge.
The Plaintiff-Appellant Summum, a religious
organization, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for violation of its First Amendment
rights against the Defendants-Appellees, the
City of Pleasant Grove, its mayor, city
administrator, and city council members.
Summum appeals the District Court's denial
of its request for a preliminary injunction. We
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1) and reverse the District Court's
decision.
BACKGROUND
A city park in Pleasant Grove, Utah, contains
a number of buildings, artifacts, and
permanent displays, many of which relate to
or commemorate Pleasant Grove's pioneer
history. For example, the park contains one of
Pleasant Grove's first granaries, its first city
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hall, and its first fire department building. For
purposes of this appeal, the most important
structure is a Ten Commandments monument,
donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles in
1971, two years after it established a local
chapter in Pleasant Grove.
In September 2003, Summum, a religious
organization with headquarters in Salt Lake
City, Utah, sent the mayor of Pleasant Grove
a letter requesting permission to erect a
monument containing the Seven Aphorisms
of Summum in the city park. In its letter,
Summum stated that its monument would be
similar in size and nature to the Ten
Commandments monument already present in
the park. Approximately two months after
Summum made its request, the mayor sent
Summum written notification that the city had
denied its request because the proposed
monument did not meet the city's criteria for
permanent displays in the park. According to
the letter, all permanent displays in this
particular park must "directly relate to the
history of Pleasant Grove" or be "donated by
groups with long-standing ties to the Pleasant
Grove community." The following year, in
August 2004, the city passed a resolution
codifying and expanding upon its alleged
policy for evaluating requests for permanent
displays in the park. The resolution contains a
number of factors the city council must
consider in deciding whether a proposed
display meets a historical relevance
requirement. In May 2005, Summum renewed
its request, sending the mayor another letter
with substantially the same language as the
first letter.
When the city did not respond to its second
request, Summum filed suit in federal district
court seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief, as well as monetary damages, for
Pleasant Grove's violation of Summum's free
speech rights under the U.S. Constitution and
for the city's violation of the Utah
Constitution's free expression and
establishment provisions. Summum contends
that the city violated its rights by excluding its
monument while allowing other permanent
monuments of an expressive nature (e.g., the
Ten Commandments) to be displayed in the
park. In an oral ruling on various motions, the
District Court denied Summum's request for a
preliminary injunction requiring the city to
permit the display of Summum's monument
in the park. Summum subsequently appealed
this decision, arguing that the District Court
abused its discretion in denying the injunction
based on Summum's First Amendment claim.
DISCUSSION
I. Preliminary Injunction Standard
We review a district court's decision to deny
a motion for a preliminary injunction for
abuse of discretion, which we have
characterized as "an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable
judgment." Schrier v. Univ. of Colorado, 427
F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2005). "A district
court abuses its discretion when it commits an
error of law or makes clearly erroneous
factual findings." Wyandotte Nation v.
Sebelius, 443 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir.
2006). In reviewing the district court's
decision, "[w]e examine the . . . court's
underlying factual findings for clear error, and
its legal determinations de novo." Davis v.
Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir.
2002).
To prevail on a motion for a preliminary
injunction in the district court, a moving party
must establish that:
(1) [he or she] will suffer irreparable
injury unless the injunction issues;
(2) the threatened injury . . .
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outweighs whatever damage the
proposed injunction may cause the
opposing party; (3) the injunction, if
issued, would not be adverse to the
public interest; and (4) there is a
substantial likelihood [of success] on
the merits.
But because a preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary remedy and is intended "merely
to preserve the relative positions of the parties
until a trial on the merits can be held," we
have held that the moving party must meet a
heightened standard when requesting one of
three types of historically disfavored
injunctions.
The three types of disfavored injunctions are
"(1) preliminary injunctions that alter the
status quo; (2) mandatory preliminary
injunctions; and (3) preliminary injunctions
that afford the movant all the relief that it
could recover at the conclusion of a full trial
on the merits." 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente
Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973,
975 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc). When a
preliminary injunction falls into one of these
categories, it "must be more closely
scrutinized to assure that the exigencies of the
case support the granting of a remedy that is
extraordinary even in the normal course." Id.
A district court may not grant a preliminary
injunction unless the moving party "make[s] a
strong showing both with regard to the
likelihood of success on the merits and with
regard to the balance of harms." Id. at 976.
In this case, the preliminary injunction clearly
falls within two categories of disfavored
injunctions: it alters the status quo and is
mandatory. An injunction alters the status quo
when it changes the "last peaceable
uncontested status existing between the
parties before the dispute developed." Schrier,
427 F.3d at 1260 (quotations omitted). The
last uncontested status between Summum and
Pleasant Grove was one of no relationship
between the two parties. Because Summum's
monument is not currently displayed in a
Pleasant Grove city park, an injunction
ordering Pleasant Grove to permit the display
of Summum's monument clearly changes the
status quo. In addition, by requiring the city to
make arrangements for the display of
Summum's monument, an injunction would
mandate that the city act and would require
the district court to supervise the city's
actions to ensure it abides by the injunction.
Because an injunction would "affirmatively
require" Pleasant Grove "to act in a particular
way" and would require ongoing court
supervision, it is a mandatory injunction.
Because the injunction falls into two
disfavored categories, Summum must have
made "a strong showing both with regard to
the likelihood of success on the merits and
with regard to the balance of harms" to
prevail on its motion at the district court level.
Based on the record, we cannot discern
whether the District Court applied this
heightened standard. In its oral ruling, the
court simply noted that it denied Summum's
motion because it failed to establish a
substantial likelihood of success on the
merits. The court did not analyze the other
three factors or explicitly state that it applied
a heightened standard to Summum's request.
But even if the District Court concluded that
Summum could not prevail using the lesser
standard, it certainly would reach the same
conclusion under the heightened standard.
Although the "failure of the district court to
apply the correct standard" to a request for a
preliminary injunction "amounts to an abuse
of discretion," any abuse in this case was in
Summum's favor. We therefore assume that
the District Court applied the heightened
standard and review the court's legal
conclusions and findings of fact for abuse of
discretion.
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II. Preliminary Injunction Analysis
In its oral ruling on Summum's motion for a
preliminary injunction, the District Court
indicated that Summum would not prevail on
the merits if Pleasant Grove proved it had a
well-established policy for evaluating
proposed monuments that was reasonable and
viewpoint neutral. After finding that the facts
regarding the city's policy (or lack thereof)
were in dispute, the court concluded that
Summum had not established a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits. It
therefore denied Summum's motion without
addressing the other three factors required for
issuance of a preliminary injunction.
As we explain below, the District Court
abused its discretion by analyzing Summum's
First Amendment claim under the incorrect
legal standard. But rather than remanding to
the District Court for the appropriate analysis,
we find the record sufficiently developed to
allow us to determine whether Summum has
met its burden under the four factors
necessary to prevail on its motion.
A. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the
Merits
1. Identifying the nature of the relevant forum
To determine the appropriate First
Amendment standard under which to review
the city's denial of Summum's request, the
reviewing court must engage in a "forum
analysis." The characterization of the forum at
issue is crucial because "the extent to which
the Government can control access depends
on the nature of the relevant forum."
Cornelius v. NAA CP Legal Def & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). In
identifying the relevant forum, the court looks
at both "(1) the government property to which
access is sought and (2) the type of access
sought." Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d
995, 1001 (10th Cir. 2002). In this case,
Summum seeks to display its monument
among other monuments in Pleasant Grove's
city park. The permanent monuments in the
city park therefore make up the relevant
forum.
Having identified the relevant forum, the
reviewing court must also determine whether
the forum is public or nonpublic in nature. In
general, the forum will fall into one of three
categories:
(1) a traditional public forum (e.g.,
parks and streets), (2) a designated
public forum (i.e., the government
voluntarily transforms a nonpublic
forum into a traditional public
forum, thereby bestowing all the free
speech rights associated with the
traditional public forum, albeit on a
potentially temporary basis, onto
that now "designated public
forum"), or (3) a nonpublic forum
(i.e., the government retains the right
to curtail speech so long as those
curtailments are viewpoint neutral
and reasonable for the maintenance
of the forum's particular official
uses).
In the case before us, the District Court
indicated that the applicable analysis is
whether Pleasant Grove's policy is reasonable
and viewpoint neutral. The court therefore
analyzed the city's actions using the standard
associated with a nonpublic forum.
The city park is, however, a traditional public
forum. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
characterized streets and parks as
"quintessential public forums," Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983), because people have
traditionally gathered in these places to
exchange ideas and engage in public debate:
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In places which by long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to
assembly and debate, the rights of the state to
limit expressive activity are sharply
circumscribed. At one end of the spectrum are
streets and parks which "have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public,
and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions." Id. Because the park is a
public forum, the city's restrictions on speech
are subject to strict scrutiny.
Moreover, the city cannot close or otherwise
limit a traditional public forum by fiat; a
traditional public forum is defined by its
objective characteristics, not by governmental
intent or action. In short, the nature of the
forum in this case is public.
Pleasant Grove contends that our decisions in
City of Ogden and Summum v. Callaghan,
130 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1997), support its
argument that the monuments and other
structures in the city park constitute a
nonpublic forum. But in both City of Ogden
and Callaghan, the property at issue could not
be characterized-by tradition or government
designation-as a public forum. City of
Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1002; Callaghan, 130
F.3d at 916-17. Conversely, in the present
case, the property is a park, the kind of
property which has "immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public." Hague, 307
U.S. at 515. In this way, the present case more
closely resembles the facts in Eagon. In
Eagon, individuals sued Elk City for violation
of their free speech rights after the city
excluded their display from "Christmas in the
Park," an annual event during which
individuals and groups were allowed to erect
displays in Ackley Park. 72 F.3d at 1483. In
conducting our forum analysis, we
characterized the relevant forum as "Ackley
Park during the 'Christmas in the Park' event"
and held that the forum was a traditional
public forum, in which "content-based
restrictions on speech are valid only if
necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and if narrowly drawn to achieve that end."
Id. at 1487. Similarly, the fact that Summum
seeks access to a particular means of
communication (i.e., the display of a
monument) is relevant in defining the forum,
but it does not determine the nature of that
forum.
By applying the standard associated with a
nonpublic forum, the District Court
committed an error of law. In a nonpublic
forum, content-based restrictions on speech
are permissible as long as they do not
discriminate on the basis of the speaker's
viewpoint and are reasonable. Perry Educ.
Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 49. But in a public forum,
content-based restrictions are presumptively
invalid. R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 382 (1992). In order for a content-based
restriction to survive strict scrutiny, the
government must "show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end." Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 45. As
we explain below, Pleasant Grove has failed
to justify its restriction on speech under this
standard.
[In a footnote, the court notes exceptions the
Supreme Court has found, but asserts that the
Supreme Court has not extended those
exceptions to the context of the present case,
so "the case is best resolved through the
application of established forum principles."]
2. Application of strict scrutiny to content-
based restrictions in a traditional public
forum
Pleasant Grove concedes that its restriction on
speech in the park is content based. By
requiring that monuments meet the city's
historical relevance criteria, the city excludes
270
monuments on the basis of subject matter and
the speaker's identity. Because the city's
restrictions are content based, they may not be
analyzed under the less exacting intermediate
scrutiny applied to content-neutral restrictions
regulating the time, place, or manner of
expression in public forums.
We must therefore determine whether
Pleasant Grove has demonstrated that
application of its historical relevance criteria
will, "more likely than not, be justified by the
asserted compelling interests." Gonzales, 126
S. Ct. at 1219. Even though the injunction in
this case is disfavored and Summum's request
is therefore analyzed under a heightened
standard, in the context of a First Amendment
challenge, Pleasant Grove bears the burden of
establishing that its content-based restriction
on speech will "more likely than not" survive
strict scrutiny. See Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666
("As the Government bears the burden of
proof on the ultimate question of [the
restriction's] constitutionality, [the moving
party] must be deemed likely to prevail unless
the Government has shown that [the moving
party's] proposed less restrictive alternatives
are less effective than [the restriction].").
Because Pleasant Grove argued below that the
relevant forum is nonpublic in nature, it did
not assert a compelling interest that would
justify excluding Summum's monument. The
only interest Pleasant Grove asserted is an
interest in promoting its history. The city's
failure to offer any reason why this interest is
compelling is sufficient
for Summum to meet its burden in
demonstrating a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits.
But even if we assume that Pleasant Grove's
stated interest is compelling, the city has also
failed to establish that the content-based
exclusion of Summum's monument is
"necessary, and narrowly drawn," to serve the
city's interest in promoting its history. As the
Supreme Court has explained, defining a
governmental interest this narrowly (i.e., the
promotion of the city's history in this
particular park) turns the effect of the
regulation into the governmental interest.
Furthermore, the city may not use content-
based restrictions to advance a particular
ideology. The city may further its interest in
promoting its own history by a number of
means, but not by restricting access to a
public forum traditionally committed to
public debate and the free exchange of ideas.
In addition to the city's stated interest in
promoting its history, the 2004 city resolution
governing monuments in the park contains
aesthetic and safety justifications for the
speech restriction. Cities have substantial
interests in the aesthetic appearance of their
property. To further these interests, Pleasant
Grove may pass a reasonable content-neutral
resolution regulating the time, manner, or
place of speech in the park. For example, it
could ban all permanent displays of an
expressive nature by private individuals.
Here, however, the city has furthered its
objectives by passing a content-based
resolution, which excludes all speech that
does not meet its historical relevance criteria;
the resolution is therefore subject to strict
scrutiny. We need not decide whether the
city's interests in aesthetics and safety are
compelling because the resolution is not
narrowly tailored to achieve its stated
interests. The city has not offered any reason
why monuments with its preferred historical
content will preserve park space and reduce
safety hazards more effectively than
monuments containing other content. Rather,
the distinction between monuments with
particular historical content and monuments
lacking this content "bears no relationship
whatsoever" to the resolution's stated
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interests in aesthetics and safety. The city
may not burden speech that does not present
the danger the regulation seeks to address:
"Where at all possible, government must
curtail speech only to the degree necessary to
meet the particular problem at hand, and must
avoid infringing on speech that does not pose
the danger that has prompted regulation."
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 265 (1986).
Summum's monument is similar in size,
material, and appearance to the Ten
Commandments monument already displayed
in the park. The city's exclusion of the
monument based on its content cannot be
justified by an interest in aesthetics or safety.
Because Pleasant Grove has not demonstrated
that application of its historical relevance
criteria is more likely than not to be justified
by its stated interests, we conclude that
Summum has established a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits and
proceed to a determination of whether
Summum has satisfied its burden under the
remaining three factors necessary for a
preliminary injunction.
B. Irreparable Injury
The second factor we must consider in
determining whether Summum is entitled to a
preliminary injunction is whether Summum
will suffer irreparable harm if denied an
injunction. Deprivations of speech rights
presumptively constitute irreparable harm for
purposes of a preliminary injunction: "The
loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 373, (1976). For this reason,
we have assumed irreparable injury when
plaintiffs are deprived of their commercial
speech rights even though restrictions on
commercial speech are subject to intermediate
scrutiny, not strict scrutiny as in the case
before us. If we can assume irreparable harm
in the context of commercial speech, we can
surely assume irreparable harm when the
government deprives an individual of speech
in a traditional public forum subject to the
highest scrutiny. Given the character of the
deprivation in this case (i.e., exclusion from a
traditional public forum), we hold that
Summum has established it will suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction is denied.
C. Balance of Harms
Next, we consider whether the First
Amendment injury to Summum outweighs
any prospective injury to Pleasant Grove in
the event the injunction is granted. Pleasant
Grove argues that it will suffer substantial
harm because, if Summum is allowed to
display its monument, the city will be
inundated with requests from other
individuals and the park will be flooded with
monuments. But the city's potential harm
must be weighed against Summum's actual
First Amendment injury. The record contains
no evidence to support Pleasant Grove's
contention that an injunction in this case will
prompt an endless number of applications for
permanent displays in the park. The city's
speculative harm cannot outweigh a First
Amendment injury, especially because
Summum has established a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits. We
therefore hold that Summum has made a
strong showing with regard to the balance of
harms.
D. Public Interest
Lastly, we consider whether granting the
injunction would be contrary to the public
interest. We have held that preliminary
injunctions which further plaintiffs' free
speech rights are not adverse to the public
interest. Because an injunction requiring the
city to permit the display of Summum's
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monument will further free speech rights, the
injunction is clearly in the public interest.
CONCLUSION
We hold that Summum has met its burden
under all four factors necessary for a
preliminary injunction and has made the
strong showing required under the heightened
standard for disfavored injunctions.
[REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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SUMMUM, a corporate sole and church, Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
PLEASANT GROVE CITY, Defendant-Apellee
Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit
August 24, 2007
JUDGES: Before TACHA, Chief Judge, KELLY, HENRY, BRISCOE, LUCERO , MURPHY,
HARTZ, O'BRIEN, MCCONNELL, TYMKOVICH, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit
Judges. LUCERO, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing. McCONNELL, J., joined by
GORSUCH, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing. TACHA, J., response to dissent from denial
of rehearing.
OPINION
ORDER
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
These matters are before the court on two
separate petitions for rehearing, both with en
banc suggestions, filed by the appellees. The
petitions were filed separately and
correspond to the two opinions issued in
these appeals on April 17, 2007.
The requests for panel rehearing are denied
by the original panel which decided these
cases.
The en banc petitions were transmitted to all
of the judges of the court who are in regular
active service. A poll was requested.
Through an equally divided vote, the
decisions of the panel will stand. See Fed. R.
App. P. 35(a); 10th Cir. R. 35.5 (noting that
a majority of the active judges of the court
may order rehearing en banc). Accordingly,
the en banc requests are denied. Judges
Lucero, O'Brien, McConnell , Tymkovich,
Gorsuch and Holmes would grant rehearing
en banc. Judges Lucero and McConnell
have filed dissents to the denial. They are
attached and incorporated in this order.
Judge Gorsuch has joined in Judge
McConnell's dissent. Judge Tacha , writing
separately, has responded. That response is
also incorporated in this order.
Dissent by Lucero, McConnell, Tacha
LUCERO , J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc.
Because the panel's opinion will leave our
circuit unnecessarily entangled in future
review of time, place, and manner
restrictions, and because in my judgment the
panel's opinion incorrectly decides the
question of the nature of the forum involved
in cases of this type, I respectfully dissent
from the denial of rehearing en banc.
Conceptually, it is important to distinguish
between transitory and permanent speech.
As I see it, not unlike most public parks in
America in which permanent monuments
have been placed, the cases before us
involve limited public fora. In limited public
fora, local governments may make content-
based determinations about what
monuments to allow in such space, but may
not discriminate as to viewpoint.
As an initial matter, I agree with the panel
that these monuments do not constitute
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government speech. Under the Wells
framework, the government must have
exercised some control over the form and
content of the speech before the fact, not
merely accepted it after the fact. Wells v.
City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132,
1141-43 (10th Cir. 2001).... In these cases,
the private parties conceived the message
and design of the monuments without any
government input, thus the speech must be
considered private. See Summum v. City of
Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1004-06 (10th Cir.
2002). . . . It follows that these cases
necessarily implicate government regulation
of private speech.
Whether government regulation of private
speech violates the First Amendment
depends on context. Courts engage in forum
analysis to determine whether the speaker
acts in a traditional public forum, a
designated public forum, or a nonpublic
forum, and it is in this analysis that I differ
with the panel. In identifying the type of
forum involved, we first consider the
government property at issue and the type of
access sought. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Def & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985); City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1001.
Only after the type of forum is identified do
we ask whether it is public or nonpublic in
nature. Because the government property
involved in these cases consists of the city
parks, and the access sought is the
installation of permanent monuments, the
panel correctly concludes that the relevant
forum consists of permanent monuments in
the city parks. See Summum v. Pleasant
Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1050 (10th Cir.
2007); Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d
1263, 1269 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007). In the next
step of the forum analysis, however, the
panel asserts that the relevant forum is the
entire park, regardless of the type of access
sought. Pleasant Grove, 483 F.3d at 1050;
Duchesne, 482 F.3d at 1269. The panel's
claim that access "is relevant in defining the
forum, but ... does not determine the nature
of that forum," id. at 1269 n.1, confuses the
forum analysis. Only by defining the forum
with reference to the access sought can a
court determine the nature of that forum. See
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801. In Perry
Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass 'n, a case which the panel cites, the
Supreme Court first narrowed the forum to
the mail delivery system within a school,
and only then did it consider the nature of
this forum; it did not simply conclude that
schools in general are public fora. 460 U.S.
37, 49 (1983). Perry also held that a court
may make conceptual distinctions in
defining the forum, even if there are no
physical barriers. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at
801 ("Perry ... examined the access sought
by the speaker and defined the forum as a
school's internal mail system and the
teachers' mailboxes, notwithstanding that an
'internal mail system' lacks a physical
situs.") (citation omitted). As in Perry and
Cornelius, Summum seeks access to a
particular means of communication, but the
nature of the forum necessarily hinges both
on the method of communication and on the
location.
The panel gives great weight to the
conception that city parks are "quintessential
public forums," see Perry, 460 U.S. at 45,
but in my view, permanent displays do not
fall within the set of uses for which parks
have traditionally been held open to the
public. In Perry, the Court noted that parks
are "places which by long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to
assembly and debate," and "which have
immemorially been held in trust for the use
of the public, and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions." Id.
(quotation omitted) (emphasis added). . . . In
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short, a park is a traditional public forum
when access is sought to it for temporary
speech and assembly, such as protests or
concerts, but it hardly follows that parks
have been held open since time immemorial
for the installation of statues of Balto the
Husky or the sword-wielding King Jagiello,
to note two of the more popular attractions
in New York City's Central Park.
I recognize that there is some disagreement
among our sister circuits on this point, but
courts consistently have given special
consideration to the issue of displays
installed on public land....
In my view a park is not a traditional public
forum insofar as the placement of
monuments is concerned, but that still leaves
the question of whether it is a designated
public forum or a nonpublic forum.
Although there is a disagreement among our
sister circuits regarding the categorization of
limited public fora, this circuit and recent
Supreme Court opinions have treated limited
public fora as a species of nonpublic fora.
See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch.,
533 U.S. 98, 106-107 (2001); City of Ogden,
297 F.3d at 1002 n.4; Callaghan, 130 F.3d
at 914. In the present cases, the city
governments have not allowed the kind of
"general access" or "indiscriminate use" of
park property that is a hallmark of a
designated public forum. Summum v.
Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 915 n.13 (10th
Cir. 1997) (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at
803; Perry, 460 U.S. at 47). Instead, they
have "create[d] a channel for a specific or
limited type of expression where one did not
previously exist," Child Evangelism
Fellowship, 457 F.3d at 382, and have thus
established limited public fora. As discussed
supra, the right to install permanent
monuments did not previously exist in these
parks, and in these cases the cities have
allowed only "selective access to some
speakers or some types of speech in a
nonpublic forum." Callaghan, 130 F.3d at
916. Here, the cities have permitted a few
monuments to be erected for specific
purposes-in the case of Pleasant Grove, to
memorialize the city's history, and in the
case of Duchesne, to honor service groups.
Having created limited public fora, the cities
may make reasonable content-based, but
viewpoint-neutral, decisions as to who may
install monuments in the parks. Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 806.
There are some indications that the cities
engaged in impermissible viewpoint
discrimination by denying Summum access
to the limited public fora, and the need for
further briefing and argument on this point
is one reason why en banc proceedings are
necessary. More importantly, however, the
panel has given an unnatural reading to the
traditional public forum doctrine, and binds
the hands of local governments as they
shape the permanent character of their
public spaces. Although these governments
may enact time, place, and manner
restrictions that will give them some control
over monuments in their parks, they now
must proceed on the basis of the panel's
faulty legal reasoning. More troubling is that
such restrictions will undoubtedly be
challenged in court and reviewed under a
strict scrutiny standard. The panel decision
forces cities to choose between banning
monuments entirely, or engaging in costly
litigation where the constitutional deck is
stacked against them. Because I believe the
panel's legal conclusions are incorrect, and
that its decisions will impose unreasonable
burdens on local governments in this circuit,
I would grant rehearing en banc.
McCONNELL, J, joined by GORSUCH, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc.
These opinions hold that managers of city
parks may not make reasonable, content-
based judgments regarding whether to allow
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the erection of privately-donated monuments
in their parks. If they allow one private party
to donate a monument or other permanent
structure, judging it appropriate to the park,
they must allow everyone else to do the
same, with no discretion as to content-
unless their reasons for refusal rise to the
level of "compelling" interests. See
Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263,
1274 (10th Cir. 2007); Summum v. Pleasant
Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1054 (10th Cir.
2007). . . . This means that Central Park in
New York, which contains the privately
donated Alice in Wonderland statute, must
now allow other persons to erect Summum's
"Seven Aphorisms," or whatever else they
choose (short of offending a policy that
narrowly serves a "compelling"
governmental interest). Every park in the
country that has accepted a VFW memorial
is now a public forum for the erection of
permanent fixed monuments; they must
either remove the war memorials or brace
themselves for an influx of clutter.
Significantly, the religious nature of the
donated monuments is not relevant to the
free speech question (though it would be to
an Establishment Clause challenge). These
cases happen to involve Ten
Commandments monuments, but it could
work the other way. A city that accepted the
donation of a statue honoring a local hero
could be forced, under the panel's rulings, to
allow a local religious society to erect a Ten
Commandments monument-or for that
matter, a cross, a nativity scene, a statue of
Zeus, or a Confederate flag.
With all due respect to the panel, this
conclusion is unsupported by Supreme
Court precedent. None of the cases cited
supports this proposition. By tradition and
precedent, city parks-as "traditional public
forums"-must be open to speeches,
demonstrations, and other forms of
transitory expression. But neither the logic
nor the language of these Supreme Court
decisions suggests that city parks must be
open to the erection of fixed and permanent
monuments expressing the sentiments of
private parties. By their policies or actions,
governments may create designated public
forums with respect to fixed monuments,
but-contrary to these opinions-the mere
status of the property as a park does not
make it so.
It is plain that the cities in these cases did
not create designated public forums for the
erection of permanent monuments in their
parks. In the Duchesne case, the Ten
Commandments monument is apparently the
only fixed monument in the park. In
Pleasant Grove, the other permanent
structures and monuments "relate to or
commemorate Pleasant Grove's pioneer
history." 483 F.3d at 1047. In neither case
did the city, by word or deed, invite private
citizens to erect monuments of their own
choosing in these parks. It follows that any
messages conveyed by the monuments they
have chosen to display are "government
speech," and there is no "public forum" for
uninhibited private expression.
In Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005),
the Supreme Court considered a nearly
identical monument donated by the Fraternal
Order of Eagles to the State of Texas and
displayed under analogous circumstances.
Without dissent on this point, the Court
unhesitatingly concluded the monument was
a state display, and applied Establishment
Clause doctrines applicable to government
speech. Id. at 692 (calling the monument
"Texas' display"). Various courts of appeals
have reached the same conclusion on similar
facts. ACLU Nebraska Foundation v. City of
Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772, 778 (8th Cir.
2005) (Eagles monument "installed . . . by
the City" and counted as "City's display");
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Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 176 (5th
Cir. 2003) (Eagles monument belonged to
the state)....
Our own leading precedent on government
speech confirms these holdings. Wells v.
City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132
(10th Cir. 2001), involved a temporary
holiday display, which was on municipal
property and co-sponsored by the city and
private businesses; the display included a
large sign on city property thanking private
donors for their contributions to the city's
holiday display. The Court concluded that
the message conveyed by this sign was
government speech. The city, we reasoned,
chose to erect the sign for its own purposes,
the city controlled the content of the sign,
and it determined when, where, and how the
sign would be displayed. 257 F.3d at 1141-
42. Wells employed a four-part analysis
derived from the Eight Circuit's Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of
Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000), which
involved the asserted right of the Missouri
KKK to sponsor a segment of All Things
Considered on National Public Radio. In
both Wells and Knights, the governmental or
private character of the speech was in doubt
because "ownership" could not be clearly
established. Did the holiday decor belong to
the city or to the private donors in Wells?
Did the sponsorship message written by the
KKK belong to that organization or to the
public employee who broadcast it statewide
on a state radio station?
The instant cases are easier than Wells,
because ownership of the "speech" in these
cases is clear: the Ten Commandments
monument in Duchesne was donated by the
Cole family to the City of Duchesne, and the
Ten Commandments monument in Pleasant
Grove was donated by the Fraternal Order or
Eagles to the City of Pleasant Grove. At the
relevant time, the cities owned the
monuments, maintained them, and had full
control over them. But even if ownership
were not clear, the second and fourth prongs
of the Wells test would nonetheless be
dispositive: The cities exercised total
"control" over the monuments, 257 F.3d at
1141, and they bore "ultimate
responsibility" for the monuments' contents
and upkeep. Indeed, because the cities
owned the monuments, they could have
removed them, destroyed them, modified
them, remade them, or (following state law
procedures for disposition of public
property) sold them at any time. Indeed, the
City of Duchesne attempted to do just that-
sell the monument along with the plot of
land on which it sits. See 482 F.3d at 1266-
67. Cf Serra v. U.S. General Servs. Admin.,
847 F.2d 1045, 1049 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding
that when an artist donates or sells a piece of
art to the government for public display, the
artist loses control over the artwork).
The only difference from Wells is that in the
Summum cases, the cities did not design
these monuments. The cities, however,
accepted the statues, treated them as public
property, and displayed them for their own
purposes on public land. The cities were
under no obligation to accept the statues,
and could have objected to their content.
When they accepted donation of the
monuments and displayed them on public
land, the cities embraced the messages as
their own. Similarly, Duchesne and Pleasant
Grove controlled the placement of the
statues, just as in Wells Denver bore
"ultimate responsibility for the content of
the display." 257 F.3d at 1142.
Once we recognize that the monuments
constitute government speech, it becomes
clear that the panel's forum analysis is
misguided. Viewpoint- and sometimes
content-neutrality are required when the
government regulates speech in public
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forums, but the government's "own
speech . . . is controlled by different
principles." Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
834 (1995). Specifically, "when the State is
the speaker, it may make content-based
choices." Id. at 833. See also Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991). The
government may adopt whatever message it
chooses-subject, of course, to other
constitutional constraints, such as those
embodied in the Establishment Clause-and
need not alter its speech to accommodate the
views of private parties. Downs v. Los
Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003,
1013 (9th Cir. 2000).... In other words, just
because the cities have opted to accept
privately financed permanent monuments
does not mean they must allow other private
groups to install monuments of their own
choosing.
Other circuits have reached this conclusion
in similar cases. See Tucker v. City of
Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir. 2005)
("Courts have generally refused to protect
on First Amendment grounds the placement
of objects on public property where the
objects are permanent or otherwise not
easily moved.")....
This does not mean that the Ten
Commandments monuments in Duchesne
and Pleasant Grove are immune to First
Amendment challenge. Rather, as
government speech, they may be challenged
by appropriate plaintiffs under the
Establishment Clause, as applied to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Their validity would depend on details of
their context and history, in accordance with
the Supreme Court's recent decisions in
McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844
(2005), and Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S.
677 (2005). We have no occasion here to
speculate on the outcome of any such
litigation.
The panels' decisions in these cases,
however, are incorrect as a matter of
doctrine and troublesome as a matter of
practice. I realize that en banc proceedings
are a major investment of time and judicial
resources, and that we cannot en banc every
case that errs. But the error in this case is
sufficiently fundamental and the
consequences sufficiently disruptive that the
panel decisions should be corrected.
TACHA, J., response to dissent from denial
of rehearing en banc.
Throughout my judicial career, I have been
loath to write separately because I firmly
believe that an intermediate court of appeals
should speak with as much clarity and
consensus as possible. I reluctantly take the
unprecedented step of responding to the
dissents from the denial of rehearing en banc
because, left unanswered, the dissents could
lead a reader to conclude that these cases
present unresolved issues that are properly
raised and appropriately addressed on these
facts. In particular, I write to emphasize that
these cases do not raise novel or unsettled
questions regarding government speech. Nor
do the panel decisions suggest that, when
cities display permanent private speech on
public property, they necessarily open the
floodgates to any and all private speech in a
comparable medium. Rather, the decisions
follow well-established First Amendment
precedent requiring that cities regulate
private speech in public forums equally.
Because the opinions contain clear
discussions of the legal authority on which
they rely, I need not respond at length to the
allegation that they are unsupported by
Supreme Court precedent. I need only say
that the Supreme Court has never
distinguished between transitory and
permanent expression for purposes of forum
analysis. In fact, this distinction, so crucial
to the reasoning of both dissents, lacks the
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support of both precedent and logic. If a city
allows a private message to be heard in a
public park, why would the permanent
nature of the expression limit the First
Amendment scrutiny we apply?
As Supreme Court precedent makes clear,
the type of speech does not, and should not,
determine the nature of the forum. See City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993). . . . If a city
wishes to regulate the number of permanent
private displays in a public forum, it may do
so through reasonable content-neutral
regulations governing the time, manner, or
place of such speech. See id. at 429-30 ("It
is the absence of a neutral justification for its
selective ban on newsracks that prevents the
city from defending its newsrack policy as
content neutral."); see also Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 761 (1995)....
Judge McConnell's dissent would have us
ignore these well-established forum
principles when the government does not
"by word or deed" create a designated
public forum for permanent private
expression. Dissent at 3. In this view, if the
government has not created a designated
public forum, its acceptance alone turns
private speech into government speech.
More important, under this approach,
government acceptance of the physical
medium of speech, not the message, is
sufficient. This approach is an
unprecedented, and dangerous, extension of
the government speech doctrine. To make
government ownership of the physical
vehicle for the speech a threshold question
would turn essentially all government-
funded speech into govenment speech. But
this would be an absurd result. No one
thinks The Great Gatsby is government
speech just because a public school provides
its students with the text. This is because the
speech conveyed by the physical text
remains private speech regardless of
government ownership.
Although a public school is engaging in
speech activity when it selects the text, its
ability to do so is based on a different line of
Supreme Court cases recognizing the
government's ability to make content-based
judgments when it acts in particular roles
(e.g., educator, librarian, broadcaster, and
patron of the arts). We note this distinction
in both opinions. Summum v. Pleasant
Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1052 n.4 (10th
Cir. 2007); Summum v. Duchesne City, 482
F.3d 1263, 1269 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007). In
light of this precedent, the City of New
York, acting as a patron of the arts, need not
worry about having to erect all manner of
structures based on the installation of Alice
in Wonderland and other works of art in
Central Park. We cannot, however, extend
the reasoning of these Supreme Court
decisions to allow the government to make
content-based decisions concerning all
permanent private speech in a public forum.
As the panel decisions explain, the cities in
these two cases were acting as regulators of
private speech and not, for example, as
patrons of the arts.
In short, the government does not speak just
because it owns the physical object that
conveys the speech. Instead, as the Supreme
Court has explained, the appropriate inquiry
is whether the government controls the
content of the speech at issue, that is,
whether the message is a government-
crafted message. See, e.g., Johanns v.
Livestock Marketing Ass 'n, 544 U.S. 550,
560 (2005). ... The four-factor approach to
government speech that we adopted in Wells
v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d
1132, 1140-42 (10th Cir. 2001), reflects the
Supreme Court's focus on whether the
message is the government's own. But
contrary to Judge McConnell's dissent, we
said nothing in Wells that suggests our
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government speech inquiry turns on the
ownership of the physical medium
conveying the speech at issue. Indeed, the
second Wells factor cited by the dissent is
not about controlling the physical medium
of the speech, but about controlling the
content of that speech. See id. at 1142. A
city's control over a physical monument
does not therefore transform the message
inscribed on the monument into city speech.
If this were true, the government could
accept any private message as its own
without subjecting the message to the
political process, a result that would shield
the govermment from First Amendment
scrutiny and democratic accountability.
This is in fact the result that Judge
McConnell's dissent advocates, and it is
most apparent in the dissent's equation of
government endorsement in the
Establishment Clause context with
government speech under the Free Speech
Clause. Citing Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S.
677 (2005), the dissent emphasizes that the
Supreme Court has characterized a Ten
Commandments monument under analogous
circumstances as a "state display" for
purposes of the Establishment Clause. See
id. at 692 (holding that "Texas' display of
this monument" did not violate the
Establishment Clause). The simplest
response to this observation is that a state's
display of a monument is not necessarily
state speech; if the government displays a
private religious message, its display may be
challenged under the Establishment Clause
regardless of whether the government
adopted the monument's message as its
own. See Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d at
1047 n.2 (explaining that the government
may violate the Establishment Clause
without directly speaking). Van Orden and
the circuit cases cited by the dissent stand
for the simple proposition that a city's
acceptance and display of a privately
donated monument with religious content
may constitute state action violating the
Establishment Clause. But none of these
cases supports the proposition that, when the
state acts to accept a monument, it
automatically turns the message that
monument conveys into state speech.
On a broader note, because the
Establishment and Free Speech Clauses
serve different purposes, discussions of state
action in Establishment Clause cases are not
germane to a determination of when the
government speaks for purposes of the Free
Speech Clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has analyzed government speech differently
in the context of free speech, recognizing
the differing theoretical justifications
underlying the Establishment and Free
Speech Clauses....
Thus, in the context of the Free Speech
Clause, we cannot extend the government
speech doctrine any further. To extend
government speech to the context before us
would allow the government to discriminate
among private speakers in a public forum by
claiming a preferred message as its own.
Moreover, because the Establishment Clause
would apply only to religious expression, an
expanded government speech doctrine
would effectively remove the government's
regulation of permanent non-religious
speech from all First Amendment scrutiny.
Such an approach is clearly contrary to
established First Amendment principles. See
Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose,
361 F.3d 786, 795-96 (4th Cir. 2004). . . .
Because this approach to government speech
is unsupported by Supreme Court precedent
and the purposes of the First Amendment,
this Court may not consider it. And because
the relevant law and its application are clear,
en banc consideration is inappropriate.
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"With the Commandments,
Must City Make Room?"
Washington Post
April 1, 2008
Robert Barnes
The Supreme Court said yesterday that it
will decide whether a city's decision to
place a monument to the Ten
Commandments in a public park means it
also must make room for the display of other
directives purportedly sent from above.
In this case, [Pleasant Grove v. Summum,]
a religious group that operates from a
pyramid outside Salt Lake City wants to
place what it calls the Seven Aphorisms in a
city park, contending that the words are
lesser-known instructions that Moses
received from God.
Pleasant Grove City, Utah, said no. But a
federal appellate court has agreed with the
religious group Summum-founded in 1975
by its leader, Summum "Corky" Ra-that if
a city accepts the Ten Commandments, it
opens itself to requests from others and may
not discriminate.
Unlike the Supreme Court's most recent
cases over government display of the Ten
Commandments, the Utah case is a free-
speech challenge that does not involve the
Constitution's provision on establishment of
religion. It will be heard next term.
Pleasant Grove City, one of several Utah
municipalities that received monument
requests from Summum, is represented by
Jay Sekulow of the American Center for
Law and Justice.
It said in a statement that letting the lower
court's ruling stand "could force local
governments across the country either to
dismantle a host of monuments, memorials,
and other displays including long-standing
patriotic and historical displays" or open up
the public spaces "to all comers."
The city says that once it accepted the Ten
Commandments from the Fraternal Order of
Eagles in 1971, the display became
"government speech" rather than private
speech, and it does not have to be balanced
with other viewpoints.
"In short, accepting a Statue of Liberty does
not compel a government to accept a Statue
of Tyranny," the city's brief said, nor would
erecting a monument to a war hero allow the
display of a monument denouncing war.
But a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 10th Circuit in Denver said the city did
not come up with the monument to the Ten
Commandments, a private group did. Its
placement in a public park, a traditional
venue for public speech, meant that
government could not discriminate if other
groups wished to display their beliefs. The
full appeals court split 6 to 6 on the issue,
which meant the panel's ruling held.
Washington lawyers Pamela Harris and
Walter Dellinger, representing Summum,
urged the court not to review what they said
was a "narrow and fact-specific decision"
and said there is no reason to believe that "a
plague of offensive monuments will clutter
public spaces throughout the country" if the
ruling is allowed to stand.
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"No Rehearing in Summum Case"
Deseret Morning News
August 25, 2007
Geoffrey Fattah
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver
has denied a request for a larger rehearing
on the issue of the Summum religious
group's ability to erect a display next to
displays of the Ten Commandments in the
city parks of Duchesne and Pleasant Grove.
In a published opinion issued Friday
evening, 10th Circuit judges were split 6-to-
6 on whether to grant requests by Duchesne
and Pleasant Grove cities to have all 12 of
the 10th Circuit judges rehear the case.
Called an "En Banc" hearing, a panel of all
12 appellate judges can hear a case. Such a
decision carries some heavy legal weight,
which can impact other appellate courts
across the country.
A three-judge panel of the 10th Circuit
handed down a decision last April that
determined that members of Summum had a
right under the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution to erect a display of its Seven
Aphorisms next to displays of the Ten
Commandments.
The ruling was similar to one the 10th
Circuit issued in 2002 against Ogden City,
forcing the city to relocate its display of the
Ten Commandments onto nearby private
property. All three city displays were
donations from the Fraternal Order of Eagles
many years ago.
Friday's tie vote lets stand the appellate
court's decision
The group Summum claims its religion is
based on traditions dating back to the
ancient Egyptians.
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"Summum May Display Aphorisms"
Desert Morning News
April 21, 2007
Amy Choate-Nielsen
PLEASANT GROVE-A monument listing
the Seven Aphorisms of the Summum faith
could soon accompany a monument to the
Ten Commandments in Pioneer Park.
A ruling released Tuesday by the 10th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals says the group has
a right under the First Amendment to
display a monument in the park until a
lawsuit between the Summum faith and
Pleasant Grove city is resolved.
Now city officials must decide if they will
appeal the preliminary injunction, remove
their existing monument or do nothing.
"We're still trying to figure out what the
rationale behind the ruling was and what
exactly it was (the 10th U.S. Circuit Court)
ruled against," said Pleasant Grove Mayor
Mike Daniels. "Until we get those details,
we won't have an answer."
If the city does nothing, a new monument
representing the Summum philosophy could
appear in the park, which the city says has
been established to host historical relics that
are of significance to the city.
If the city appeals the process, the
preliminary injunction will not take effect
until a secondary decision is made. If the
city removes its monument, it is likely the
Summum group will no longer pursue its
lawsuit, said Summum attorney Brian
Barnard of the Utah Legal Clinic in Salt
Lake City.
"That changes the situation drastically
because our presentation is, if (Pleasant
Grove) is allowing one person to (display a
monument) in the city park, they can allow
everybody, but if they're not going to allow
everybody, that changes the landscape
dramatically," Barnard said. "It may well be
that Pleasant Grove says, 'We'll just take the
monument down,' but that's not my client's
desire. Their desire is to be able to put up
their monument and share their Seven
Aphorisms with the world just like the Ten
Commandments are shared with the world."
The Seven Aphorisms of the Summum
faith-which was founded in Utah in
1975-deal with the principles of
psychokinesis, correspondence, vibration,
opposition, rhythm, cause and effect and
gender. The philosophy also incorporates
modem mummification.
According to Daniels, the aphorisms are not
appropriate for the park because they do not
represent a connection to the community.
The Ten Commandments monument was
donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles,
whose members performed hours of service
for the city, Daniels said. If the city were to
remove the existing monument to avoid
erecting the aphorisms, Daniels said,
residents would likely be upset.
"I think there's already a sense of concern
from the majority of people in the area that
somehow their rights are being infringed
upon by a minority that's not even
represented here in the area, and I'd have to
agree with them from that perspective,"
Daniels said. "I think the community would
not react favorably."
The Summum group originally approached
Pleasant Grove in 2003 with the request that
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it be allowed to erect a monument. Pleasant
Grove denied the group's proposal, and a
lawsuit ensued in 2005.
The city is now joined with Duchesne,
which also has a Ten Commandments
monument in its city park, in a court battle
against the Summum group.
"My understanding is that (the lawsuit is),
for lack of a better word, a scavenger hunt
for Ten Commandments monuments in the
state, to try to have them removed," said
Edward White III, an attorney with the
Thomas More Law Center in Michigan, who
is representing Duchesne and Pleasant
Grove. "There were nine monuments on
public properties in Utah in the beginning,
and now there are only two left."
According to a Web site run by Summum,
the group believes the Seven Aphorisms
were received on a tablet by Moses before
he received the Ten Commandments. When
Moses saw the Israelites were not prepared
to accept the aphorisms, he broke the tablet
and revealed its principles to a select few,
they believe.
Although Barnard says the lawsuit has been
pending until now, a trial date is scheduled
to discuss the issue in September.
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"Judge Denies a Motion on Summum Display:
Religious Group's Battle Likely to Face a Bench Trial"
Deseret Morning News
February 2, 2006
Geoffrey Fattah
A monument declaring Summum's Seven
Aphorisms won't be coming to a Pleasant
Grove city park anytime soon.
During a hearing Wednesday, U.S. District
Judge Dee Benson denied a motion by
Summum for leave to erect their monument
next to an existing Ten Commandments
display.
The Salt Lake-based religious group is
currently locked in a legal battle with the
city of Pleasant Grove over the display. In a
federal suit, the group says it has a
constitutional right to erect its monument in
a park owned by the city. But city officials
say they have a long-standing, albeit
unwritten, policy of only allowing
monuments that pertain to the city's history
or by those with long-standing ties to the
Pleasant Grove community. They say
Summum lacks both of these.
Brian Barnard, attorney for Summum, said
the park is a traditional public forum and
that when the Fraternal Order of Eagles
donated the Ten Commandments monument
to the city around 1970, the group had only
been in Pleasant Grove two years. Barnard
said this challenges the city's long-standing
ties policy.
Barnard also pointed out that the city
accepted a Sunstone taken from the LDS
temple at Nauvoo, Ill., donated by a Pleasant
Grove resident. The stone is displayed in the
park, Barnard said.
Barnard argued that the city cannot be
selective about what monuments it accepts
based on the subject and cannot discriminate
if they disagree with the subject.
Benson admitted the city has an "uphill
road" in justifying the long-ties argument
but historic relevance is a larger issue. Last
year the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
displays of the Ten Commandments can be
allowed on government property as long as
the focus is on historic relevance, such as
among a display of historic monuments. The
Supreme Court ruled, however, that Ten
Commandments displays that focus on
religion are not allowed.
The comparison was made to Summum 's
similar suit against Ogden over a similar
monument outside the city's old City Hall.
That case went to the 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals, which overturned a lower court
ruling in favor of Ogden. The circuit court
ruled that Ogden's monument lacked
historic significance and the monument was
removed from city property and relocated
nearby on private property.
A third lawsuit filed against Duchesne is
pending before the 10th Circuit after city
officials there deeded the land under the
monument to a private citizen in an effort to
avoid legal controversy.
Benson said if Pleasant Grove can prove its
policy is "viewpoint neutral" then the city
would prevail.
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Attorney Francis Manion said there is a
difference between expressing viewpoints
verbally and erecting a permanent structure.
Manion said he believes the city can prove
that although the policy wasn't written, it
has been in place for decades.
Trying to have some sense of humor,
Benson asked both sides if they could
resolve the issue without his help. "Can you
settle this thing?" Benson said. "Maybe you
can let them have five commandments."
Outside court, Manion said the serious
reality is that the city and Summum are not
likely to find a settlement and that the case
is likely to go before Benson for a bench
trial.
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"'Aphorisms' in Pl. Grove?"
Deseret Morning News
September 16, 2003
Leigh Dethman
PLEASANT GROVE-Pleasant Grove
could avoid pending litigation by allowing a
Utah-based religious group to erect a
monument near the city's Ten
Commandments display, says an attorney
who has threatened the city with court
action.
The group, Summum, wants to display its
"Seven Aphorisms"-religious principles
that guide Summum's followers-in a
Pleasant Grove park where a Ten
Commandments monument has sat for more
than 30 years.
"We would like to erect a monument similar
in size and nature in that same city park,"
said Summum President Ammon Ra in a
letter to Pleasant Grove Mayor Jim Danklef.
"Displaying our aphorisms along with the
Ten Commandments would serve the public
good and make the world a better place."
Danklef said the city is still pondering
whether it will challenge demands to remove
the monument, but allowing Summum to
build a monument will not be part of the
decision. Summum officials had asked that
the city respond to its request by yesterday.
"We haven't answered them yet, but I don't
think we'll do that (let them build a
monument)," Danklef said. "We haven't
discussed it as a council. We think we've
got some things going for us."
The religious group, founded in 1975, has
sought to build monuments denoting their
Egyptian-based beliefs in other Utah cities
where Ten Commandments monuments
have figured into church-state separation
litigation, including Salt Lake City and
Ogden.
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver
ruled in 1997 in the Salt Lake case that the
Ten Commandments monument could stay
on public property surrounding the City-
County building if Summum was allowed to
erect its own monument. Salt Lake officials
instead moved the monument to private
land.
The group later filed suit against Ogden
after city officials rejected a request to allow
a "Seven Aphorisms" monument in a garden
that also displayed the Ten Commandments.
Ogden also chose to move its Ten
Commandments monument onto private
property.
Summum's attorney, Brian Barnard-who
has sent two letters to Pleasant Grove
officials threatening court action-said he
believes the religious group's request fits
into the concept the city attorney has
suggested as a defense for keeping the
monument. City attorney Christine Petersen
said last week that because the Ten
Commandments monument is in a park with
other memorials and displays honoring the
city's heritage, the city believes a court
challenge could be defeated. Barnard said
adding Summum's monument would
broaden the park's reach.
"A dispute over something like this does not
do any good for the city or for the people of
the city," Barnard said.
Pleasant Grove received its Ten
Commandments monument in 1971 from
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the Fraternal Order of Eagles. Terry Carlson,
a former president of the Pleasant Grove
Eagles chapter, said Barnard is making an
issue of something that really isn't such a
big deal.
"All he's doing is getting a whole bunch of
free publicity," Carlson said. "He has
nothing that he's expecting to gain out of
this, other than to have it moved."
Salt Lake City attorney Frank Mylar said he
is willing to help to keep the monument at
its current location, an inconspicuous city
park at 100 N. 100 East. Mylar is enlisting
the help of Francis Manion, senior counsel
at the American Center for Law and Justice.
Manion is considered an expert in
defense of public displays of
Commandments monuments.
the
Ten
Carlson believes that even if the city enlists
the help of national public interest law firms,
the whole tiff is a big waste of time.
"I think he (Barnard) ought to find
something better to do than go around
looking for monoliths that aren't hurting
anybody or anything," he said. "If he wants
to complain or protest about something, tell
him to protest about something that is
worthwhile. This (the Ten Commandments
monument) isn't hurting anybody. All it can
do is good."
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"Monuments in Cross Hairs: Attorney Aims
to Rid Public Lands of the Markers"
Deseret Morning News
July 9, 2003
By Laura Sanderson
PLEASANT GROVE-Attorney Brian
Barnard is out to rid city-owned land of
monuments containing the Ten
Commandments .. . if he can find them.
Barnard says a 1973 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals lawsuit indicates there are nine Ten
Commandments monuments in Utah-all
donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles
(FOE) in the late '60s and '70s.
As of Tuesday, Barnard had located eight.
His latest discovery sits inconspicuously
behind an antique shop in a Pleasant Grove
park at 100 N. 100 East.
"I wonder if Pleasant Grove felt slighted
because no one was picking on them,"
Barnard joked.
If that were true, a letter sent to Pleasant
Grove Mayor Jim Danklef on Tuesday-
threatening litigation if the stone monument
is not moved to private property-has
remedied the slight.
"It does come as a surprise to us," said City
Administrator Frank Mills. "We thought we
had it in a pretty prominent position."
"We are taking a look at the different
options of what we think will best represent
the citizens and feeling of Pleasant Grove,"
he added.
The letter represents the latest move in an
ongoing effort that started in 1994 to force
cities and counties to remove religious
emblems from public property. Proponents
say the effort is meant to enforce church and
state separation.
The effort initiated by the religious group
Summum-which sought to erect a
monument in Salt Lake City denoting their
Egyptian beliefs alongside one of the
donated Ten Commandment monuments-
has resulted in the removal of six public
monuments to private locations following
lawsuits and threatened litigation.
In 1997, the 10th Circuit ruled in the Salt
Lake case that the Ten Commandments
monument could stay on public property
only if Summum was allowed to erect its
own monument containing the faith's
"Seven Aphorisms," which include
principles of vibration, opposition and
psychokinesis.
Salt Lake moved its Ten Commandments
monument to private property instead. Two
years later, after a similar lawsuit, Ogden
did the same. Other cities, fearing litigation,
made pre-emptive moves.
"Our goal was to make certain that the Ten
Commandments would not become
something that would divide our
community," said Provo spokesman Mike
Mower.
Provo moved its monument from city-
owned Memorial Park to the corner of
Tabernacle Park, which is owned by The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
Millimeters away from the busy intersection
of Center Street and University Avenue, the
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monument is prominently displayed for
passing cars and pedestrians.
"We were thrilled to get the monument
placed in an area where it is more visible,"
Mower said.
Barnard, who is now working on behalf of
the Society of Separationists, said he also
hopes that people will pay attention to the
monuments ... as long as they aren't on city
land.
In Pleasant Grove, however, it appears most
people weren't even aware of the
monument.
"It's in Pleasant Grove?" asked Debbie
Wilkins, a parks and recreation employee
unfamiliar with the monument. Her reaction
is typical of most residents.
"Very, very few people know where it is at,"
said Scott Carlson, secretary for the Pleasant
Grove FOE aerie. "And if they look at it,
they wouldn't know what it is or where it
came from."
Carlson, who had few kind words for
Barnard, said his group is willing to display
the monument at the aerie but doesn't see a
conflict between church and state.
"We don't feel it's a religious thing,"
Carlson said. "The Ten Commandments rule
us all, no matter our religion."
Barnard begs to differ.
"For Pleasant Grove to be displaying a
commandment that says keep holy the
sabbath and you should have no God before
me-that tells me that Pleasant Grove is
supporting a particular religious thought."
And while Barnard searches for the elusive
ninth monument, some residents wonder
what his next targets might be. Perhaps
cities with religion-linked names like Nephi
or Moses Lake, Wash.?
"I guess it depends on which Moses they
were named after," Barnard responded.
Current status of eight Ten Commandment
monuments donated by the Fraternal Order
of Eagles:
* Ogden-lawsuit, moved to private
property
* Salt Lake-lawsuit, moved to private
property
* Murray-letter, moved to private
property
* Tooele-letter, moved to private
property
* Roy-letter, moved to private
property
* Provo-moved to private property
* West Valley City-always on private
property
* Pleasant Grove-letter, remains on
public property
* The location of a ninth monument
referred to in a 1973 10th Circuit Court
of Appeals ruling is currently unknown.
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Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville
and Davidson County, Tennessee
06-1595
Ruling Below: Crawford v. Metro. Gov't ofNashville & Davidson County, 211 Fed. Appx. 373,
(6th Cir. Tenn. 2006), cert. granted, Craiiford v. Nashville & Davidson County, 2008 U.S.
LEXIS 1102 (2008).
Plaintiff worked for Defendant for thirty years. In 2002, defendant commenced an investigation
into allegations of sexual harassment in the workplace. During the investigation, Plaintiff was
interviewed and told investigators that she had been sexually harassed. The investigation
concluded with a finding of inappropriate conduct, but no disciplinary action was taken.
Following the conclusion of the investigation, Plaintiff and two other employees who reported
harassment were fired. Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging unlawful retaliation for
her participation in the investigation. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendant, and the Sixth Circuit upheld the judgment.
Question Presented: Does the anti-retaliation provision of section 704(a) of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act protect a worker from being dismissed because she cooperated with her
employer's internal investigation of sexual harassment?
Vicky S. CRAWFORD, Plaintiff-Petitioner,
V.
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY,
Tennessee; Gene Hughes; Pedro Garcia, Defendants-Respondents.
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Decided November 14, 2006
PER CURIAM. Vicky S. Crawford, a
former employee of the Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson
County, Tennessee ("Metro"), appeals the
district court's grant of summary judgment
against her claims for retaliation under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII").
Because we find that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that Metro is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we
affirm the grant of summary judgment.
I
As this case is before us on an appeal of a
grant of summary judgment, we state the
facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. See Hopson v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 306 F.3d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 2002).
Vicky Crawford had worked for Metro for
thirty years before being fired in November
of 2002. Crawford alleges that the situation
that led to her firing arose in the fall of
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2001, when Metro hired Dr. Gene Hughes as
the employee relations director for the Metro
School District. As employee relations
director, Hughes was responsible for, inter
alia, investigating complaints of
discrimination. In May 2002, an attorney for
the Metro Legal Department contacted the
Human Resources Department after Jennifer
Bozeman, an attorney with Metro Legal,
learned from another Metro employee that
there were several employees within the
administrative offices that had expressed
concern about specific incidents of
inappropriate behavior by Hughes. Because
Hughes would normally have been
responsible for investigating complaints of
sexual harassment, this complaint was
instead brought to the attention of Dr. Pedro
Garcia, the director of schools. Metro then
assigned Veronica Frazier, the assistant
director of human resources, to investigate
the complaint. In carrying out the
investigation, Frazier contacted employees
who worked with Hughes in the Metro
administrative offices and asked them to
come to her office so that she could
interview them. One of the employees so
approached was Crawford.
In July 2002, Crawford went to the legal
department as requested and Frazier
questioned her about Hughes. Crawford told
the investigators that Hughes had sexually
harassed her and other employees.
According to Crawford, she believed that
she was exercising her rights under federal
law when she informed Frazier of Hughes's
actions. Frazier's investigation concluded
that Hughes had engaged in inappropriate
and unprofessional behavior, though not to
the extent of Crawford's allegations. It
appears that no disciplinary action was taken
against Hughes; the investigators did
recommend training and education for the
staff.
According to Crawford, during the
investigation, three employees made
statements that Hughes had engaged in
sexually inappropriate conduct, and after the
sexual harassment investigation, these three
employees were immediately investigated
on other grounds and all promptly
discharged. Crawford herself was terminated
in January 2003 after having been accused
of embezzlement and drug use, charges
which she states were "ultimately found to
be unfounded." In June 2003, Crawford filed
a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
alleging retaliation, and after receiving her
notice of right to sue, she brought this suit.
III
Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of [its]
employees . . . because [the employee] has
opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter
[("the opposition clause"], or because [the
employee] has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this subchapter [("the participation
clause")]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To
establish a prima facie case of unlawful
retaliation under Title VII, Crawford must
demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that: "(1) [she] engaged in activity
that Title VII protects; (2) defendant knew
that [she] engaged in this protected activity;
(3) the defendant subsequently took an
employment action adverse to the plaintiff;
(4) a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse
employment action exists." Abbott v. Crown
Motor Co., Inc., 348 F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir.
2003). Upon appeal, Crawford claims that
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her actions during the internal investigation
constitute both opposition to a practice made
unlawful by Title VII and participation in an
investigation under Title VII, and that she
therefore engaged in activity that Title VII
protects. As did the district court, we hold
that precedent compels a contrary
conclusion.
First, Crawford's actions do not constitute
opposition under the meaning of the
opposition clause. We have enumerated the
types of activities that constitute opposition
under Title VII: "complaining to anyone
(management, unions, other employees, or
newspapers) about allegedly unlawful
practices; refusing to obey an order because
the worker thinks it is unlawful under Title
VII; and opposing unlawful acts by persons
other than the employer-e.g., former
employers, union, and co-workers." Johnson
v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 579
(6th Cir. 2000). The general idea is that Title
VII "demands active, consistent 'Opposing'
activities to warrant . . . protection against
retaliation." Bell v. Safety Grooving and
Grinding, LP, 107 F. App'x 607, 610 (6th
Cir. 2004).
Crawford's actions consisted of cooperating
with Metro's investigation into Hughes by
appearing for questioning at the request of
Frazier and, in response to Frazier's
questions, relating unfavorable information
about Hughes. Crawford does not claim to
have instigated or initiated any complaint
prior to her participation in the investigation,
nor did she take any further action following
the investigation and prior to her firing. This
is not the kind of overt opposition that we
have held is required for protection under
Title VII.
Second, Crawford's participation in an
internal investigation initiated by Metro in
the absence of any pending EEOC charge is
not a protected activity under the
participation clause. We have held that
"Title VII protects an employee's
participation in an employer's internal
investigation into allegations of unlawful
discrimination where that investigation
occurs pursuant to a pending EEOC charge."
Abbott, 348 F.3d at 543. In Crawford's case,
however, no EEOC charge had been filed at
the time of the investigation or prior to her
firing; the investigation was internal and was
prompted by an informal internal statement.
Courts have generally held that the
participation clause does not protect "an
employee's participation 'in an employer's
internal, in-house investigation, conducted
apart from a formal charge with the EEOC';
at a minimum, an employee must have filed
a charge with the EEOC or otherwise
instigated proceedings under Title VII." Id.
Crawford argues that we should break from
the general trend requiring a formal EEOC
charge to have been filed or the machinery
of Title VII otherwise invoked before the
participation clause takes effect. Crawford
points to the Supreme Court's decision in
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775 (1998), which created an affirmative
defense against an employer's vicarious
liability for sexual harassment by its
employees when: (1) the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior,
and (2) the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Id. at
805-07. Crawford hypothesizes that after
Faragher, an employer could implement
formal sexual harassment policies and
reporting requirements, investigate
complaints made to management, and then
such investigations would serve as an
affirmative defense to vicarious liability
arising out of claims of sexual harassment.
294
She then argues that if the participation
clause does not protect participation in
internal investigations made in the absence
of an EEOC charge, employees called in
such investigations will know that they may
be fired if they testify negatively, and will
stay silent. She concludes that employers,
lacking corroborating witnesses, will not
take action to remedy sexual harassment,
while being simultaneously shielded from
vicarious liability by the Faragher
affirmative defense.
As an initial matter, this foreboding scenario
is predicated upon a lax reading of
Faragher. In order to be entitled to an
affirmative defense, an employer must
exercise "reasonable care." Id. Certainly, a
policy or practice of firing a person who
testified negatively during an investigation
into complaints of sexual harassment would
not be "reasonable." Courts have held that
an anti-harassment policy designed to deter
sexual harassment can help an employer
meet its burden as to the first element of the
Faragher test only if the policy is "both
reasonably designed and reasonably
effectual" and not administered "in bad
faith." See, e.g., Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d
388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999). A policy of firing
any witness that testified negatively during
an internal investigation would certainly
constitute bad faith; even an instance of an
allegedly unjustified firing would put the
Faragher defense at risk.
This court has stated that the purpose of
Title VII's participation clause "is to protect
access to the machinery available to seek
redress for civil rights violations and to
protect the operation of that machinery once
it has been engaged. Accordingly, any
activity by the employee prior to the
instigation of statutory proceedings is to be
considered pursuant to the opposition
clause." Booker v. Brown and Williamson
Tobacco Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th
Cir. 1989). The impact of Title VII on an
employer can be onerous. By protecting
only participation in investigations that
occur relative to EEOC proceedings, the
participation clause prevents the burden of
Title VII from falling on an employer who
proactively chooses to launch an internal
investigation. Expanding the purview of the
participation clause to cover such
investigations would simultaneously
discourage them. We will not alter this limit
delineated by the language of Title VII and
recognized by this court and others.
IV
Accordingly, for the reasons set out above,
we AFFIRM the district court's grant of
summary judgment.
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"Supreme Court to Hear Key
Anti-Discrimination Case"
Los Angeles Times
January 19, 2008
David G. Savage
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court
agreed Friday to decide whether employees
are protected from being fired or demoted if
they cooperate with an internal investigation
of a supervisor who is accused of
discrimination.
Under federal law, it is illegal to
discriminate against employees based on
their race, religion or sex. The law also
protects from retaliation workers who file a
federal civil rights lawsuit or a federal
discrimination complaint.
But several lower courts have ruled recently
that this protection does not extend to
employees who participate in internal
investigations by private companies or
public agencies, but do not file their own
lawsuits or federal complaints.
This creates a huge gap in the law, civil
rights lawyers say, particularly for problems
such as sexual harassment in the workplace.
The high court itself advised employers they
should encourage workers to confidentially
report examples of harassment.
Yet some judges have ruled the law does not
protect employees who make such reports.
The justices voted to hear an appeal from
Vicky S. Crawford, a longtime school
payroll employee in Nashville who was fired
shortly after agreeing to speak to a school
official who was investigating allegations of
sexual harassment by a supervisor.
Although Crawford was not the first to raise
the allegations, she and several other women
told the investigator of crude comments and
lewd gestures that they said Gene Hughes
made. She reported that Hughes had "put his
crotch up to [her] window" and that he once
"grabbed her head and pulled it to his
crotch."
Despite these reports, Hughes, the school
district's employee relations director, was
not disciplined. But soon after the
investigation ended, Crawford and the two
other employees who reported his alleged
behavior were fired. School officials
accused Crawford, a 30-year veteran, of
"neglect of duty" and drug use.
Crawford sued the Metropolitan
Government of Nashville for violating her
rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
She contended her firing was triggered by
her reports of sexual harassment by Hughes.
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission approved her suit.
But a federal judge and the U.S. Court of
Appeals in Cincinnati dismissed her suit
before a trial, saying she was not protected
from being fired for cooperating with the
internal probe.
The appellate judges said Crawford had not
filed a formal complaint of discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. She was merely a witness to
the harassment, not the prime victim, they
said. They reasoned that the law protects
employees only when they file official
charges, not when they cooperate with an
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employer's internal investigation.
U.S. Solicitor General Paul D. Clement
joined with Crawford's lawyers in urging
the court to hear her appeal and to rule in her
favor. Internal investigations are "an integral
part" of enforcing the civil rights law in the
workplace, he said. These investigations will
not work unless "employees who give
candid testimony are protected against
retaliation," he said.
The justices are expected to hear Crawford
v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville in
late April and issue a ruling by July.
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"High Court Hasn't Closed
the Book on Retaliation"
The National Law Journal
June 4, 2008
Marcia Coyle
Despite two solid victories for workers in
job bias cases in the Roberts Court recently
and what some consider "surprising" votes
by the two newest justices in those cases,
plaintiffs' and management attorneys
hesitate to predict a significant shift away
from the U.S. Supreme Court's generally
pro-employer stance of recent years.
But what is significant and evident from the
decisions on May 27 is that all but two of
the justices now accept that protection from
retaliation for making a discrimination
claim-even if not mentioned in the text of a
statute-is encompassed by the express right
in federal civil rights laws to be free from
discrimination. CBOCS West v. Humphries,
No. 06-1431; Gomez-Perez v. Potter, No.
06-1321.
"It's definitely true that the perception in
past years has been the Court is more hostile
to plaintiffs, but the one employment area
where that can't be argued now is
retaliation," said employment law scholar
Melissa Hart of the University of Colorado
School of Law.
Employers had argued in the two recent
retaliation cases that the justices had "let
loose the beast" with their 2006 decision in
Burlington Northern v. White, 548 U.S. 53,
espousing a sweeping view of the anti-
retaliation provision in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and that they should go
no further, noted Hart.
"But the underlying message in the two
decisions is that the retaliation claim is part
and parcel of the anti-discrimination right,"
she said.
AFFIRMING PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS
The high court has had several opportunities
now to curtail retaliation rights by job-bias
plaintiffs but either has expanded or
affirmed them, agreed management attorney
Joel Rice, of counsel to the Chicago office
of Atlanta's Fisher & Phillips. "It does seem
as if the Court has had almost a special
solicitude for people bringing claims of
retaliation," he said.
This could be just one of those "anomalies"
where there happens to be a flurry of cases
that go one way, Rice said.
"But these decisions indicate the court takes
seriously an individual's right to bring a
complaint."
And while both sides weigh the practical
impact of the decisions issued on May 27,
they also note the court is not done with this
area of employment law. A closely watched
retaliation case already has been docketed
for argument next term. It goes to the heart
of employers' efforts to avoid or respond to
discrimination claims: their internal
investigations of discrimination complaints.
Crawford v. Metropolitan Govt of
Nashville, No. 06-1595.
"I'm hesitant to say I'm confident about the
next retaliation case," said employee counsel
Lisa Banks, partner at Washington's Katz,
Marshall & Banks. "I don't know what these
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decisions portend for the future, but they
give us hope it's not a lost cause which was
everyone's fear about the Roberts Court."
In the CBOCS West decision, a 7-2 majority
held that Section 1981 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, which bars race discrimination
in the making and enforcing of contracts,
encompasses retaliation claims. And, in
Gomez-Perez, a 6-3 majority ruled that the
provision covering federal employees in the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act also
prohibits retaliation against federal
employees who complain of age
discrimination. Both laws were silent on
retaliation.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justice
Samuel A. Alito Jr. voted with the majority
in CBOCS; the only dissenters were justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. Alito
wrote the majority opinion in Gomez-Perez;
Roberts, Scalia and Thomas dissented.
Central to both decisions was stare decisis-
the majority's faithfulness to prior rulings-
here: Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396
U.S. 229 (1969), and Jackson v.
Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U.S. 167
(2005). Sullivan recognized retaliation
claims under Section 1982 of the 1866
statute, and the Court relied upon it to find
anti-retaliation rights under Title IX of the
Education Amendments in the Jackson case.
A number of management attorneys said
they were surprised when the justices agreed
to decide CBOCS in particular because, they
claim, the circuits generally agreed that
retaliation claims were available under
Section 1981.
"The Court confirmed what we all thought
to be the case-the viability of Section 1981
retaliation claims," said management
attorney Sarah Kelly, member at
Philadelphia's Cozen O'Connor. "The
puzzle to me was why did they take the
case?"
Management and employee attorneys
suggested the answer may be simply that the
justices never had ruled on the issue under
both statutes and sought to clarify the law.
But some attorneys and scholars also
suggested that in granting review, at least
four justices initially may have thought they
could undo the Jackson decision.
Jackson was a controversial, 5-4 ruling.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was the key
majority vote. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
had dissented. Buttressing its vulnerability
was the fact that Alito had dissented in the
earlier and major retaliation ruling in
Burlington Northern, and Roberts had
voiced clear hostility toward implied causes
of action.
"I thought both cases would come out 5-4
for the employers," said employment scholar
Paul Secunda of the University of
Mississippi School of Law. But Kennedy,
Alito and Roberts defied expectations.
"For Alito to come back in Gomez-Perez
and provide protection under the ADEA was
really eye-opening," said Secunda.
Twenty years ago, the Court "stumbled
badly" when, in a series of devastating
rulings, it gave civil rights laws a "wooden
reading," said employee counsel Paul
Mollica, a partner at Chicago's Meites,
Mulder, Mollica & Glink. Congress fairly
swiftly reversed most of those rulings, he
noted.
With its series of retaliation decisions, "the
Court seems more attentive to continuity in
the law and not upsetting settled
expectations," he said. "They know there's a
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huge number of these cases on federal
dockets. They're looking for ways to
achieve consensus, if not unanimity."
Justice Stephen Breyer found consensus
through the long lens of stare decisis.
"I do wonder if this was more the
institutional desire not to be revolutionary
than stare decisis," said Colorado's Hart.
"To have ruled for employers, they really
would have been saying, 'What all the
courts are doing, we're just going to
change.' That would have been
uncomfortably revolutionary."
But there is little consensus among
practitioners on both sides about the impact
of the most recent rulings.
"I could see this decision increasing the
number of plaintiffs who will use Section
1981 as a fallback to Title VII," said Fisher
& Phillips' Rice. "Certainly there are a
number of plaintiffs who will assert claims
under both already, but this will further
encourage them. In general, Section 1981
tends to be a little underutilized."
Management counsel Diana Hoover, partner
in the Houston office of Chicago's Mayer
Brown, said that the implications of
retaliation claims under Section 1981 for
small employers could be "staggering."
Title VII applies only to companies with 15
or more employees, she noted. Section 1981
covers all employers.
"One of the biggest problems for employers
is no cap on damages under Section 1981,
but there is a cap under Title VII based on
size of the employer," she said.
Although Banks was not confident
predicting the outcome of the next
retaliation case, Colorado's Hart said she
was now more confident of a ruling in the
Crawford case in favor of employees
because of the high court's most recent
decisions.
Crawford arises from complaints by female
employees, other than the plaintiff, of
serious sexual harassment by a director. In
an internal investigation by the employer,
the plaintiff, who had worked for city
government for 30 years, was interviewed
and recounted sexually harassing incidents
by the director against her. She and three
other employees who had given supporting
testimony subsequently were investigated
for allegedly unrelated infractions and fired.
The 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that the plaintiffs participation in the
investigation was unprotected by Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision.
"I think there are good arguments on both
sides of that issue," said Cozen's Kelly.
"For employers, you want to encourage
them to conduct their own investigations and
not to be hamstrung by thinking every
person contacted is going to become the
source of a separate claim against them,"
Kelly said.
Mississippi's Secunda said, "I just don't see
how you can have a meaningful enforcement
scheme if you don't protect people
cooperating in the investigation. The recent
decisions bode well for Crawford, but I
wouldn't necessarily connect the dots."
In the job bias area, the term overall has
been fairly successful for employees, both
sides agreed.
Hart suggests the Court may be more
expansive-and thus more pro-employee-
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in bias cases involving the underlying right,
but much more restrictive-and more pro-
employer-in cases involving procedural
requirements, as in last term's highly
controversial pay discrimination case,
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
127 S. Ct. 2162.
Secunda suggests a divide on certain areas
of employment law: more pro-worker in
discrimination and Employee Retirement
and Income Security Act cases, and more
pro-employer in traditional labor law cases.
"I would say they're leaning back towards
the center, but the assessment is still out," he
said. "We still have a number of cases yet
this term."
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"Court Expands Right to Sue over
Retaliation on the Job"
Washington Post
June 23, 2006
Charles Lane
The Supreme Court made it easier yesterday
for workers in most parts of the country to
sue employers for retaliating against them
when they complain about sexual
harassment or other discrimination. The
court ruled that employees may collect
damages, even in some cases where the
punishment did not involve getting fired or
losing wages.
The decision, which had the full support of
eight justices, expands the legal rights of
millions of workers who are covered by
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the
main federal law against job discrimination,
and their employers. Justice Samuel A. Alito
Jr. agreed with the result but differed from
the majority reasoning.
By setting a single national rule to define
what constitutes retaliation, the court
brought a measure of clarity to an area of
law that generates thousands of cases per
year, but had produced conflicting
interpretations of Title VII in the lower
courts.
Now, many retaliation cases that had
previously been dismissed because the facts
were not in dispute are likely to go to trial.
That will encourage lawyers for alleged
victims to take on more cases, and,
accordingly, raise companies' costs for
lawyers and defensive management
practices.
In the case decided yesterday, Burlington
Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
White, No. 05-259, forklift operator Sheila
White had won $43,500 in damages and
medical expenses from a federal jury, which
found that her boss responded to her
complaints about co-workers' sexual
harassment by transferring her to a more
arduous job and suspending her for 37 days
without pay.
She was later reinstated and awarded back
pay, and Burlington Northern argued in the
Supreme Court that this ending should have
negated her retaliation suit.
The railroad said that the law requires a link
between the alleged retaliation and a
permanent employment decision such as
termination or a pay cut. The Bush
administration agreed with that view, though
it believed that White should win her case,
even under the company's interpretation.
But Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that,
under the circumstances, the railroad's
actions would have been enough to deter a
reasonable employee from making a charge
in the first place. This, he wrote, is the
proper definition of illegal retaliation, and
should set the standard for all future cases.
Without a robust anti-retaliation law, Breyer
noted, the law's basic purposes could be
undercut, since fewer victims might
complain.
"Interpreting the anti-retaliation provision to
provide broad protection from retaliation
helps assure the cooperation upon which
accomplishment of the Act's primary
objective depends," Breyer wrote.
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Breyer concluded that even some actions
that take place outside the workplace can
qualify as retaliation, if they are serious
enough. As an example, he cited a previous
case in which an employer had filed a false
criminal charge against an employee who
had complained about discrimination.
"Justice Breyer's standard opens the door to
claims based on actions that before today
companies would not have suspected were
actionable," said Daniel P. Westman, a
lawyer with the firm Morrison & Foerster
who represents employers in job
discrimination cases. "Companies will have
to be much more careful as to how they
manage employees who are covered by Title
VII."'
The opinion also reflected a widely shared
sense at the court that employment
discrimination law has to be flexible enough
to account for the realities of a diverse
modem workplace, in which the same action
by an employer could have different effects
depending on the employee.
Citing a past case in which a mother of a
disabled child had sued for retaliation
because she was put on a shift that made it
hard for her to spend days at home, Breyer
wrote that "a schedule change may make
little difference to many workers, but may
matter enormously to a young mother with
school age children."
Even refusing to invite a worker to lunch
can be retaliation, Breyer wrote, if it is "a
weekly training lunch that contributes
significantly to the employee's professional
advancement."
"All people protected against job
discrimination benefit from this decision,
whether it be sexual harassment, or
discrimination in hiring, promotions or pay,"
said Marcia D. Greenberger, co-president of
the National Women's Law Center, which
filed a friend of the court brief supporting
White on behalf of more than 30
organizations. "If the Court had upheld the
standard urged by the railroad and the
administration, it would have created a hole
in civil rights protections big enough to
drive a forklift through."
Breyer's opinion was endorsed by a broad
liberal-conservative majority on the court,
with only Alito writing in a concurring
opinion that he saw "practical problems"
with the majority's approach. Like the Bush
administration, Alito argued that retaliation
claims should be limited to those involving
the terms or conditions of employment-but
that White should win the case, even under
that more restrictive legal standard.
In its ruling yesterday, the court adopted the
relatively pro-plaintiff rule that had been
previously outlined by the federal circuit
courts of appeals based in Chicago and
Washington, D.C., and rejected the more
restrictive standard that had prevailed in five
other regions of the country.
Only in the Western states could yesterday's
ruling limit retaliation suits, because the San
Francisco-based appeals court had endorsed
an even more pro-plaintiff standard than the
Chicago and D.C. courts.
Unlawful retaliation lawsuits were already
somewhat easier for employees to win than
lawsuits claiming discrimination only.
As a result, retaliation claims under Title VII
nearly doubled between 1992 and 2005,
from 10,499 to 19,429, according to the
Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's caseload. They constitute a
quarter of the EEOC's cases.
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Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee
07-1125
Ruling Below: Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165 (1st Cir. Mass. 2007), cert.
granted, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 2008 U.S. LEXIS 4737 (2008).
The plaintiffs' daughter claimed that an older boy on the bus forced her to expose herself. Her
story was investigated by the school and the police, but they were unable to corroborate it. The
plaintiffs were unsatisfied with the school's efforts, and so filed suit under Title IX of the
Education Amendments and Section 1983 of Title 42 of the USC. Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), has been interpreted to provide an implied private
right of action for sex discrimination by federally funded educational institutions. Section 1983
of Title 42 of the United States Code creates an express remedy for violations of the U.S.
Constitution. Three courts of appeals have held that Title IX's implied remedy does not
foreclose Section 1983 claims to enforce the Constitution's prohibition against invidious sex
discrimination. In contrast, four circuits, including the First Circuit in this case, have held that
Title IX's implied right of action is the exclusive remedy for sex discrimination by federally
funded educational institutions.
Question Presented: Whether Title IX's implied right of action precludes Section 1983
constitutional claims to remedy sex discrimination by federally funded educational institutions.
Lisa Ryan FITZGERALD, ETC., et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants,
V.
BARNSTABLE SCHOOL COMMITTEE et al., Defendants, Appellees.
First Circuit Court of Appeals
Decided October 5, 2007
[Except: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
SELYA, Senior Circuit Judge.
This appeal grows out of allegations that
paint a grotesque picture of peer-on-peer
sexual harassment at the elementary school
level. The district court, acting initially on a
motion to dismiss and thereafter on a motion
for summary judgment, resolved the case in
favor of the defendants (a school committee
and school superintendent). Although we in
no way condone harassment such as is
alleged here, we are mindful that school
districts and school officials have limited
ability to guard against such incidents. The
defendants in this case responded reasonably
to the reported harassment-and that is all
that the law requires. Accordingly, even
though we disagree with one portion of the
district court's decisional calculus, we
affirm the judgment below.
I. BACKGROUND
The essential facts (some undisputed, some
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alleged) are outlined in the district court's
exegetic opinion on summary judgment, see
Hunter v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 456 F.
Supp. 2d 255, 259-61 (D. Mass. 2006), and
we assume the reader's familiarity with that
account. Consequently, we furnish here
only a brief synopsis of the details directly
relevant to our analysis.
On the morning of February 14, 2001,
Jacqueline Fitzgerald, a kindergarten
student, informed her parents, Lisa Ryan and
Robert Fitzgerald, that each time she wore a
dress to school-typically, two to three
times a week-an older student on her
school bus would bully her into lifting her
skirt. Lisa Ryan Fitzgerald believed that
these incidents accounted for recent changes
in Jacqueline's behavior. She immediately
called the principal of Jacqueline's school,
Frederick Scully, to report the allegations.
The school system employed a prevention
specialist, Lynda Day, whose
responsibilities included responding to
reports of inappropriate student behavior
and instituting warranted disciplinary
measures. Scully and Day met with
Jacqueline and her parents later that
morning. Because school officials were
unable to identify the alleged perpetrator
from Jacqueline's sketchy account, they
arranged for her to observe students
disembarking from the school bus.
This surveillance took place over the next
two days. Jacqueline identified the
perpetrator as Briton Oleson, a third-grader.
That same day, Scully and Day questioned
Briton, who steadfastly denied the
allegations. Day then interviewed the bus
driver and a majority of the students who
regularly rode the bus. Despite these efforts,
she was unable to corroborate Jacqueline's
version of the relevant events.
Shortly thereafter, the Fitzgeralds told
Scully that Jacqueline had furnished
additional details about her ordeal. She now
said that, in addition to pressing her to lift
her dress, Briton had bullied her into pulling
down her underpants and spreading her legs.
Scully immediately scheduled a meeting
with the Fitzgeralds in order to discuss this
new information. He also re-interrogated
Briton and followed up on some of the
interviews that Day had conducted.
By this time, the local police department had
launched a concurrent investigation. This
probe was handled by a detective
specializing in juvenile matters, Reid Hall,
who among other things questioned both
Jacqueline and Briton. Hall found Briton
credible, and the police department
ultimately decided that there was
insufficient evidence to proceed criminally
against him. Relying in part on this decision
and in part on the results of the school's own
investigation, Scully reached a similar
conclusion as to disciplinary measures.
During the currency of these probes, the
Fitzgeralds had been driving Jacqueline to
and from school. In late February, the school
offered to place her on a different bus or,
alternatively, to leave rows of empty seats
between the kindergarten students and the
older pupils on the original bus. The
Fitzgeralds rejected these suggestions. The
school's primary suggestion-switching
buses-attracted special indignation; in the
Fitzgeralds' eyes, the school was punishing
Jacqueline rather than Briton (who would
continue to ride the original bus).
The Fitzgeralds countered with a series of
other alternatives, such as placing a monitor
on the bus or transferring Briton to a
different bus. The superintendent of the
school system, Russell Dever, declined to
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implement any of these proposals.
Although her parents' actions ensured that
there were no further incidents aboard the
school bus, Jacqueline asserted that she had
several unsettling interactions with Briton as
the school year progressed. Some were
casual encounters in the hallways. The most
notable interaction, however, occurred
during a mixed-grade gym class. This was
an episode in which a gym teacher randomly
required Jacqueline to give Briton a "high
five."
Each incident was acknowledged by Scully
as soon as it was reported, and there is no
claim that Scully failed to address these
incidents. In any event, Jacqueline stopped
participating in gym class and began to miss
school with increasing frequency.
In April of 2002, the Fitzgeralds sued two
defendants-the elementary school's
governing body (the Barnstable School
Committee) and the superintendent-in the
federal district court. Their complaint
included (i) a claim against the School
Committee for violation of Title IX of the
Education Act Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688; (ii) claims against
both the School Committee and the
superintendent under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and
(iii) a miscellany of state-law claims against
both defendants.
In due season, the defendants filed an
omnibus motion to dismiss. Ruling ore
sponte, the district court (Keeton, J.) granted
the motion as to the section 1983 and state-
law claims but denied it as to the Title IX
claim. Following the completion of
discovery, the School Committee moved for
summary judgment on the latter claim. The
district court (Young, J.) obliged. See
Hunter, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 266. This timely
appeal ensued.
We begin with the plaintiffs' contention that
the district court erred in granting summary
judgment on the Title IX claim. We afford
de novo review to that ruling and, in so
doing, we apply the same legal standards
that pertained in the lower court. Thus, we
may affirm this disposition only if the facts
contained in the summary judgment record,
viewed in the light most congenial to the
nonmovants (here, the Fitzgeralds), show
beyond legitimate question that the movant
(here, the School Committee) is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
We turn next to the substantive law that
governs the claim in question. Title IX
provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o
person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a). Although the statute does
not contain an explicit private right of action
as a vehicle for enforcing its commands, the
Supreme Court has interpreted it to confer
such a right. Under this judicially implied
private right of action, aggrieved parties
may recover pecuniary damages for
violations.
. . . Title IX does not make an educational
institution the insurer either of a student's
safety or of a parent's peace of mind.
Understandably, then, "deliberate
indifference" requires more than a showing
that the institution's response to harassment
was less than ideal. In this context, the term
requires a showing that the institution's
response was "clearly unreasonable in light
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II. THE TITLE IX CLAIM
of the known circumstances." Davis, 526
U.S. at 648. Relatedly, to "subject" a student
to harassment, the institution's deliberate
indifference must, at a minimum, have
caused the student to undergo harassment,
made her more vulnerable to it, or made her
more likely to experience it.
In this instance, three basic points are not in
dispute. First, it is uncontradicted that the
elementary school is a creature of the School
Committee; that the School Committee is a
recipient of federal funds; and that,
therefore, the School Committee is legally
bound to comply with the strictures of Title
IX. Second, the parties agree that the School
Committee acquired actual knowledge of the
school-bus harassment on February 14,
2001, (when Lisa Ryan Fitzgerald reported
what Jacqueline had told her). Third, it
cannot be gainsaid that, if true, Jacqueline's
allegation-that she was forced to pull up
her skirt, drop her underpants, and spread
her legs-constituted severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive harassment.
To begin, the school reacted promptly to the
complaint; commenced a full-scale
investigation; and pursued the investigation
diligently. As the scenario unfolded, school
officials paid close attention to new
information, emerging developments, and
the parents' concerns. Given its inability to
corroborate Jacqueline's allegations and the
termination of the police investigation with
no recommendation for further action, the
defendants' refusal to institute disciplinary
measures against Briton was reasonable.
Title IX was not intended either to pretermit
thoughtful consideration of students' rights
or to demand a gadarene rush to judgment.
After all, in situations involving charges of
peer-on-peer harassment, a public school has
obligations not only to the accuser but also
to the accused.
The school's prompt commencement of an
extensive investigation and its offer of
suitable remedial measures distinguish this
case from cases in which courts have
glimpsed the potential for a finding of
deliberate indifference.
The plaintiffs suggest that the adequacy of
the School Committee's response is
undermined by its offer of unsuitable
remedial alternatives. They point out that
they proposed other remedial measures, such
as the placement of a monitor on
Jacqueline's school bus, which the school
rejected. They insist that an educational
institution, acting in good faith, would have
embraced these proposals. The problem,
however, is that this line of argument
misconstrues the nature of Title IX liability
for peer-on-peer sexual harassment. As we
have said, the statute does not require an
educational institution either to assuage a
victim's parents or to acquiesce in their
demands.
III. THE SECTION 1983 CLAIMS
In addition to the claim brought directly
under Title IX, the plaintiffs advanced
claims against the School Committee and
Superintendent Dever under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. That statute provides a right of action
for any person who, at the hands of a state
actor, has experienced "the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws" of the United
States. For this purpose, municipal officials
are considered to be state actors.
In this instance, the plaintiffs seek to use
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section 1983 to redress deprivations of both
a federal statutory right (implicating Title
IX) and a federal constitutional right
(implicating the Equal Protection Clause).
At an early stage of the litigation the district
court, ruling from the bench, found these
claims precluded under applicable Supreme
Court doctrine. Because the court decided
this question on a motion to dismiss, its
disposition engenders de novo review. In
conducting this review, we consider the
statutory claims and the constitutional
claims separately.
A. The Statutory Claims
Generally speaking, section 1983 may be
used to redress the deprivation of a right
guaranteed by a federal statute. But that
general proposition is festooned with
exceptions. One familiar exception is that
section 1983 cannot be used to enforce a
statutory right when that statute's remedial
scheme is sufficiently comprehensive as to
demonstrate Congress's intent to limit the
available remedies to those provided by the
statute itself. This limitation ensures that
plaintiffs cannot circumvent the
idiosyncratic requirements of a particular
remedial scheme by bringing a separate
action to enforce the same right under
section 1983.
The plaintiffs do not dispute the force of this
principle but, rather, argue that Title IX's
remedial scheme is not sufficiently
comprehensive to evince Congress's intent
to preclude section 1983 enforcement
actions. They point out that the primary
means of enforcement set out in the statute
itself is the withholding of federal funds, see
20 U.S.C. § 1682, and they attach great
significance to the fact that this mechanism
is rarely used. Thus, they visualize section
1983 actions as a necessary complement to
the administrative under-enforcement of
Title IX rights.
This argument is poorly conceived. One
flaw is that preclusion doctrine is concerned
with what Congress intended and what
remedies it deemed appropriate-not with
how vigorously others (including the
Executive Branch) may choose to enforce
those remedies. Moreover, taking Executive
Branch enforcement into account would
work a de facto delegation of legislative
power to the Department of Education; in
effect, the Department would be granted the
power to determine the availability of
section 1983 remedies through the
modulation of its enforcement activity. Yet
we have not been directed to any language
in Title IX suggesting such a delegation, and
we do not believe that any such language
exists.
An even more conspicuous flaw is that the
plaintiffs' argument ignores the availability
of a private judicial remedy under Title IX
itself. The case at hand is a paradigmatic
example of both the existence and the utility
of that remedy.
The plaintiffs would have us disregard the
availability of this important anodyne
because it is judicially implied rather than
discernible on the face of the statute.
Although there is some support for that
thesis, see Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High
Sch. Athl. Ass'n, 459 F.3d 676, 690-91 (6th
Cir. 2006); Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d
1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1997), we are not
persuaded that this view is correct.
The test for section 1983 preclusion does not
turn on whether private causes of action
under a particular statutory scheme are
explicit or implicit. The dispositive criterion
revolves around congressional intent: Did
Congress intend the remedial scheme under
the statute to be exclusive? That intent may
be demonstrated either "by express
provision or other specific evidence from the
statute itself." Wright v. Roanoke Redev. &
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Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987).
That "specific evidence" goes beyond the
explicit provisions of the statute and
includes its legislative history.
Several years ago the Supreme Court
conducted a thorough review of the
legislative history of Title IX and
determined that Congress intended to create
a private right of action. This is the private
right of action that courts, including this
court, have found to be implicit in the text of
Title IX. We, like the majority of the other
courts of appeals that have addressed the
issue, believe that this private right of action
must be considered as part of the warp and
woof of Title IX's overall remedial scheme
for purposes of preclusion analysis.
That conclusion is of decretory significance
here. In all of the cases in which the
Supreme Court has found that section 1983
is available to redress the deprivation of a
federal statutory right, it has emphasized
that the underlying statute did not allow for
a private right of action (express or implied).
By contrast, whenever the underlying statute
contained a private right of action (express
or implied), the Court has deemed that fact
to be strong evidence of congressional intent
to preclude parallel actions under section
1983. Thus, the existence of a private
judicial remedy often has proved to be, in
practical effect, "the dividing line between
those cases in which [the Court has] held
that an action would lie under § 1983 and
those in which [it has] held that it would
not." City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S.
at 121.
The plaintiffs acknowledge that Title IX, as
authoritatively interpreted, confers an
implied private right of action. They note,
however, that this right of action is a more
restrictive remedy than that afforded by
section 1983. One major distinction is that,
unlike section 1983, Title TX does not
supply a right of action against individual
school officials (such as Superintendent
Dever) for monetary relief.
In our view, that distinction makes no
difference. Precedent teaches that a remedial
scheme can be considered comprehensive
for purposes of preclusion analysis without
affording a private right of action for
monetary relief against every potential
wrongdoer. The key case is Smith, in which
the Supreme Court discerned a
comprehensive remedial scheme sufficient
to preclude section 1983 actions despite the
total absence of any private rights of action
against individual state actors for monetary
relief.
Given this precedent, we see no problem in
holding section 1983 actions, including
section 1983 actions against individuals,
precluded by Title IX, even though such a
holding would deprive plaintiffs of the right
to seek relief against the individuals alleged
to have been responsible for conduct
violative of Title IX. After all, Title IX
"amounts essentially to a contract between
the Government and the recipient of funds,"
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286 (emphasis
supplied), and, accordingly, it makes perfect
sense that Congress would aim the
weaponry of Title IX at that recipient-not
at the recipient's staff. Sanctioning section
1983 actions against individual school
officials would permit an end run around
this manifest congressional intent and must,
therefore, be deemed precluded.
To sum up, an action against the offending
educational institution itself is what
Congress thought appropriate for the
enforcement of Title IX's guarantees. In
explicating this private right of action, the
Supreme Court, consistent with its
discernment of Congress's intent, imposed
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important limits on liability. These include
the requirement, in peer-on-peer sexual
harassment cases, that the educational
institution have actual notice of the
harassing conduct.
It is uncertain whether these
circumscriptions would carry over if section
1983 actions were permitted against
educational institutions and school officials.
Either way, however, such an action would
not square with congressional intent. Were
the circumscriptions carried over, a section
1983 action would be redundant; were they
not, the availability of the action would
undermine the implied private right of action
that Congress intended. Seen in this light,
we think that Title IX's remedial regime is,
to borrow a phrase from the Court,
"incompatible with individual enforcement
under § 1983." Blessing v. Freestone, 520
U.S. 329, 341, 117 S. Ct. 1353, 137 L. Ed.
2d 569 (1997).
To say more on this point would be
supererogatory. We conclude that the
remedial scheme of Title IX is sufficiently
comprehensive to demonstrate Congress's
intention to preclude the prosecution of
counterpart actions against state actors-
entities and individuals alike-under section
1983. We therefore uphold the lower court's
ruling that the plaintiffs' Title IX claims,
brought under the mantle of section 1983,
are precluded.
B. The Equal Protection Claims
In addition to precluding section 1983
claims based on the particular federal
statutory regime, a sufficiently
comprehensive remedial scheme also may
preclude constitutional claims that are
virtually identical to those that could be
brought under that regime. See Smith, 468
U.S. at 1011 (finding it "difficult to believe"
that Congress intended a section 1983 action
under the Education of the Handicapped Act
given the "comprehensive nature of the
procedures and guarantees set out in the
[statute]"). Specifically, the Smith Court
held that Congress intended the Education of
the Handicapped Act (EHA) to be the
"exclusive avenue" through which the
plaintiff could assert due process and equal
protection claims "virtually identical" to
their EHA statutory claims.
The parallel to this case is striking: the
plaintiffs' equal protection claim is virtually
identical to their claim under Title IX. And
they offer no theory of liability under the
Equal Protection Clause other than the
defendants' supposed failure to take
adequate actions to prevent and/or remediate
the peer-on-peer harassment that Jacqueline
experienced.
This then brings us to the second step in the
inquiry: whether Congress intended these
virtually identical constitutional claims to be
precluded by Title IX. We conclude that our
previous observations on the possibility of
enforcing Title IX through the
instrumentality of section 1983 apply with
equal force here, notwithstanding the slight
differences in context.
The comprehensiveness of Title IX's
remedial scheme-especially as embodied
in its implied private right of action-
indicates that Congress saw Title IX as the
sole means of vindicating the constitutional
right to be free from gender discrimination
perpetrated by educational institutions-and
that is true whether suit is brought against
the educational institution itself or the flesh-
and-blood decisionmakers who conceived
and carried out the institution's response. It
follows that the plaintiffs' equal protection
claims are also precluded.
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We add a coda. Our holding on this point
should not be read to imply that a plaintiff
may never bring a constitutionally based
section 1983 action against an employee of
an educational institution concurrently with
the prosecution of a Title IX action. For
example, when a plaintiff sues an individual
who is himself alleged to be immediately
responsible for the injury, such an action
may lie regardless of whether the claim
sounds in equal protection or some other
constitutional theory. This is as it should be:
when a plaintiff alleges that an individual
defendant is guilty of committing an
independent wrong, separate and apart from
the wrong asserted against the educational
institution, a claim premised on that
independent wrong would not be "virtually
identical" to the main claim.
That is not the case here. The plaintiffs have
not named Dever as a defendant based on
any independent wrongdoing on his part but,
rather, based on his role as the School
Committee's ultimate decision-maker. See
Appellants' Br. at 52-53. Accordingly, their
section 1983 claim against him, like their
section 1983 claim against the School
Committee, is precluded by Title IX's
remedial scheme.
IV. CONCLUSION
To summarize succinctly, we take into
account the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the alleged harassment,
including events that transpired subsequent
to the school-bus encounters. Seen through
that wide-angled lens, the School
Committee's response cannot, as a matter of
law, be characterized as clearly
unreasonable. Thus, the School Committee
cannot be held liable under Title IX for
deliberate indifference. We also conclude
that the plaintiffs' claims brought pursuant
to section 1983 were properly dismissed on
the ground that those claims, as presented in
this case, are precluded by Title IX's
comprehensive remedial scheme.
This is an unfortunate case. If Jacqueline's
allegations are true, she is a victim-but that
is not reason enough to impose on the
defendants duties that range beyond the
carefully calibrated boundaries of Title IX.
That would be a decision for Congress, not
for the courts. For our part, we need go no
further.
AFFIRMED.
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"Justices Reject 'Class of One' Argument"
The New York Times
June 10, 2008
Linda Greenhouse
. . . [O]n Monday, the court agreed to decide
whether a law known as Title IX, which bars
sex discrimination in schools and colleges
that receive federal money, provides the
exclusive route to court for discrimination
victims.
This case, Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School
Committee, No. 07-1125, is an appeal by the
parents of a kindergarten student in Hyannis,
Mass., who was sexually harassed on the
school bus by an 8-year-old boy. (Under
Supreme Court precedents, sexual
harassment is a form of sex discrimination.)
The parents sued after concluding that
school officials had not responded
appropriately to their complaint about their
daughter's treatment.
The lower courts ruled that Title IX, which
does not encompass suits against individuals
and also contains a number of other
limitations, provided the exclusive remedy.
The question is whether the parents can also
invoke the much broader and more
straightforward federal civil rights law
known as Section 1983. The intersection of
these two statutes is a complex issue that is
likely to attract considerable attention in the
education world.
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"1st Circuit Says School May Be Liable for
Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment"
Lawyers USA
October 22, 2007
Lawyers USA Staff
A school can be sued for deliberate
indifference to student-on-student sexual
harassment, even though the victim was not
subject to severe and pervasive harassment
after the school learned of the conduct, the
1st Circuit has ruled in Fitzgerald v.
Barnstable School Committee.
The plaintiffs notified the superintendent at
their daughter's elementary school that an
older student had repeatedly bullied their
daughter into raising her skirt on the school
bus. School officials met with the parents
that morning and the school initiated an
investigation that failed to corroborate the
allegations. As a result, the accused student
wasn't disciplined.
The plaintiffs sued under Title IX and Sect.
1983, claiming the investigation was
unreasonable and the school's actions
permitted further interaction between the
accused and their daughter.
The court agreed that a school could be held
liable for deliberate indifference to sexual
harassment.
"[Schools] may run afoul of Title IX not
merely by 'caus[ing]' students to undergo
harassment but also by 'making them liable
or vulnerable' to it. Under [this broader
formulation], a single instance of peer-on-
peer harassment theoretically might form a
basis for Title IX liability if that incident
were vile enough and the institution's
response, after learning of it, unreasonable
enough to have the combined systemic
effect of denying access to a scholastic
program or activity," the court said.
However, in this case, the court determined
that the "fact that subsequent interactions
between [the victim] and [the accused]
occurred does not render the [school]
deliberately indifferent. To avoid Title IX
liability, an educational institution must act
reasonably to prevent future harassment; it
need not succeed in doing so," the court
said.
The court also rejected Sect. 1983 as a
means to enforce rights under Title IX:
"[T]he plaintiffs' argument ignores the
availability of a private judicial remedy
under Title IX itself," it concluded.
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"1st U.S. Civil Court of Appeals Rules Civil Rights Claim over
Alleged Student Harassment Precluded"
Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly
October 15, 2007
Eric T. Berkman
A Section 1983 action brought by a couple
who accused a school district and its
superintendent of insufficiently protecting
their kindergartner from alleged sexual
harassment by an older student was
precluded by Title IX of the Civil Rights
Act, the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
has decided.
The plaintiff parents argued that Title IX's
remedy scheme-which does not offer a
private right of action against individual
actors-was insufficiently comprehensive
for the statute to be intended as an exclusive
avenue of relief for such claims.
But the 1st Circuit disagreed, affirming a
U.S. District Court judge's dismissal of the
Sect. 1983 claim.
"Given [U.S. Supreme Court] precedent, we
see no problem in holding section 1983
actions, including section 1983 actions
against individuals, precluded by Title IX,"
wrote Judge Bruce M. Selya for the court.
"[T]he remedial scheme of Title IX is
sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate
Congress's intention to preclude the
prosecution of counterpart actions against
state actors entities and individuals alike-
under section 1983."
The court also affirmed another U.S. District
Court judge's finding that the district's
response to the child's allegations was
sufficient to satisfy Title IX itself.
The 31-page decision is Fitzgerald, et al v.
Barnstable School Committee, et al.
Circumvention Prevention?
John M. Simon of Boston, who represented
the defendants, praised the decision for
recognizing the "daunting challenges" faced
by school administrators in maintaining a
safe school environment.
He added that the decision is particularly
important because it blocks future plaintiffs
from circumventing under the guise of a
constitutional or statutory violation "the
very demanding requirements" for liability
under Title IX.
"Congress intended that Title IX govern
claims of peer sexual harassment in
education," said Simon. "Litigants, at least
in the 1 st Circuit, are now stuck with that."
Plaintiffs' counsel Wendy A. Kaplan of
Boston called the ruling a "cutback" on civil
rights.
"The decision really gives schools wide
latitude to ignore the interests of their
students and to not take any interest in
protecting the welfare of their students,"
said Kaplan, who called Title IX "basically
useless," pointing out that the U.S.
Department of Education has not filed a
Title IX enforcement action in a harassment
case in 35 years.
"The courts and the Education Department
won't enforce Title IX [unless it is related to
athletics]," she said. "This court allowed the
school to totally disregard the interests of a
5-year-old girl, and I think this has wide-
ranging and negative effects."
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Nonetheless, the plaintiffs will not appeal
the decision, said Kaplan.
"We think our chances of prevailing at the
Supreme Court level are unrealistic given
the present makeup of the court," she noted.
Alleged Harassment
On Feb. 14, 2001, a kindergarten student in
Barnstable informed her parents, plaintiffs
Lisa Ryan and Robert Fitzgerald, that each
time she wore a dress to school, a boy in the
third grade would bully her into lifting it up.
The girl's mother reported the allegations to
the school principal. The school's
investigation apparently did not corroborate
the girl's version of the events.
Shortly afterward, the girl told the plaintiffs
that, in addition to pressing her to lift her
dress, the third-grader bullied her into
pulling down her underpants and spreading
her legs.
The principal met with the plaintiffs to
discuss the allegations, questioned the third-
grader and followed up on earlier interviews
with the bus driver and children who rode
the bus.
The local police department was
investigating the case at the same time. After
questioning both the girl and her alleged
harasser, a detective decided that there was
not enough evidence to proceed criminally.
The principal reached a similar conclusion
regarding disciplinary measures.
While the investigations were proceeding,
the plaintiffs had been driving their daughter
to and from school until, in late February,
the school offered to place the girl on a
different bus or to have the bus driver keep
empty two rows of seats between the
kindergartners and older students.
The plaintiffs rejected these solutions,
viewing them as punitive toward their
daughter. They suggested instead that the
school place a monitor on the bus or transfer
the third-grader to another bus.
The school superintendent declined
implement their suggestions.
to
The girl later reported several more
uncomfortable interactions with the third-
grader that year, both in the school hallway
and in a mixed-grade gym class.
Though the principal apparently
acknowledged and addressed each incident,
the girl stopped participating in gym class
and accumulated an increasing number of
absences from school.
In April 2002, the plaintiffs sued
Barnstable School Committee and
superintendent in U.S. District Court.
the
the
They brought a Title IX claim against the
School Committee, alleging that school
officials' response to the alleged harassment
failed to satisfy statutory requirements.
The plaintiffs also brought a 42 U.S.C. Sect.
1983 claim against the School Committee
and the superintendent, alleging that their
conduct as state actors deprived the
plaintiffs of their rights under both Title IX
and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
U.S. District Court Judge Robert E. Keeton
dismissed the Sect. 1983 claim. Following
discovery, U.S. District Court Judge
William G. Young granted summary
judgment on the Title IX claim. The
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plaintiffs' appeal followed.
Claim Preempted
The 1st Circuit rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that because Title IX was under-
enforced and offered no private judicial
remedy, its remedy scheme was
insufficiently comprehensive to preclude
their Sect. 1983 claim.
First, Selya explained, the preclusion
doctrine is concerned with which remedies
Congress has deemed appropriate, not with
the intensity with which other entities
enforce them.
Additionally, "the plaintiffs' argument
ignores the availability of a private remedy
under Title IX itself," the judge continued,
pointing out that the Supreme Court had
interpreted such a right in its 1979 decision
in Cannon v. Univ. of Chi.
With respect to the plaintiffs' contention that
Title IX's private remedy is insufficiently
comprehensive since it does not allow an
action against individual school officials,
Selya said the distinction was irrelevant.
"Precedent teaches that a remedial scheme
can be considered comprehensive for
purposes of preclusion analysis without
affording a private right of action against
every private wrongdoer," said the judge.
"Sanctioning section 1983 actions against
individual school officials would permit an
end run around this manifest congressional
intent and must, therefore, be deemed
precluded."
The court also upheld Keeton's dismissal of
the Title IX claim itself.
"The [school's] actions may not have
constituted an ideal response to the
complaint of harassment," said Selya. "But
Title IX does not require educational
institutions to take heroic measures, to
perform flawless investigations, to craft
perfect solutions, or to adopt strategies
advocated by parents. The test is objective-
whether the institution's response . . . is so
deficient as to be clearly unreasonable."
In this case, the school's response could not
be characterized "in that derogatory
manner," the court concluded.
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AT& T v. Hulteen
07-543
Ruling Below: Hulteen v. AT&T Corp., 498 F.3d 1001; 2007 App. LEXIS 19586 (9th Cir.
2007), cert. granted, A T&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 5217 (2008).
Plaintiffs were employees of AT&T and predecessor companies and took maternity leave
between 1968 and 1976 before the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. In
calculating service credits for pension and other benefits, Plaintiffs were not allowed to count
their maternity leave since the company's policy at the time of the leave only allowed for a
limited amount of maternity leave. Plaintiffs sued, claiming that AT&T must calculate their
service credits based on the PDA even though the PDA was not in effect at the time of their
leave. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Plaintiffs.
Question Presented: Before passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), it
was lawful to award less service credit for pregnancy leave than for other temporary disability
leaves. Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Accordingly, the questions presented are:
1. Whether an employer engages in a current violation of Title VII when, in making post-PDA
eligibility determinations for pension and other benefits, the employer fails to restore service
credit that female employees lost when they took pregnancy leaves under lawful pre-PDA leave
policies.
2. Whether the Ninth Circuit's finding of a current violation of Title VII in such circumstances
gives impermissible retroactive effect to the PDA.
Noreen HULTEEN; Eleanora Collet; Linda Porter; Elizabeth Snyder;
Communications Workers of America, Plaintiffs-Appellees
V.
AT&T Corporation, Defendant-Appellant
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided August 17, 2007
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge: retirement benefits after the effective date of
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
This appeal presents an issue previously ("PDA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), when it
decided on virtually identical facts sixteen gave service credit in those calculations for
years ago in Pallas v. Pacific Bell, 940 F.2d all pre-PDA temporary disability leave taken
1324 (9th Cir. 1991). There, we held that by employees except leave by reason of
Pacific Bell violated Title VII in calculating pregnancy. Pallas, 940 F.2d at 1326-27.
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Here, a three-judge panel of our court, in a
now-withdrawn opinion, held that AT&T
Corporation ("AT&T"), successor in interest
to Pacific Bell and Pacific Telephone and
Telegraph ("PT&T"), did not violate Title
VII by engaging in identical conduct. The
panel reasoned that Pallas no longer
controlled because it was inconsistent with
intervening Supreme Court authority
governing retroactivity principles. Hulteen v.
AT&T Corp., 441 F.3d 653, 664 (9th Cir.
2006) (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244 (1994)). Because we conclude
that Pallas is not "clearly irreconcilable"
with intervening authority, see Miller v.
Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en banc), we affirm the district court's
application of Pallas to the undisputed facts
presented here and its award of summary
judgment against AT&T. We further hold
that our conclusion in Pallas that calculation
of service credit excluding time spent on
pregnancy leave violates Title VII was, and
is, correct.
I.
Noreen Hulteen, Eleanora Collet, Linda
Porter, Elizabeth Snyder and the
Communications Workers of America,
AFL-CIO (collectively "Hulteen"), brought
this suit to challenge AT&T's use of a
facially discriminatory service credit policy
to calculate employee pension and
retirement benefits. Each of the individual
plaintiffs took pregnancy leave between
1968 and 1976. They would have enjoyed
more favorable benefits or retirement
opportunities had they, at the time that they
parted from AT&T, been given full service
credit for their pre-PDA pregnancy leaves.
Congress passed the PDA in 1978.
Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 995, 92 Stat.
2076 (1978). The PDA clarified that Title
VII prohibits discrimination "because of or
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions," as
discrimination "because of sex." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k). The PDA further provides that
"women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related
purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not
so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work." Id. Thus, Title VII, as
amended by the PDA, requires employers to
accord women who take pregnancy leave the
same benefits as employees who take other
types of temporary disability leave.
From as early as 1914, AT&T, along with its
predecessor companies PT&T and Pacific
Bell, has used a Net Credited Service
("NCS") date to calculate employee
benefits, including eligibility for early
retirement and pension payment amounts.
The NCS date is an employee's original hire
date, adjusted forward in time for periods
during which no service credit accrued. An
earlier NCS date places an employee in a
superior position for service-related
determinations such as job bidding, vacation
time and retirement benefits.
Before August 7, 1977, AT&T and its
predecessor companies classified pregnancy
leave as personal leave. An employee on
personal leave received a maximum of thirty
days NCS credit, whereas there was no limit
on the amount of NCS credit for employees
on temporary disability leave. ...
On August 7, 1977, PT&T adopted the
Maternity Payment Plan ("MPP"). The MPP
extended the maximum pregnancy NCS
credit to thirty days before delivery and a
maximum of six weeks after delivery. The
MPP also allowed pregnant employees to
work until the onset of the pregnancy
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disability. On April 29, 1979, the effective
date of the PDA, PT&T adopted the
Anticipated Disability Plan ("ADP"). The
ADP replaced the MPP and provided service
credit for pregnancy leave on the same terms
as other temporary disability leave. No
service credit adjustments or changes to the
NCS date were made for female employees
who had taken pregnancy leave under either
the MPP or the pre-1977 system. In 1984,
ownership of PT&T was transferred to
AT&T. The NCS credit calculation method
described above remains in force at AT&T,
notwithstanding AT&T's operations within
the Ninth Circuit and our controlling
decision in Pallas.
Noreen Hulteen retired involuntarily in 1994
as part of an AT&T reduction in force. She
has 210 days of uncredited pregnancy leave
that resulted in reduced pension benefits.
Eleanora Collet retired voluntarily under an
incentive program in 1998 with 261 days of
uncredited pregnancy leave. Linda Porter is
a current employee with seventy-three
uncredited days from pregnancy leave and
forced leave before the onset of her
pregnancy disability. Elizabeth Snyder
terminated her employment voluntarily in
2000, and has sixty-seven days of uncredited
pregnancy and unrelated temporary
disability occurring during her pregnancy
leave. The AT&T plan administrator, in
2000, authorized a credit for Snyder's first
thirty days of her 1974 pregnancy leave "as
was the policy at the time," changing her
NCS date from July 29, 1966 to June 29,
1966.
Hulteen brought suit, alleging, inter alia, that
AT&T violated Title VII in its calculation of
NCS credit. On cross-motions for summary
judgment, the parties stipulated to all of the
material facts. Applying Pallas, the district
court granted Hulteen's motion for summary
judgment on the Title VII claim. AT&T
timely appealed, and on March 8, 2006, a
panel of our court reversed the district court,
holding that Pallas gave "the PDA
impermissible retroactive effect under
controlling law today." Hulteen, 441 F.3d at
655. Judge Rymer dissented, arguing that
because there appears to be "no acceptable
basis . . . to overrule Pallas, and AT&T
offers no reason for distinguishing it, . . .
Pallas remains binding and controls
disposition of this case." Id. at 670. A
majority of the active judges of this court
voted in favor of rehearing en banc. We
consider the appeal anew.
II.
We review de novo the district court's grant
of summary judgment. "We must determine,
viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to [AT&T], the non-moving party,
whether . . . the district court correctly
applied the substantive law." Olsen v. Idaho
State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th
Cir. 2004).
A.
The district court correctly held that our
decision in Pallas compels the conclusion
that AT&T violated Title VII by failing to
credit pre-PDA pregnancy leave when it
calculated benefits owed Hulteen. Lana
Pallas was a former Pacific Bell employee
who took pregnancy leave before the PDA
was enacted. Pallas, 940 F.2d at 1325. "In
1987, Pacific Bell instituted a new
retirement benefit for management
employees called the 'Early Retirement
Opportunity."' Id. at 1326. To qualify for
the benefit, an eligible employee had to
accrue twenty years of service as measured
by the same NCS system applied to Hulteen.
Id. Pallas was denied eligibility because a
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pregnancy-related leave taken in 1972
deprived her of the necessary amount of
service credit by some three or four days. Id.
The district court dismissed Pallas's Title
VII sex discrimination claim for failure to
state a claim, and we reversed. In doing so,
we criticized reliance on the Supreme
Court's decisions holding that challenges
based on disparate impacts resulting from a
facially neutral bona fide seniority system
must be brought during a limitations period
running from the date the system was
adopted. Id. at 1326-27 (citing Lorance v.
AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 911
(1989) (holding that "when a seniority
system is nondiscriminatory in form and
application, it is the allegedly discriminatory
adoption which triggers the limitations
period"), and United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 557-58 (1977)).
We found Lorance and Evans inapposite for
two reasons. First, because the
discriminatory program that gave rise to the
lawsuit was instituted in 1987, Pallas's
claim "could not have been brought earlier."
Id.
Second, we concluded that, unlike the
facially neutral seniority credit policy in
Evans,
the net credit system used to
calculate eligibility under the Early
Retirement Opportunity is not
facially neutral. The system used to
determine eligibility facially
discriminates against pregnant
women. The system distinguishes
between similarly situated
employees: female employees who
took leave prior to 1979 due to a
pregnancy-related disability and
employees who took leave prior to
1979 for other temporary
disabilities.
Id. at 1327. We therefore held, relying on
Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986),
that Pacific Bell's decision to discriminate
against Pallas in 1987 was actionable
because "liability may be imposed" for a
pre-Title VII discriminatory policy to the
extent it is perpetuated in post-Title VII
employment decisions. Pallas, 940 F.2d at
1327 (citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395
(Brennan, J., joined by all other Members of
the Court, concurring in part) ("Each week's
paycheck that delivers less to a black than to
a similarly situated white is a wrong
actionable under Title VII, regardless of the
fact that this pattern was begun prior to the
effective date of Title VII.")).
. . . Pacific Bell adopted a policy that
calculates pregnancy leave differently than
other temporary disability leave, and it
engages in intentional discrimination each
time it applies the policy in a benefits
calculation for an employee affected by
pregnancy, even if the pregnancy occurred
before the enactment of the PDA. 940 F.2d
at 1327.
In Pallas, we did not address whether the
PDA had retroactive effect because Pallas's
complaint alleged that a post-PDA
determination-the calculation of benefits
after the PDA was enacted-discriminated
against women on the basis of their pre-
PDA pregnancy leaves.
B.
AT&T admits that under Pallas its current
conduct in calculating retirement benefits
excluding pre-PDA pregnancy leave violates
Title VII. AT&T argued to our three-judge
panel that Landgraf worked a "sea-change"
in retroactivity principles. Thus, AT&T
continued, Landgraf is intervening authority
with which the decision in Pallas is "clearly
320
irreconcilable," a retroactivity argument the
panel majority embraced. However, as
Judge Rymer's dissenting opinion ably
points out, AT&T's Landgraf argument
fails. We adopt Judge Rymer's reasoning:
[We] read Landgraf as refining,
rather than sea-changing, the
landscape[,] for the Court
explicitly drew upon Justice
Story's "influential definition" of
retroactivity in Society for
Propagation of the Gospel v.
Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 766-69,
F. Cas. No. 13156 (1814), to make
clear how courts should determine
whether a statute operates
retroactively:
A statute does not operate
"retrospectively" merely
because it is applied in a case
arising from conduct antedating
the statute's enactment, or
upsets expectations based in
prior law. Rather, the court
must ask whether the new
provision attaches new legal
consequences to events
completed before its
enactment. The conclusion that
a particular rule operates
"retroactively" comes at the
end of a process of judgment
concerning the nature and
extent of the change in the law
and the degree of connection
between the operation of the
new rule and a relevant past
event.
When a case implicates a
federal statute enacted after the
events in suit, the court's first
task is to determine whether
Congress has expressly
prescribed the statute's reach.
If Congress has done so, of
course, there is no need to
resort to judicial default rules.
When, however, the statute
contains no such express
command, the court must
determine whether the new
statute would have retroactive
effect, i.e., whether it would
impair rights a party possessed
when he acted, increase a
party's liability for past
conduct, or impose new duties
with respect to transactions
already completed. If the
statute would operate
retroactively, our traditional
presumption teaches that it
does not govern absent clear
congressional intent favoring
such a result.
Landgraf 511 U.S. at 268, 269-70,
280[] (internal citations omitted).
[We] do not believe that the
reasoning or theory of Pallas is so
irreconcilable with the reasoning or
theory of Landgraf as to give [a
three-judge] panel license to
overrule it. Pallas held that the
actionable conduct was PT&T's
decision to discriminate against the
employee on the basis of
pregnancy when she applied for,
and was denied, early retirement.
The decision to deny benefits was
made in the post-PDA world. As
we emphasized in United States ex
rel. Anderson v. Northern Telecom,
Inc., 52 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 1995), if
"the law changes the legal
consequences of conduct that takes
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place after the law goes into effect,
the law operates on that conduct
prospectively." Id. at 814. This
being the case, and assuming
(without deciding) that Congress
intended the PDA to have
prospective effect only, Pallas was
premised on a discrete act-the
decision to deny a retirement
benefit-that gave rise to a current
violation of the PDA. Given
Pallas's finding of a current
violation, the Act operated
prospectively on that decision.
Hulteen, 441 F.3d at 666-67 (Rymer, J.,
dissenting).
III.
A plain reading of Title VII supports the
legal conclusion reached in Pallas. By
passing the PDA, Congress clarified that
discrimination "because of sex" under Title
VII included discrimination "because of or
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k). It further added the requirement
that employers treat "women affected by
pregnancy ... the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as
other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work." Id.
In interpreting this additional requirement,
we must begin with the text of the
statute.. ..
The ordinary meaning of "affected" is
"[a]cted upon, influenced, or changed." The
American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language 28 (4th ed. 2000); see
also Black's Law Dictionary 62 (8th ed.
2004) (defining "affect" as "[m]ost
generally, to produce an effect on; to
influence in some way"). Applying the
ordinary meaning of the term "affected"
here leads to the conclusion that although
Hulteen was affected by pregnancy when
she took pregnancy leave, she was again
"affected by pregnancy" when AT&T
calculated her retirement benefits in 1994,
deliberately choosing to use an NCS date
that would deprive her of benefits received
by those who were not "affected by
pregnancy" by excluding her earlier
pregnancy leave from the later calculation of
benefits. It was well within AT&T's ability
and control to calculate Hulteen's benefits in
1994 giving her service credit for the time
she spent on pregnancy leave, and to thus
avoid violating the PDA. AT&T simply
chose to continue its systematic
discrimination against women, based on
pregnancy, even after Congress made it
illegal.
In 1991, Congress amended the Civil Rights
Act to make it clear, if Pallas had not
already done so, that an employer who
adopts a seniority system for an intentionally
discriminatory purpose commits an unlawful
employment practice "when the seniority
system is adopted, when an individual
becomes subject to the seniority system, or
when a person aggrieved is injured by the
application of the seniority system or
provision of the system." Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071,
1078-79 (Nov. 21, 1991). Congress thus
clarified that injury occurs at the time that
the seniority system is applied to the
aggrieved party because that is when the
employee is actually harmed by the
deprivation of benefits....
AT&T applied its discriminatory seniority
system to Hulteen in 1994, causing her to be
deprived of early retirement benefits and
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thus injuring her. AT&T never asserted that
it could not credit Hulteen with pregnancy
leave when it denied and/or calculated her
benefits. Indeed, AT&T and Hulteen
stipulated not only to the number of days
each plaintiff was penalized within the
charging period for past pregnancies but also
to AT&T's ability to add service credit to an
employee's length of service. Instead of
engaging in its discriminatory calculation
and defending the EEOC charge and this
litigation, AT&T could have simply credited
the applicable number of days to each
plaintiffs NCS date when it calculated her
benefits.
IV.
The district court properly applied our
decision in Pallas to conclude that AT&T's
post-PDA benefits calculations violated the
PDA. Pallas was, and remains, good law.
We therefore affirm the district court's
summary judgment in favor of Hulteen,
Collet, Porter, Snyder and CWA on their
Title VII sex discrimination claims.
AFFIRMED.
Dissent
O'SCANNLAN, Circuit Judge:
By concluding that Pallas v. Pacific Bell,
940 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1991) remains good
law, the majority erroneously perpetuates a
circuit split with the Sixth and the Seventh
Circuits. I believe that Pallas was wrong
then and is wrong now. Because this en banc
court can and should overrule Pallas and
follow the Seventh Circuit's well-reasoned
decision in Ameritech Benefit Plan
Committee v. Communication Workers of
America, 220 F.3d 814 (7th Cir.), I must
respectfully dissent from the majority's
conclusion that the sex discrimination
claims in this case are timely.
I.
[Restatement of AT&T's seniority system,
previous treatment of maternity leave, and
the individual circumstances of the
plaintiffs.]
II.
A.
In 1978 ... Congress passed the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
555, 92 Stat. 2076, which became effective
on April 29, 1979, and amended Title VII to
define "because of sex" or "on the basis of
sex" to include discrimination based on
pregnancy. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The PDA
states in relevant part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on
the basis of sex" include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same
for all employment-related
purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit
programs, as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability
or inability to work, and nothing in
section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall
be interpreted to permit otherwise.
Id.
An individual must file charges of
discrimination under Title VII within 180
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days "after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred," unless the
employee has first instituted proceedings
with a state or local agency, in which case
the period is extended to 300 days. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The dispositive
issue in this case is whether Hulteen timely
filed a sex discrimination action within the
specified period of limitations.
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly
stressed, we must "identify with care the
specific employment practice that is at
issue" when determining whether the sex-
discrimination action is timely. Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct.
2162, 2167 (2007). There are three possible
candidates in this case: (1) AT&T's
adoption of its pregnancy leave rules before
the enactment of the PDA; (2) AT&T's
application of those leave rules to adjust
Hulteen's NCS date before the enactment of
the PDA; and (3) AT&T's calculation of
Hulteen's retirement benefits in 1994 based,
in part, on the NCS date it consistently
maintained for her without retroactively
adjusting that date for pre-PDA pregnancy
leave. The time to challenge the first and
second possible employment practices,
however, has long since expired.
Accordingly, relying on our prior decision in
Pallas, Hulteen points us to the third
alternative employment practice in 1994
when AT&T declined to grant retroactive
NCS credit for pre-PDA pregnancy leave
before it calculated her retirement benefits.
Accepting Hulteen's argument that such
calculation in 1994 constituted a new and
current violation of Title VII, the majority
holds that her Title VII action is timely. In
so concluding, the majority perpetuates
Pallas's error by breathing new life into an
expired sex discrimination claim. On
virtually identical facts, the Seventh Circuit
reached the opposite conclusion in
Ameritech. Because I believe the Seventh
Circuit's decision faithfully applies
controlling Supreme Court precedents and
the relevant provisions of Title VII, I would
follow that court's reasoning.
III.
"The outcome of this case," as the Seventh
Circuit recognized, "turns on which of two
competing lines of authority provide a better
'fit' here." Ameritech, 220 F.3d at 822. The
Seventh Circuit followed United Air Lines v.
Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), and its
progeny. In Pallas, on the other hand, this
court followed Bazemore v. Friday, 478
U.S. 385 (1986). Because the majority
follows Pallas today, the Bazemore and
Evans line of cases deserve careful attention.
A.
In Bazemore, the North Carolina
Agricultural Extension Service ("Service")
maintained two separate, racially segregated
work forces and paid black employees less
than white employees prior to the enactment
of Title VII. 478 U.S. at 390-91 (Brennan,
J., joined by all other Members of the Court,
concurring in part). After the enactment of
Title VII, the Service integrated the
workforce, but the pay disparity between
black employees and white employees in the
same positions remained. Id. The Supreme
Court held that the Service was not liable for
the discriminatory acts that occurred prior to
the enactment of Title VII and therefore
"recovery may not be permitted for [pre-
Title VII] acts of discrimination." Id. at 395.
However, the Supreme Court concluded that
the pay disparity that remained after the
enactment of Title VII was unlawful because
"[e]ach week's paycheck that delivers less to
a black than to a similarly situated white is a
wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless
of the fact that this pattern was begun prior
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to the effective date of Title VII." Id. at 395-
96.
B.
1.
The Supreme Court's decision in Evans
represents the fountainhead for the
competing line of authority. In Evans,
United Air Lines ("United") maintained a
policy of refusing to allow its female flight
attendants to be married. 431 U.S. at 554.
Evans married in 1968 and therefore was
forced to resign pursuant to United's no-
marriage policy. Id. Previously, the Seventh
Circuit held that United's policy violated
Title VII. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444
F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.). Evans, however, was
not a party to Sprogis and failed to initiate
any proceedings against United within the
period of limitation for that past act of
discrimination. Evans, 431 U.S. at 555.
After United ended the no-marriage policy,
United rehired Evans in 1972 as a new
employee, but refused to give her seniority
credit for any prior service with United. Id.
Evans conceded that it was too late to bring
an action for her forced termination, but
asserted that "United [was] guilty of a
present, continuing violation of Title VII
and therefore that her claim is timely." Id. at
557.
Evans argued that "the seniority system
gives present effect to the past illegal act and
therefore perpetuates the consequences of
forbidden discrimination." Id. at 557.
Rejecting that argument, the Court
emphasized that "United's seniority system
does indeed have a continuing impact on her
pay and fringe benefits. But the emphasis
should not be placed on mere continuity; the
critical question is whether any present
violation exists." Id. at 558 (first emphasis
added). Concluding that none did, the Court
explained that "[a] discriminatory act which
is not made the basis for a timely charge is
the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act
which occurred before the statute was
passed. . . . [I]t is merely an unfortunate
event in history which has no present legal
consequences." Id. at 558.
C.
Bazemore stands for the general proposition
that an employment practice coupled with
discriminatory intent within the charging
period gives rise to a current violation of
Title VII, even if related to past, uncharged
discriminatory acts. See Ledbetter, 127 S.
Ct. at 2174. The Evans-Ricks-Ledbetter line
of authority stands for the proposition that
an act within the charging period that gives
present effect to past discriminatory acts,
without more, does not give rise to a current
violation. Hulteen's case turns on whether
AT&T calculated her benefits in 1994 with
the requisite discriminatory intent
(Bazemore) or whether that calculation
simply gave effect through the NCS date of
past, uncharged discriminatory acts (Evans-
Ricks-Ledbetter).
In Ameritech, the Seventh Circuit found the
Evans line of authority controlling because
of the "fact, simplistic as it may seem, that
[the] case involves computation of time in
service-seniority by another name-
followed by a neutral application of a
benefit package to all employees with the
same amount of time." Ameritech, 220 F.3d
at 823. Pallas and the majority today, on the
other hand, reached the contrary conclusion,
finding that Bazemore was the "controlling
Supreme Court precedent" for two reasons:
"First, the discriminatory program which
gave rise to this suit, the Early Retirement
Opportunity, was instituted in 1987. . . .
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Pallas challenges the criteria adopted in
1987 to determine eligibility for the new
benefit program. . . . Second, the net credit
system used to calculate eligibility under the
Early Retirement Opportunity is not facially
neutral. The system used to determine
eligibility facially discriminates against
pregnant women." 940 F.2d at 1327. With
respect, Pallas was clearly wrong. The
Supreme Court's logic in Evans, Ricks, and
Ledbetter dictates the outcome of the case
before us today.
1.
The Supreme Court's most recent decision
in Ledbetter confirms that under Evans
"current effects alone cannot breathe life
into prior, uncharged discrimination."
Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2169. The charging
period (here, the 180 days during which
Hulteen was required to file a charge with
the EEOC), "is triggered when a discrete
unlawful practice takes place." Id. Such a
discrete unlawful practice requires the
coalescence of two elements: (1) an
employment practice (defined as "'a discrete
act' or single 'occurrence' that takes place at
a particular point in time"); and (2)
discriminatory intent. Id. at 2169, 2171.
Here, the majority concludes that the
AT&T's denial of benefits under the
retirement plan in 1994 is an "employment
practice." Ante, at 10041-42. But that alone
is insufficient. Ledbetter requires concurrent
discriminatory intent.
a.
The problem with the majority's conclusion
that the NCS seniority system is facially
discriminatory because the NCS date
reflects AT&T's pre-PDA pregnancy leave
rules is that it necessarily depends on a
retroactive application of the PDA. Before
the enactment of the PDA, the Supreme
Court had concluded in Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 97 S. Ct. 401, 50 L. Ed. 2d 343, that
classifications based on pregnancy involved
no facial gender-based discrimination. Id. at
134-36, 138; see also Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 140, [*1023] 98 S. Ct.
347, 54 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1977) ("Petitioner's
decision not to treat pregnancy as a disease
or disability for purpose of seniority
retention is not on its face a discriminatory
policy."). Pallas concluded that the NCS
seniority system was facially discriminatory
because it "distinguishes between similarly
situated employees: female employees who
took leave prior to 1979 due to a pregnancy-
related disability and employees who took
leave prior to 1979 for other temporary
disabilities." 940 F.2d at 1327. This
conclusion therefore rests on a silent
premise that gives impermissible retroactive
effect to the PDA.
D.
In sum, because there is no evidence that
AT&T acted with the requisite
discriminatory intent in 1994 when it
calculated Hulteen's retirement benefits
based in part on the NCS seniority system,
Bazemore is inapposite. Without more, the
NCS seniority system simply gives present
effect to a past pre-PDA incident. Under
Evans that pre-PDA incident is "merely an
unfortunate event in history [with] no
present legal consequences." 431 U.S. at
558. For this reason, the Supreme Court's
logic in the Evans line of authority,
reinforced weeks ago in Ledbetter, controls
the outcome of this case. Under that line,
"[a] new violation does not occur, and a new
charging period does not commence, upon
the occurrence of subsequent
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nondiscriminatory acts that entail adverse
effects resulting from the past
discrimination." Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at
2169 (emphasis added). The time for
Hulteen to have challenged AT&T's pre-
PDA pregnancy leave rules has long since
expired.
VI.
As Judge Dumbauld lamented in his dissent
to Pallas, we consider "'a melancholy tale
[o]f things done long ago, and ill-done."'
940 F.2d at 1327 (Dumbauld, J., dissenting)
(quoting John Ford, The Lover's
Melancholy). Because Pallas invented a
timely Title VII violation where the
determination of benefits simply gave
present effect to past, unchallenged acts,
contrary to Supreme Court authority, it must
be overruled. Because the majority today
erroneously embraces Pallas and
perpetuates a circuit split with the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits, I must respectfully dissent.
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"High Court to Take up Pregnancy Leave Case"
Washington Post
June 24, 2008
Christopher Twarowski
Noreen Hulteen gave birth to a daughter,
Rachael, in 1968, when she was 34. While
on maternity leave, she required surgery and
wound up missing 240 days of work.
Hulteen, 74, contends that her employer,
Pacific Bell-now AT&T-did not properly
weigh her pregnancy leave into her
retirement and other benefits. Yesterday, the
U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the
issue in [AT&T v. Hulteen] a case that
could affect thousands of women who are
near or at retirement age.
The case centers on whether women who
took pregnancy leave before 1979, when the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act went into
effect, should be entitled to the benefits the
law provides. AT&T has argued that it is not
required to credit retroactively the time
women spent on maternity leave before the
legislation's enactment.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, an
amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, prohibits discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy and allows those on
maternity leave the same coverage as other
medical leave. Before the law, AT&T
classified maternity leave as personal leave,
allowing for only 30 days of coverage.
Those on disability leave had unlimited
coverage. AT&T changed its policy when
the act went into effect, effectively treating
pregnancy leave the same as temporary
disability leave.
Hulteen and three other women sued AT&T
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th
Circuit for violation of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, arguing that the
company did not properly calculate their
pension and retirement benefits under the
law. The court ruled in August that
pregnancy leave taken before the
discrimination act must be treated the same
as disability leave. Hulteen and the other
women took pregnancy leaves between 1968
and 1976.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to take up
the matter at the urging of the Bush
administration after AT&T appealed the
case.
"We are gratified that the court has agreed to
hear our appeal," said AT&T spokesman
Walt Sharp.
Judith E. Kurtz, a San Francisco-based
attorney for Hulteen and the others,
characterized the case as "the second
generation of pregnancy discrimination."
She said, "Women who were discriminated
against back in the '70s are being
discriminated against again."
Kurtz successfully represented other women
in a similar suit in 1991, Pallas v. Pacific
Bell. The 9th Circuit's decision against
AT&T in Hulteen v. AT&T relied heavily
upon the Pallas case. The ruling awarded
tens of millions of dollars to its plaintiffs,
Kurtz said.
In 2000, the 7th Circuit Court ruled in a
similar case, Ameritech Benefit Plan
Committee v. Communication Workers of
America, that workers were not entitled to
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retroactive seniority credit for pregnancy
leave that occurred before the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act.
"We're hopeful," Kurtz said. "We were
litigating the issue 25 years ago. We thought
that we were right then, and we think that
we're right now."
The U.S. Supreme Court case is AT&T v.
Hulteen, 07-543.
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"AT&T Pregnancy Suit Ruling Is Overturned"
San Francisco Chronicle
August 18, 2007
Bob Egelko
A federal appeals court overturned an earlier
ruling Friday and ordered a boost in
retirement benefits for female AT&T
employees who took pregnancy leave before
1979, the year that federal law banned
discrimination based on pregnancy.
The women, who may number in the
hundreds nationwide, according to their
lawyer, were allowed up to 30 days of paid
leave during pregnancy before 1979.
Employees of AT&T and its predecessor,
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph, who took
disability leave during the same period were
entitled to be paid as long as they were
disabled.
The disparity was also reflected in
retirement payments, both before and after
1979, which credited workers for periods of
paid leave but not for unpaid leave. A three-
judge panel of the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals in San Francisco ruled 2-1 in
March 2006 that the women were not
entitled to equal benefits, but the full court
then ordered a hearing by a larger panel,
which ruled 11-4 in the women's favor on
Friday.
The suit was filed in San Francisco in 2001
by four women as a proposed nationwide
class action.
"No one disputes that women who were out
on pregnancy leave before 1979 are today
getting less than their counterparts who
worked exactly the same number of days for
AT&T," said Hugh Hewitt, a lawyer for the
women. The question that the court
answered, he said, is "whether or not it can
be corrected by law."
AT&T, which has denied acting illegally,
could appeal to the Supreme Court. The
ruling conflicts with decisions by two other
appeals courts in similar cases, a
disagreement that increases the likelihood of
Supreme Court review.
Congress passed the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act after the Supreme Court
ruled in 1976 that unequal treatment of
pregnant employees did not constitute sex
discrimination. Once the law took effect in
1979, AT&T granted pregnant employees
full credit for time spent on leave, but did
not equalize retirement credits for pre-1979
leaves.
As a result, the four women in the lawsuit
lost between six months and a year of
retirement credit, their lawyers said.
The disputed issue in the case was whether
the women's claim required retroactive
enforcement of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act against conduct by
AT&T-granting less paid leave for
pregnancy than for other disabilities-that
was legal before 1979.
The Supreme Court has frowned on
retroactive enforcement of new laws that
affect private rights and obligations, saying
such laws must apply only to future acts
unless Congress clearly intended them to
cover past acts as well. But the appeals court
majority said it wasn't applying the 1979
330
law to AT&T's pre-1979 limitations on
disability benefits, but instead to its post-
1979 decision to pay lesser retirement
benefits to the same employees.
AT&T "continues to operate its (retirement)
system in a discriminatory fashion" by
paying retirees less because they took
pregnancy leaves, said the majority opinion
by Judge Kim Wardlaw. Dissenting Judge
Diarmuid O'Scannlain said the ruling was
based on acts that were legal at the time.
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"Court Won't Hear Case"
Chicago Tribune
January 28, 2001
Jack Thompson
The Supreme Court is staying out of a
dispute over whether women who were
denied job seniority credit when they took
pregnancy leave during the 1960s and 1970s
can, as a result, be given smaller retirement
benefits today.
The court, without comment, turned down
arguments by female Ameritech phone
company workers that relying on an old
pregnancy-leave policy to deny or reduce
current benefits "clearly discriminates
against female workers."
During the 1960s and 1970s, the portion of
AT&T that later became Ameritech allowed
women who took pregnancy leave to count
only 30 days of the leave toward their
seniority credit. Workers on leave for other
disabilities received seniority credit for the
entire leave.
In 1979 Congress enacted the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, which barred
discrimination against pregnant workers.
The company changed its policy but not the
seniority of workers who took pregnancy
leave before then.
Ameritech was created in 1984 as a result of
the AT&T breakup. Ameritech was taken
over by SBC Communications Inc. in 1999.
Ameritech created several early retirement
plans starting in 1991. They were challenged
by women who missed becoming eligible
for early retirement because of lost seniority
during their pregnancies.
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"$25 Million Settlement by Pac Bell"
San Francisco Chronicle
July 9, 1999
Harriet Chiang
Regional Pacific Bell has agreed to pay $25
million to settle a lawsuit brought by 10,000
female employees, many of them near
retirement age, who were denied credit
toward their pension when they took
pregnancy leave.
The settlement will affect a generation of
Pacific Bell employees who had their babies
before the 1979 Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, which entitles women on pregnancy
leave to the same benefits as others on
disability.
The pregnancy leave issue is becoming hotly
debated in the workplace.
Similar lawsuits have been filed in New
York, Cincinnati and other parts of the
country by women who became working
mothers 20 or 30 years ago and now are
eligible for pensions.
The Pacific Bell suit, filed in San Francisco
in 1989, is the first in California to address
the issue. A hearing will be held today
before U.S.
District Judge D. Lowell Jensen in Oakland,
who will decide whether to approve the
settlement.
"It's hard for women now to understand
what we were dealing with," said Lana
Pallas, a Pacific Bell employee for 24 years
who filed the initial lawsuit. "I think that the
settlement is basically fair."
Pallas, 49, was forced to take a personal
leave when she gave birth to her daughter in
1972. In 1987, when she applied for an early
retirement program, she discovered that she
was four days short because the company
did not grant her service credit during part of
her pregnancy leave.
Pallas worked in the company's offices in
Riverside and San Ramon.
The settlement in the class action lawsuit
comes after a long court battle and applies to
all women who were on Pacific Bell's
payroll as of Jan. 1, 1984.
The women were represented by Equal
Rights Advocates, a San Francisco public
advocacy group that specializes in sex
discrimination cases, and the
Communications Workers of America, the
union that represents the Pacific Bell
employees.
Judith Kurtz, a San Francisco lawyer for
Equal Rights Advocates, called the
pregnancy suits "second- generation cases"
involving women who were twice denied
workplace benefits-first when they were
pregnant and then decades later when they
become eligible for pension benefits.
"These women who are now retiring are
finding that they are still carrying the burden
of what happened to them 20 or 30 years
ago," she said.
The issue is particularly significant in the
telecommunications industry where women
for decades dominated the lower-paying
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jobs, working as telephone operators and
secretaries.
Some suits in other states have been settled.
But Mary O'Melveny, a lawyer for the
union, said that this is the most far-reaching
agreement because it not only provides $25
million to 10,000 current and former
employees, it also restores their seniority
credit.
She said that Pacific Bell changed its policy
after the 1979 law went into effect, but
failed to correct its past practices and restore
credit to female employees.
She noted that before 1979, an employee
who was out on disability because of a
broken leg or a vasectomy was eligible for
benefits and service credits, but those same
benefits were denied women on pregnancy
leave.
"It's a very significant settlement,"
O'Melveny said.
John Britton, a spokesman for Pacific Bell,
confirmed that the San Francisco-based
company had reached a settlement in the
case. "Pacific Bell believes that our actions
all along were appropriate," he said. "We
think what's best now is to put this matter
behind us."
Pallas said that she filed the suit after she
was compelled to work four more years after
she was denied the early retirement program
in 1987.
In 1972, she said that she wanted to come
back to work six weeks after she had had a
cesarean section and her doctor cleared her
to go back to work.
But Pacific Bell's company doctor
recommended that she take a leave of three
months. After she protested, she was
allowed to come back to work a month later
than she had originally planned.
She left Pacific Bell in 1991 and now works
for another company. She says she has no
hard feelings for her former company and
still does consulting work for them.
Pallas said she pursued the case as a matter
of principle and was encouraged by her
daughter, who is now 27. She noted that her
own mother, who also worked for Pacific
Bell and is 69, is among those who will be
eligible for benefits from the settlement.
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"Working Mothers Score a Major Victory in Court"
San Francisco Examiner
August 13, 1991
Seth Rosenfeld
In a victory for working mothers, a federal
court has allowed a woman to sue Pacific
Bell for sex discrimination because the
company refused to credit her pregnancy
leave toward retirement benefits.
The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in
San Francisco ruled 2-1 Monday that
companies must count pregnancy leave
toward retirement benefits as they would
other temporary disability leaves, even if the
leaves were taken before the 1979 federal
law banning discrimination based on
pregnancy.
Lawyers for Lana Pallas, a single mother
and longtime worker who sued Pacific Bell,
said the ruling could benefit thousands of
women employed at hundreds of firms
throughout the nine Western states covered
by the 9th Circuit.
Many corporations don't give women
workers retirement credit for pregnancy
leaves taken before 1979, the lawyers said,
including other "Baby Bell" companies
created with the breakup of AT&T.
"That's current discrimination," said Maria
Blanco, a lawyer with Equal Rights
Advocates, a San Francisco public interest
law firm representing Pallas. "Any employer
who has a similar policy is violating the
law."
Pac Bell spokesman Dick Fitzmaurice said
lawyers for the San Francisco-based firm
had not seen the court order and could not
comment, but believed the company had
followed the law. He said the company still
denies full retirement credit for pregnancy
leaves taken before 1979.
Pac Bell has about 58,000 workers in
California and Nevada, mostly women.
Pallas, 41, went to work for Pac Bell in
1967. She requested a pregnancy leave in
1972, but the firm, following widespread
corporate policy at the time, required her to
take a personal leave.
In 1987, Pac Bell offered employees of more
than 20 years an early retirement, including
an immediate monthly pension and
continuing health benefits.
Pac Bell denied Pallas' application on the
ground that she was three days short of 20
years.
Pallas, now a product designer at the
telephone company, said she wanted to
leave the firm to become a real estate
broker, but needed the benefits for herself
and her daughter.
She sued the company, claiming that its
refusal to count her pregnancy leave like any
other temporary disability leave violated the
1979 federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
The company said it had followed the law
because all female employees who took
pregnancy leaves after 1979 were allowed
disability leave and received full credit for
retirement. The firm contended it did not
have to count pregnancy leaves taken before
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1979 toward retirement benefits.
U.S. District Judge D. Lowell Jensen in San
Francisco agreed with Pac Bell, and in 1988
threw the case out.
But the appeals court said the firm's policy
amounted to current discrimination because
it has continued to give more retirement
credit to women who took other types of
disability leave before 1979 than it gives
women who took pregnancy leaves during
the same period.
336
Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association
07-869
Ruling Below: Pocatello Educ. Ass 'n v. Heideman, 504 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. Idaho 2007), cert.
granted, Ysursa v. Pocatello Ed. Ass'n, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2923 (2008).
Labor organizations challenged an Idaho statute barring local government employees from
conducting payroll deductions for "political activities." Appellees contend that the statute is a
violation of their First Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
statute should be reviewed under strict scrutiny, because it is content based, and the state had
failed to prove that local government payrolls are nonpublic fora in which the state is allowed to
place content-based restrictions.
Question Presented: Does the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit a
state legislature from removing the authority of state political subdivisions to make payroll
deductions for political activities under a statute that is concededly valid as applied to state
government employers?
POCATELLO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; Idaho Education Association; Professional
Fire Fighters of Idaho, Inc.; Service Employees International Union, Local 687; AFL-CIO,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
Mark HEIDEMAN, in his official capacity as Bannock County Prosecuting Attorney,
Defendant, and Ben Ysursa, in his official capacity as Secretary of State for the State of
Idaho; Lawrence Wasden, in his official capacity as Attorney General for the State of
Idaho, Defendants-Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Decided October 5, 2007
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff labor organizations ("Plaintiffs")
sued officials of the State of Idaho,
claiming that the Voluntary Contributions
Act ("VCA"), Idaho Code § 44-2004(2)
and -2601 to -2605, violated Plaintiffs'
constitutional rights under the First
Amendment as well as other constitutional
provisions. Before the district court, the
State officials conceded that all challenged
provisions were unconstitutional, except
Idaho Code § 44-2004(2), which prohibits
any payroll deductions for "political
activities." The district court held the ban
on payroll deductions to be constitutional
as applied to the state government itself,
but unconstitutional as applied to private
and local government employers. The
State officials contend on appeal that the
payroll deduction ban may be
constitutionally applied to local
government employers. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291.
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We hold that Idaho Code § 44-2004(2), as
applied to local government employers,
violates the First Amendment because it is
a content-based law for which the State
officials assert no compelling justification.
Moreover, the State officials have not
demonstrated that the law should be
reviewed under the more relaxed standard
applicable to speech restrictions in
nonpublic fora. In particular, they have not
shown that the State of Idaho may
properly assert a proprietary interest in
controlling access to the payroll systems
that constitute the fora in this case. Case
law suggests that the authority over local
governments the State possesses by
operation of law is not enough to associate
the local workplaces or payroll deduction
programs with the State of Idaho, and the
State officials have adduced no specific
evidence that the State actually does own,
administer, or control the payroll
deduction programs.
Standard of Review
We review de novo the district court's
decision on cross-motions for summary
judgment.... We must decide whether the
record, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, shows
that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Mixed
questions of law and fact and ultimate
conclusions of law receive de novo
review. We may affirm the district court's
grant of summary judgment on any ground
supported by the record.
Factual and Procedural Background
In 2003, the Idaho legislature enacted the
VCA, a series of amendments to Title 44
of the Idaho Code, including an
amendment to Chapter 20 ("Right to
Work"). The Chapter 20 amendment
states: "Deductions for political activities
as defined in chapter 26, title 44, Idaho
Code, shall not be deducted from the
wages, earnings or compensation of an
employee." "Political activities" are
defined as "electoral activities,
independent expenditures, or expenditures
made to any candidate, political party,
political action committee or political
issues committee or in support of or
against any ballot measure." Idaho Code §
44-2602(1)(e).
Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the
constitutionality of the VCA, naming as
defendants Bannock County Prosecuting
Attorney Mark Heideman, Idaho Attorney
General Lawrence Wasden, and Secretary
of State Ben Ysursa (collectively,
"Defendants"). Plaintiffs sought
declaratory and injunctive relief from
enforcement of § 44-2004(2) as violative
of their rights to free speech and equal
protection under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Defendants conceded that several provisions
of the VCA were unconstitutional because
they restricted the ability of labor
organizations to solicit political
contributions, namely, Idaho Code § 44-
2601 to -2605. On cross-motions for
summary judgment with respect to the
remaining substantive provision banning
payroll deductions for political activities, the
district court held that the payroll deduction
prohibition violated the First Amendment to
the extent it applied to local government
employers and private employers. It also
held, however, that the payroll deduction
ban could be applied constitutionally to the
State's own payroll system, i.e., to
employees of the State of Idaho.
Accordingly, the court granted in part and
denied in part both motions. Ysursa and
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Wasden ("Appellants") now appeal the
district court's ruling that § 44-2004(2) is
unconstitutional with respect to local
government employers and school district
employers.
Analysis
Idaho Code § 44-2004(2) burdens speech by
diminishing Plaintiffs' ability to conduct any
of the activities defined by the Idaho Code
as "political." The term "political activities"
is broadly defined to include virtually all
types of electioneering, including "electoral
activities" as well as spending on behalf of
or against candidates, ballot measures,
political action or issue committees, or
parties.
The First Amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." The Fourteenth Amendment
renders that prohibition applicable to the
States.
This restriction on voluntary political
contributions burdens political speech,
which is protected by the First Amendment;
indeed, political speech is a "central
concern" of First Amendment jurisprudence.
The law does not prohibit Plaintiffs from
participating in political activities, but it
hampers their ability to do so by making the
collection of funds for that purpose more
difficult. The district court found that unions
face substantial difficulties in collecting
funds for political speech without using
payroll deductions because of their
members' concerns over identity theft
associated with other electronic transactions,
as well as the time-consuming nature of
face-to-face solicitation. The district court
found that the payroll deduction ban would
decrease the revenues available to Plaintiffs
to use for political speech. Restricted
funding will, therefore, diminish Plaintiffs'
ability to engage in political speech, and §
44-2004(2) is properly viewed as a
regulation of protected speech.
The law on its face prohibits payroll
deductions only for political activities. This
is subject-matter discrimination, which is a
form of content discrimination.
Ordinarily, because we are dealing with
content-based restriction of political speech,
we would evaluate its validity under strict
scrutiny. Indeed, content-based regulations
of speech are generally presumptively
invalid, under the rationale "that content
discrimination 'raises the specter that the
Government may effectively drive certain
ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."'
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387
(1992). To be constitutional, § 44-2004(2)
must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling interest. As Appellants proffer
no compelling interest in favor of the law,
both sides agree that it would easily fail
strict scrutiny.
Strict scrutiny, however, is not applied in all
circumstances involving content-based
restrictions. Appellants contend that two
excepted circumstances apply here, and it is
to that argument that we now turn.
I. Government-Subsidized Speech
In general, government may refrain from
paying for speech with which it disagrees.
The nonsubsidy doctrine is premised on the
rationale that the government is free to
confer no benefit at all and is therefore
entitled to condition the receipt of the
benefit on speech or silence.
Applying this doctrine, the district court
held that the State of Idaho could properly
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forbid payroll deductions of its own
employees to be used for union activities, as
the First Amendment imposes no obligation
to subsidize union and employee speech by
paying for the administration of the payroll
deductions. The parties appear to be in
agreement as to this point, and the holding is
unchallenged on appeal. As the district court
noted, however, there is no subsidy by the
State of Idaho for the payroll deduction
systems of local governments.
II. Forum Analysis
In certain cases, regulation of speech on
government property is not subject to strict
scrutiny. In particular, it is well established
"that, when the government permits speech
on government property that is a nonpublic
forum, it can exclude speakers on the basis
of their subject matter, so long as the
distinctions drawn are viewpoint neutral and
reasonable in light of the purpose served by
the forum." Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2381.
Appellants invoke this doctrine, arguing that
the proper way to view the statute is to look
at the payroll deduction programs of local
governments as nonpublic fora belonging to
the State. Appellants argue that § 44-
2004(2) is therefore valid because it is
viewpoint neutral, applying to all employers
and to any type of political contribution, and
assert that the restriction "is plainly
reasonable given Idaho's interest in its
payroll system not assisting or having the
appearance of assisting with political
matters."
A.
Government regulation of speech in public
spaces has historically been governed by the
public forum doctrine. The extent to which
the government can control access depends
on the nature of the relevant forum. The
traditional public forum includes property
characterized, "by long tradition or by
government fiat" as "devoted to assembly
and debate." Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at
45 (noting that streets and parks are the
quintessential examples of public fora). The
government may exclude speakers from a
traditional public forum "only when the
exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and the exclusion is narrowly
drawn to achieve that interest." Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 800.
In comparison, "designated public fora" are
created where the government has opened
public property for expressive activity. If
the government has opened the property to a
class of speakers, rather than offering
selective access to individual speakers, the
property is a designated public forum with
respect to all speakers within that class. The
state may also designate a public forum for
discussion of certain subjects. In a
designated public forum, content-based
prohibitions on speech, including the
exclusion of particular speakers, "must be
narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling
state interest." Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S.
at 46. In other words, as long as the forum
is open, the state is bound by the same
standards as apply to the traditional public
forum.
Finally, a nonpublic forum has been
characterized as "[a]ny public property that
is not by tradition or designation a forum for
public communication." Faith Ctr. Church
Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d
891, 907 (9th Cir. 2007). For example, in
International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)
("ISKCON"), the Court declared airport
terminals to be a nonpublic forum because,
although speech activity occurs in airport
terminals, their tradition and purpose is to
facilitate passenger air travel and serve as a
commercial enterprise, not to promote
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expression. The government may limit
access to "a nonpublic forum to activities
compatible with the intended purpose of the
property." Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at
49.
A "forum" does not need to be a physical
place. For example, in Cornelius, the
Supreme Court held that a charity drive
within federal workplaces constituted a
forum. The Court reasoned that the relevant
forum should be determined on the basis of
the type of access sought by the speaker to
the relevant property, and the NAACP did
not claim any general right of access to the
federal workplace outside of the charity
drive. Thus, the Court considered the
relevant forum to be the charity drive
itself rather than the federal workplace.
Following Cornelius, the relevant forum in
this case would be the payroll deduction
programs of the local governments, as
Plaintiffs seek access to this part of local
government workplaces. Appellants assert
that the payroll deduction programs are
nonpublic fora. The government may place
content-based limits on speech in a
nonpublic forum, "so long as the distinctions
drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum and are viewpoint
neutral." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.
Appellants assert that § 44-2004(2) meets
this test.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue strenuously
that forum analysis does not apply at all
because neither the payroll deduction
programs nor the local workplaces are
"property" of the State of Idaho in any
sense, and the State of Idaho therefore
cannot assert an interest in protecting the
fora. To resolve this question, we consider
first the required relationship between the
government entity seeking to impose a free
speech restriction and the forum in which it
is imposed. We then examine the
relationship between the State of Idaho and
the workplaces of its local governments.
B.
In ISKCON, the Court explained the
rationale for forum analysis as follows:
"Where the government is acting as a
proprietor, managing its internal operations,
rather than acting as lawmaker with the
power to regulate or license, its action will
not be subjected to the heightened review to
which its actions as a lawmaker may be
subject." 505 U.S. at 678. Thus, in these
situations, the role of the government has
changed from regulator to something akin to
that of a private landowner, with at least
some of the associated exclusionary rights.
Forum analysis developed in battles over
access to physical spaces, such as streets,
buses, and airports, where property law
provides a ready guide to the scope of the
government's rights. Supreme Court
precedent accordingly suggests that a forum
may be subject to government control where
the government entity maintains a
proprietary relationship over the relevant
property. For example, in ISKCON, the
Court noted specifically that the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey, the
entity which had adopted the speech-
restricting regulation, owned and operated
the airport terminals which constituted the
property subject to the challenged
regulation. 505 U.S. at 675.
By contrast, the mere possession of legal
authority to regulate an entity, without more,
represents an insufficient level of control
over that property to claim the forum in the
name of the State. In Consolidated Edison,
the Supreme Court rejected an attempt by
the State of New York, acting through the
New York Public Service Commission, to
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regulate Consolidated Edison's monthly bill
inserts. 447 U.S. at 532-33. The State argued
that it was entitled to treat the billing
envelope as "subject to the State's plenary
control" because of the State's regulatory
interest in controlling operations of a public
utility. The Court held that the State's
legitimate regulatory interest in controlling
Consolidated Edison's activities did not alter
the nature of the property as private;
therefore, case law governing rights of
access to governmental property did not
apply.
C.
Reviewing the relationship between the
State of Idaho and the workplaces of local
governments, we conclude that Appellants
have failed to establish that the State of
Idaho is the proprietor of the local
workplaces or of local government payroll
systems. The State's relationship with the
local governments instead resembles that of
a regulator who possesses broad powers
over them.
Appellants' evidence of control over local
governments is similar to that presented by
the State of New York in Consolidated
Edison. Appellants rely exclusively on the
state legislature's authority over Idaho's
political subdivisions, arguing that the
state's power to regulate various aspects of
local government necessarily gives it the
right to control access to the local
governments' payroll deduction programs.
They point out that the legislature may
create, control, alter and abolish local
governments as it sees fit, subject only to the
limits of the Idaho Constitution, citing State
ex rel. Hays v. Steunenberg, 5 Idaho 1, 45 P.
462, 463 (Idaho 1896). Appellants discuss
the doctrine of preemption of municipal law
by State law, note that local governments
may levy taxes only to the extent they are
authorized to do so by the legislature, and
note the limits on the borrowing capabilities
of counties, cities, and school districts,
citing Idaho Const. art. XII, 6; id. art. XIII,
4.
Appellants note that school districts are
supervised and controlled by the State Board
of Education, which must approve the
changing of school district boundaries, the
addition or subtraction of territory, and the
creation of new districts. Appellants also
highlight Common School District No. 61 v.
Twin Falls Bank & Trust Co., 50 Idaho 711,
4 P.2d 342 (Idaho 1931), which states that
school districts are agencies of the state.
Finally, school districts can only exercise
implied powers consistent with those
expressly granted by the legislature.
As illustrated by Consolidated Edison,
however, the generalized lawmaking power
held by the legislature with respect to a
state's political subdivisions does not
establish that the state is acting as a
proprietor with respect to the property of
local governments. In Consolidated Edison,
the New York legislature had granted the
Public Service Commission broad regulatory
powers over Consolidated Edison. The
Court nevertheless found this broad grant of
authority insufficient to render Consolidated
Edison's billing envelopes a forum of the
Public Service Commission. Here, nothing
in the Idaho Code suggests that Idaho is the
proprietor of the local government
workplaces or their payroll deduction
programs. The statutes instead suggest the
opposite-that the State has granted units of
local government the right to own and
control their own property, independent of
the State's control.
Many units of local government in Idaho are
expressly declared to be independent
corporate bodies, suggesting independent
powers of management and governance as
compared with state agencies, which lack a
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similarly corporate status.
Case law has also recognized that local
governments are distinct entities from the
State of Idaho....
Of particular importance to forum analysis,
the legislature has granted many local
governmental units various powers to
acquire, hold, and convey real and personal
property. These rights of ownership are
clearly independent of the State itself, as
other portions of the Code discuss the ability
of the local government units to grant
property to the State or to other political
subdivisions of the State. For example,
school districts have the same property
transfer rights vis-a-vis the State as they
have vis-a-vis other government entities.
Appellants presented no evidence that local
workplaces are treated differently than other
types of property owned by local
government.
In sum, the State's broad powers of control
over local government entities are solely
those of a regulator, analogous to the New
York Public Service Commission's
regulatory powers over Consolidated
Edison. Local governments are independent
corporations and many are explicitly granted
the right to own and control their own
property. Lacking any evidence of the
State's proprietary relationship with the
local government workplace, Appellants'
assertion that the payroll deduction
programs of local governments are
nonpublic fora belonging to the State must
fail.
D.
When pressed at oral argument, Appellants
conceded that the State of Idaho is not the
proprietor of local government workplaces
or their payroll deduction programs.
Nevertheless, Appellants suggest that
Consolidated Edison, involving use of
private property, is fundamentally different
from the situation presented here, and that
Plaintiffs' focus on property ownership and
control is inapposite. They emphasize that,
unlike private corporations such as
Consolidated Edison, local governments are
exclusively creatures of the State's creation;
therefore, the instrumentalities of local
governments are necessarily the
instrumentalities of the State of Idaho,
regardless of who "owns" them.
We do recognize that the forum doctrine's
stated roots in property rights has been
subject to some criticism. There is some
support in the caselaw for an alternative
theory of forum analysis which evaluates the
forum in light of the degree of control
exercised by the government entity. Under
this approach, the question is not one of
ownership or proprietorship but whether the
government has exercised a sufficient
degree of control over the forum such that it
should be granted the right to make speech-
restrictive rules in the forum.
In United States Postal Service v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 101
S. Ct. 2676, 69 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1981), for
example, the Court applied forum analysis
to privately owned mailboxes. Clearly, no
proprietary relationship exists between the
government and private mailboxes.
Nevertheless, the Court compared the
government's rights with respect to the
mailboxes to those of a private owner and
declared that the State had the ability to
preserve "property under its control." Cited
laws controlling the use of mailboxes
included a federal regulation designating the
boxes as "authorized depositor[ies]" of mail
and federal criminal laws affording such
boxes protection against damage and the
destruction of the mail contained therein.
Indeed, the boxes only became "mailboxes"
because of the government's daily use of the
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boxes for that purpose; in that sense, their
essential
controlled
character was
by the government.
completely
Under such circumstances, one can argue
that the state has a sufficient managerial
interest in the resource to justify judicial
deference to its rules. Deference is
appropriate where the government needs to
organize itself in an institutional manner.
The regular exercise of control over the
administrative activities of a particular entity
demonstrates that the government is indeed
the manager of that entity. Such pervasive
management also lessens the likelihood that
a decision made in the course of managing
an entity, which results in the exclusion of
expressive activity, had as its purpose the
suppression of expression.
But even if we were to approach forum
analysis from the vantage point Appellants
urge, it would not alter our conclusion. It is
clear that the State of Idaho does not
pervasively manage local government
workplaces or local government the payroll
deduction programs. Appellants cannot
point to any current or previous exercise of
control over local governments'
administration of their payroll systems,
except for the subject statute, § 44-2004(2).
Appellants could cite no other situation in
which Idaho has attempted to use its
asserted powers to manage the day-to-day
operations of local government personnel.
The unique nature of the State's intervention
therefore strongly suggests that the State's
purpose here is exactly that against which
the First Amendment protects-the denial of
payroll deductions for the purpose of stifling
political speech. Appellants have failed to
establish that local governments' payroll
deduction programs involve Idaho's
discretion and control over the management
of its own internal affairs, such that the
programs should be considered a nonpublic
forum of the State.
Much of First Amendment analysis balances
interests; forum analysis attempts to balance
the interests of the government in
controlling access to its property with the
speech interests of the parties who wish to
gain access to the property. In this case,
Appellants have established generally that
the State of Idaho has the ultimate power of
control over the units of government at issue
but have not established that the State
actually operates or controls the payroll
deduction systems of local units of
government. This suggests that the State of
Idaho did not establish the forum and does
not currently operate the forum.
Consequently, the State has a relatively
weak interest in preventing Plaintiffs from
exercising their First Amendment rights as
compared to the actual controlling entities.
We therefore conclude that Appellants'
assertion that local government payroll
deduction systems are nonpublic fora of the
State of Idaho is unsupported by law or
facts. The public forum doctrine does not
apply to Idaho's decision to prevent local
government employers from granting an
employee's request to make voluntary
contributions to political activities through a
payroll deduction program. Accordingly, we
apply the strict scrutiny analysis described
above, and because § 44-2004(2) fails strict
scrutiny, we hold the statute unconstitutional
as applied to local government employers.
The district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs that Idaho
Code § 44-2004(2) is unconstitutional with
respect to local units of government,
including school districts, is
AFFIRMED.
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"Court to Weigh Deductions for Union PACs"
Education Week
April 9, 2008
Mark Walsh
An Idaho state law that bars school districts
and other local government agencies from
making deductions from employees'
paychecks for political causes will be
reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Last week, the court accepted the state's
appeal in Ysursa v. Pocatello Education
Association (Case No. 07-869), in which
Idaho is defending the federal
constitutionality of a provision under its
"right to work" laws. The provision, passed
in 2003 under a measure known as the
Voluntary Contributions Act, has been
backed in Idaho and in other states by anti-
union groups.
The action is the latest sign of renewed
interest on the Supreme Court in legal issues
surrounding public-employee unions, such
as the rules about representation fees for
workers who refuse to join the union. The
court upheld a Washington state law last
year that requires unions to secure the
consent of nonmembers to use their
representation fees on political activities....
And in February, the court accepted review
of a case that will explore whether nonunion
public employees may be forced to pay
agency fees for the costs of union litigation
not directly related to their workplace's
bargaining unit. That case, Locke v. Karass
(No. 07-610), will be argued in the court's
next term, as will the newly granted Idaho
case.
The Idaho Education Association, its
Pocatello affiliate, and several other public-
employee unions in the state, which rely on
the deductions to help pay for their political
action committees, challenged the Idaho
law.
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit, in San
Francisco, ruled unanimously in October
that the provision as applied to local
government employers violates the First
Amendment free-speech and association
rights of the unions.
"This restriction on voluntary political
contributions burdens political speech," the
9th Circuit court said. "The law does not
prohibit [the unions] from participating in
political activities, but it hampers their
ability to do so by making the collection of
funds for that purpose more difficult."
Similar Ruling
In its appeal to the Supreme Court, Idaho
said the 9th Circuit "has made a striking and
unprecedented incursion into the authority
of state legislatures to control the
employment practices of political
subdivisions."
"The concern here is with the ability of the
Idaho legislature to control payroll practices
of local governmental entities," Clay Smith,
the state's deputy attorney general, said last
week in an interview. "We believe the
legislature has the reasonable authority to do
that without being compromised by the First
Amendment."
The Idaho teachers' union and the other
public-employee unions had urged the high
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court not to review the case. They noted that
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th
Circuit, in Denver, had recently made a
similar ruling in striking down Utah's
version of the Voluntary Contributions Act,
and thus no conflict existed among the
federal appeals courts on the issue....
"In reaching out to ban local governmental
entities from allowing their employees to
use the local governmental entity's payroll
system to transmit lawful political
contributions, Idaho plainly acted as a
regulator" of a speech forum, and not as a
"proprietor" of one, the unions' brief said in
arguing that the 9th Circuit panel had
applied the correct analysis.
"In Idaho, more than in many states, the
mantra has always been local control," said
John E. Rumel, the general counsel of the
11,000-member IEA. "We felt there was just
no good reason for the state to be reaching
out to regulate local payroll systems."
'Paycheck Protection'
In a friend-of-the-court brief filed in support
of Idaho's appeal, the National Right to
Work Legal Defense Foundation and other
groups said the 9th and 10th Circuit rulings
conflicted with a 1998 ruling by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, in
Cincinnati, that upheld an Ohio law similar
to Idaho's.
"The 9th Circuit effectively treats public
payrolls as akin to a public park in which a
union, or any other entity, is entitled to
fundraise, notwithstanding a payroll's
primary (perhaps only) use, which is to pay
employees," the right-to-work group's brief
said.
Stefan H. Gleason, a vice president of the
Springfield, Va.-based foundation, said the
public-employee unions, often led by the
politically powerful teachers' unions,
"oppose any infringement whatsoever on
their special privileges."
The right-to-work groups have long sought
to get states to adopt various forms of what
they call "paycheck protection" measures
for workers who do not want to join the
unions or who do not want their mandatory
representation fees to go for the unions'
political causes.
The anti-union groups have acknowledged
that even in states that have adopted such
measures, the laws have not been very
effective in curbing the influence of unions.
Still, the Supreme Court's recent foray back
into this arena has the anti-union forces
excited.
"It appears the Supreme Court is more
interested in re-examining these cases
involving union special privileges," Mr.
Gleason said.
In its decision last year in Davenport v.
Washington Education Association, the
court unanimously upheld the Washington
state authorization requirement for nonunion
members' agency fees to be used for
political causes, a provision opposed by the
unions.
But in what the unions considered a silver
lining, the justices declined the invitation of
right-to-work groups to reconsider some of
their core precedents on agency fees to make
collection from nonmembers more difficult.
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"Nonunion Educators Organization Applauds U.S. Supreme Court
Decision to Review Idaho Voluntary Contributions Act"
PR Newswire
March 31, 2008
Northwest Professional Educators (NWPE),
Idaho's only nonunion professional
educators organization, applauds the United
States Supreme Court for granting review of
the Ninth Circuit's decision invalidating
Idaho's Voluntary Contributions Act (VCA)
(Ysursa v. Pocatello Education
Association).
Originally passed in 2003, the VCA is a law
that prohibits payroll deductions for union
dues for certain purposes, including political
activities. Challenged by the Idaho
Education Association, the law was ruled
unconstitutional by the state's high court.
Currently, teachers are obligated to pay for
the state and national unions' political
activity with general union dues in order to
exercise their local collective bargaining
rights as members of a local National
Education Association affiliate. Refusing
union membership on political grounds
deprives teachers of their collective
bargaining rights even though they must
abide by the collective bargaining
agreement.
Connie Prow, NWPE member in Bruneau-
Grandview School District, stated in a
declaration supporting the VCA, "The
Voluntary Contributions Act gives us the
chance to have a say and not be intimidated
into belonging to organizations that do not
represent all that we stand for."
Cindy Omlin, Executive Director of
Northwest Professional Educators, stated,
"We are grateful that the United States
Supreme Court has taken this case. Without
the protection of the VCA, hundreds of
dollars are taken from union teachers'
paychecks that are directed to state and
national political activity that runs afoul of
teachers' beliefs and interests. Teachers
should have the right to engage in local
collective bargaining without having their
paychecks picked for unrelated state and
national union politics."
Northwest Professional Educators is a
nonprofit, non-union, professional
educators' organization focused on students
as educators' highest priority and improving
the professionalism of education. NWPE
welcomes educators of any education entity
including teachers, administrators and
support staff, and provides members with
liability insurance, legal services,
professional development resources, teacher
scholarships/ classroom mini-grants, and a
voice on education issues. NWPE is an
affiliate of the Association of American
Educators.
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"Union Leaders Welcome Ruling"
Lewiston Morning Tribune
November 30, 2005
Dean Ferguson
Union leaders are hailing a federal ruling
that strikes down a 2003 Idaho law banning
payroll deductions for political
contributions.
"It would have affected a union's ability to
collect money for political purposes," said
Lewiston firefighter Steve Repp, president
of Lewiston's chapter of the International
Association of Firefighters. "Where part of
the rub came in with it, it specifically
targeted labor organizations."
U.S. District Court Judge B. Lynn Winmill
declared the Voluntary Contributions Act a
violation of the First Amendment in his 15-
page ruling issued Nov. 23.
The law raised a firestorm of protests from
teacher and firefighter unions as Republican
leadership pushed the law in 2003.
Unions argued the law was designed to
punish them for supporting moderate
Republicans and Democrats. Backers of the
law argued it protected workers from paying
dues for political activities they may not
have supported.
Lewiston's senator, whose district has a
strong union presence, took heat for
supporting the law as a member of
leadership.
The law wasn't payback, said Sen. Joe
Stegner, R-Lewiston, who is assistant
majority leader.
"I don't believe it was a punitive effort on
the part of leadership," said Stegner. "I
viewed the issue as an individual's
protection issue versus the interests of a
larger group."
Stegner voted in favor
believing it might not
muster.
of the law despite
pass constitutional
"If we go through that (court challenge)
process, at least we end up with a little more
definitive information," said Stegner. "I
don't disagree that it might not be expensive
from time to time . . . but I don't believe it's
an absolute waste."
Winmill rejected all of the state's
arguments, but conceded the state is free to
ban payroll deductions for its own
employees, "where the state bears any part
of the cost of setting up or maintaining the
payroll deduction."
Since Idaho is a Right to Work state, wrote
Winmill, employees don't have to join
unions, let alone approve payroll deductions.
The judge was unconvinced such payroll
deductions amounted to coercion. In fact,
wrote Winmill, the ban could force "unions
to engage in face-to-face solicitation, a
technique fraught with the potential for
coercion."
He ridiculed the state's contention that the
law protected employees who forget they
authorized a payroll deduction.
Noting the law struck down an annual re-
authorization requirement, Winmill asked
why a "'forgetful-employee' rationale"
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should only apply to political deductions:
"Is there something about political
deductions that makes them particularly
forgettable? Nothing comes to mind. Indeed,
it is impossible to imagine that employees
are blas6 about the money being deducted
from their wages."
As union leaders welcome the ruling, they
have not forgotten the law's sting.
"There seems to be an appearance that they
(lawmakers) don't care for labor unions and
they don't care for public employees," said
Repp, whose local union is working toward
creating its own political action committee.
"That's not the Legislature as a whole . . .
but certainly key people in leadership have
shown that to be their true colors."
Stegner said the ruling should put the issue
to rest.
"I'm not surprised nor am I particularly
disappointed in the outcome," said Stegner.
"And I don't expect any re-attempt by the
Legislature to revisit that issue in this
upcoming session."
He added, "I could be wrong."
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Locke v. Karass
07-610
Ruling Below: Locke v. Karass, 498 F.3d 49, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18763 (2007), cert,
granted, Locke v. Karass, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 1373 (2008).
The Maine State Employees Association (MSEA) is the collective bargaining union for all public
employees in the state of Maine. MSEA is entitled to collect fees from employees who are not
members of the union in order to cover expenses related to collective bargaining. MSEA is
affiliated with the national Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and pays a fee to
maintain that affiliation and contribute to the efforts of SEIU, including litigation costs. Plaintiffs
are nonmembers of MSEA who objected to their fees being used for "extra-unit litigation" costs
by SEIU that were not directly related to the Maine employees. They claim that use of their
nonmember fees violates their First Amendment rights. The First Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed, ruling that nonmember fees could be used for extra-unit litigation as long as the
litigation satisfied the "germaneness" test established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lehnert v.
Ferris Faculty Ass'n.
Question Presented: In Ellis v. Railway Clerks, this Court unanimously "determined that the
[Railway Labor Act], as informed by the First Amendment, prohibits the use of dissenters'
[union] fees for extraunit litigation." Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 528 (1981)
(opinion of Blackmun, J., citing Ellis, 466 U.S. 435, 453 (1984)). In Lehnert, a four-member
plurality therefore held "that the Amendment proscribes such assessments in the public sector."
Id. Moreover, Justice Scalia's separate opinion, concurring in part in the judgment announced by
Justice Blackmun, reasoned that "there is good reason to treat [Ellis and the Court's other
statutory cases] as merely reflecting the constitutional rule." Id. at 555.
May a State, nonetheless, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, condition
continued public employment on the payment of agency fees for purposes of financing a
monopoly bargaining agent's affiliates' litigation outside of a nonunion employee's bargaining
unit?
Daniel B. LOCKE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
Edward A. KARASS, State Controller; Maine State Employees Association, SEIU Local
1989, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Decided August 8, 2007
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. This case raises a significant question under
the First Amendment: may a union,
350
functioning as the exclusive bargaining
agent for certain state employees, charge
nonmembers for litigation expenses incurred
by its national affiliate, if that litigation is
substantively related to the bargaining
process and is funded through a pooling
arrangement? Two other circuits have
responded in the affirmative; one has
answered in the negative. Our reading of the
Supreme Court's most recent decision on
this subject leads us to reply in the
affirmative and hold that "extra-unit
litigation" may be charged to nonmembers
where it satisfies the "germaneness test" that
generally applies to other pooled resources.
See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500
U.S. 507 (1991). We therefore affirm the
district court's entry of summary judgment
for the union and against the nonmember
employees.
I.
A. Factual Background
Both parties moved for summary judgment
below; none of the material facts are in
dispute.
The Maine State Employees Association
("MSEA") is a union representing state
workers, and has been designated by the
state as the exclusive bargaining agent for
certain employees of its executive branch.
Under MSEA's collective bargaining
agreement, it must provide certain
administrative services for all of these
employees, regardless of whether they elect
to join the union. As a result, MSEA is
entitled to receive a "service fee" (also
known as an "agency fee") from those
nonmember state employees whom it
represents. The state and MSEA negotiated
a new collective bargaining agreement in
2005, which included a provision requiring
all nonmember employees to begin paying
this service fee as of July 1, 2005. The
service fee is intended to be equal to the
amount of union dues minus those expenses
not related to the provision of collective
bargaining and contract administration
services. In other words, MSEA is permitted
to charge nonmember employees their share
of all expenditures related to its services as
the exclusive bargaining agent; those MSEA
expenditures that are not related to
bargaining and contract administration, such
as political campaign donations or benefits
provided only to members, cannot be
"charged" to the nonmembers.
MSEA's expenditures include the affiliation
fee that it pays to the Service Employees
International Union ("SEIU") to maintain its
affiliation relationship with that
organization. MSEA's July [2005] notice
also included financial information for SEIU
and classified as chargeable that proportion
of its affiliation fee that represented SEIU's
expenditures on chargeable activities. In
other words, all of SEIU's activities that
were comparable to those undertaken by
MSEA, and which MSEA deemed
chargeable in the calculation of the service
fee, were included in the calculation of the
proportion of MSEA's affiliation fee that
could be charged to nonmembers.
MSEA included in its calculation of
chargeable expenditures those costs of
litigation (by both itself and SEIU) that was
germane to collective bargaining. This
meant that nonmembers contributed,
through their service fees, to some litigation
that was not undertaken specifically for their
own bargaining unit, but rather was
conducted by or on behalf of other units or
the national affiliate, sometimes in other
states. Included within this general category
of expenditures were the salaries of SEIU's
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lawyers, and other costs of providing legal
services to bargaining units throughout the
country. Costs of litigation that was not
related to collective bargaining, however,
were not included in the service fees
assessed to MSEA's nonmembers.
Some nonmembers challenged the service
fee and an arbitration was scheduled for all
objections. The arbitration took place in
December 2005, and the arbitrator issued a
decision in May 2006, upholding MSEA's
service fee calculation. In accord with the
notice, all fees paid by nonmembers were
held in escrow until after the arbitrator's
decision was announced.
B. Procedural Background
On appeal, the nonmember employees raise
only two issues. First, they claim that
SEIU's expenditures on litigation related to
or on behalf of other bargaining units (also
known as "extra-unit litigation" expenses)
are not chargeable to nonmembers under the
First Amendment because "the State of
Maine has no 'compelling state interest' in
SEIU's far-flung litigation activities
nationwide." Second, the appellants claim
that the "district court erred when it held that
the constitution imposes no obligation to
calculate an adequate advance reduction of
the fee."
none of the Supreme Court's opinions has
squarely addressed the issue presented in
this case, we explain below our view that the
constitutionality of charging extra-unit
litigation costs to nonmember employees
turns on the same "germaneness" test that
applies to all other pooled services under
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S.
507 (1991).
C. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks
[In Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks,
466 U.S. 435 (1984),] the Court . . .
addressed the particular expenditures that
were challenged by nonmembers. In
evaluating these expenditures, the Court
recognized that the agency-shop
arrangement inherently entailed some
"significant impingement on First
Amendment rights" because the nonmember
employees were, for the sake of peaceful
labor relations, being required to "support
financially an organization with whose
principles and demands [they] may
disagree." Id. at 455. The Court nonetheless
recognized that this infringement of
constitutional rights had been permitted, by
its prior decisions in Hanson and Street,
because of the strong governmental interests
at stake. With those preliminary
considerations in mind, it articulated the
standard for permissible charges to
nonmembers as
II.
The first issue in this case, the chargeability
of extra-unit litigation that is related to
collective bargaining and that is subject to a
pooling arrangement, requires us to examine
a series of Supreme Court decisions and to
resolve an area of uncertainty. Although
whether the challenged
expenditures are necessarily or
reasonably incurred for the purpose
of performing the duties of an
exclusive representative of the
employees in dealing with the
employer on labor-management
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issues. Under this standard,
objecting employees may be
compelled to pay their fair share of
not only the direct costs of
negotiating and administering a
collective-bargaining contract and
of settling grievances and disputes,
but also the expenses of activities
or undertakings normally or
reasonably employed to implement
or effectuate the duties of the union
as exclusive representative of the
employees in the bargaining unit.
Id. at 448. Pursuant to this standard, only
those expenditures arising from activities
related to the union's duty of representation
to all of the employees in the bargaining unit
could be charged to all employees.
One of the six specific expenditures at issue
in Ellis was litigation costs. The Court held:
The expenses of litigation incident
to negotiating and administering
the contract or to settling
grievances and disputes arising in
the bargaining unit are clearly
chargeable to petitioners as a
normal incident of the duties of the
exclusive representative. The same
is true of fair representation
litigation arising within the unit, of
jurisdictional disputes with other
unions, and of any other litigation
before agencies or in the courts
that concerns bargaining unit
employees and is normally
conducted by the exclusive
representative. The expenses of
litigation not having such a
connection with the bargaining unit
are not to be charged to objecting
employees.
Id. at 453. Consistent with Ellis' general
definition of relevance (or "germaneness,"
as the Court would later describe it), which
focuses on activities that are related to a
union's collective bargaining duties,
litigation expenses chargeable to
nonmembers would also have to be related
to the bargaining process for the particular
local unit. Extra-unit litigation, by
definition, could not satisfy this standard.
E. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association
In Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S.
507 (1991), the Court addressed, for the first
time, the chargeability of "pooled
expenses." The defendant union in Lehnert
was a local affiliate of both a state union
(the Michigan Education Association, or
"MEA") and a larger, national union (the
National Education Association, or "NEA").
It paid affiliation fees to the MEA and the
NEA; these fees, along with the fees paid by
all other local affiliates, were used by the
state and national unions to support various
activities at the state and national level. The
affiliation fees also ensured the local unit's
access to the MEA's and NEA's resources
when the unit needed them (and the
correlative availability of those resources to
other local units when they were in need).
The union passed a portion of its affiliation
fees obligation on to nonmembers, by
counting a percentage of the affiliation fees
within the chargeable category of
expenditures. That chargeable category was
calculated by dividing the MEA's and
NEA's total expenditures by those
expenditures it made on "chargeable"
activities. The nonmember plaintiffs in
Lehnert challenged the amount of the
service fee, based on the inclusion of certain
expenditures in the category of "chargeable"
expenses.
The Lehnert Court began by reviewing the
relevant precedents and deriving from them
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a three-part test for determining whether a
particular union expenditure is chargeable to
nonmembers: "chargeable activities must
(1) be 'germane' to collective-bargaining
activity; (2) be justified by the government's
vital policy interest in labor peace and
avoiding 'free riders'; and (3) not
significantly add to the burdening of free
speech that is inherent in the allowance of an
agency or union shop." Id. at 519.
The Court then analyzed the nonmembers'
claim "that they may be charged only for
those collective-bargaining activities
undertaken directly on behalf of their unit."
Id. at 522. It focused on the language from
Hanson requiring that expenditures charged
to nonmembers be "germane" to collective
bargaining and concluded that such
expenditures need not have "a direct
relationship" to the nonmembers' bargaining
unit in order to satisfy the germaneness
prong of the chargeability test. Id. at 522-23.
The Court explained:
The essence of the affiliation
relationship is the notion that the
parent will bring to bear its often
considerable economic, political,
and informational resources when
the local is in need of them.
Consequently, that part of a local's
affiliation fee which contributes to
the pool of resources potentially
available to the local is assessed
for the bargaining unit's protection,
even if it is not actually expended
on that unit in any particular
membership year.
Id. at 523. Thus the nonmembers' service
fees could include "their pro rata share of
the costs associated with otherwise
chargeable activities of [the local unit's]
state and national affiliates, even if those
activities were not performed for the direct
benefit of the objecting employees'
bargaining unit." Id. at 524. In other words,
the Court concluded that the use of a pooling
or affiliation arrangement, with its
requirement that a local union pay an
affiliation fee to the state or national union,
would not render expenditures that were
otherwise chargeable (that is, substantively
relevant to collective bargaining) non-
germane to the local bargaining unit.
The Court cautioned, however, that the
permissibility of pooling arrangements
"does not serve to grant a local union carte
blanche to expend dissenters' dollars for
bargaining activities wholly unrelated to the
employees in their unit." Id. The Lehnert
Court, therefore, adopted a different
standard of germaneness than that used by
the Ellis Court. While Ellis defined germane
activities as those directly related to the
local unit's bargaining process, 466 U.S. at
448, Lehnert recognized germaneness as
having two distinct components: charged
expenditures must be (1) substantively
related to collective bargaining, and (2) "for
services that may ultimately inure to the
benefit of the members of the local union by
virtue of their membership in the parent
organization," 500 U.S. at 524. Thus,
Lehnert defined germaneness more broadly
to take account of the nature of affiliation
relationships and the pooling of resources
characteristic of such relationships.
[Discussion of the dicta in multiple opinions
addressing the use of pooled expenses for
extra-unit litigation. No opinion garnered a
majority.]
In light of this fractured opinion, Lehnert did
not resolve the specific question before us in
this case: whether a union may charge
nonmembers for expenses related to
litigation conducted by a national affiliate, if
the litigation is substantively related to the
354
bargaining process and is funded through a
pooling arrangement. Lehnert did provide
the framework, however, for analyzing the
question.
III.
B. MSEA's Extra-Unit Litigation Charges
In granting summary judgment for MSEA,
the district court held "as a matter of law
that the inclusion of the cost of extra-unit
litigation does not violate Plaintiffs'
constitutional rights." Locke v. Karass, 425
F. Supp. 2d 137, 147 (D. Me. 2006). It cited
the decisions of the Sixth and Third Circuits,
and stated that "[t]hose circuit courts that
have ruled on the issue have found that it is
constitutionally permissible for unions to
include extra-unit litigation expenses in the
service fees charged to nonmembers." Id. at
146-47.
The appellants argue that the district court
failed to give due weight to the Supreme
Court's earlier decision in Ellis, which
stated that "[t]he expenses of litigation not
having [] a connection with the bargaining
unit are not to be charged to objecting
employees." 466 U.S. at 453. They claim
that this language is dispositive and bars the
union from charging nonmembers for any
extra-unit litigation costs. In addition, they
cite to Justice Blackmun's opinion in
Lehnert, representing four Justices, and its
endorsement of the Ellis per se prohibition
on charging for extra-unit litigation, 500
U.S. at 528, in support of their argument.
They also contend that our decision in
Romero v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto
Rico, 204 F.3d 291, 299 (1st Cir. 2000), is
controlling here because, they say, it holds
that charging nonmembers for litigation,
other than that conducted by or for the
particular bargaining
unconstitutional.
unit, is
In response, MSEA argues that Ellis is not
relevant to this case because it did not
address the chargeability of pooled
resources, and its discussion of extra-unit
litigation is therefore inapplicable to the
facts here. The union also challenges
appellants' reliance on Romero, arguing that
its discussion of chargeability for extra-unit
litigation was dicta. MSEA urges us to adopt
the reasoning of the Third and Sixth
Circuits, finding that the three-part Lehnert
test should apply to extra-unit litigation in
the same way that it applies to all other
pooling arrangements.
We agree with MSEA that both Lehnert's
germaneness definition and three-part
chargeability test are applicable here. Like
the Third Circuit, we believe the
chargeability of extra-unit litigation "lies in
the intersection of the Ellis and Lehnert
holdings," 330 F.3d at 135. The Ellis
decision holds that nonmembers cannot be
charged for litigation that does not
"concern" their own bargaining unit. 466
U.S. at 453. While the language in Ellis
suggests, at first blush, that only litigation
by or for the particular bargaining unit
involved can be charged to nonmembers, a
closer reading of the opinion reveals a more
limited holding. As Otto noted, the Ellis
court was not confronted with a pooling
arrangement, 330 F.3d at 136; its decision
pertained only to the direct contribution of
local union monies to litigation efforts by
other units (or by a national affiliate)
meaning contributions to litigation expenses
given without expectation of reciprocal
contributions at a later time. Moreover, the
litigation that was deemed nonchargeable in
Ellis was specifically defined as "litigation
not involving the negotiation of agreements
or settlement of grievances." 466 U.S. at
355
440. Therefore, the import of the decision in
Ellis, relying on a narrow definition of
germaneness, is limited by its factual
background (i.e., a direct funding
arrangement).
Lehnert addressed a different factual
context-a pooling arrangement-and
explored the reasons that pooled
expenditures for litigation fall outside the
rule articulated in Ellis. 500 U.S. at 523-24.
The best way to reconcile Ellis and Lehnert
is to recognize this distinction. Ellis
continues to be good law, and to mean what
it literally says, in cases involving a unit's
direct expenditures to support litigation by
other bargaining units. But where monies
are spent in a pooling arrangement, as
described by Lehnert, Ellis does not bar the
chargeability of extra-unit litigation
expenses, and Lehnert's definition of
germaneness, applicable generally to
pooling arrangements, applies sensibly to
litigation expenses funded by such a pooling
arrangement.
Under Lehnert, an activity is germane if it is
substantively related to bargaining and will
"ultimately inure to the benefit of the
members of the local union," 500 U.S. at
524. Where a unit enters a pooling
arrangement, the pool itself provides a
benefit to the local unit. As noted in Otto,
the pooling arrangement is akin to
insurance, whereby the local unit contributes
certain amounts to a larger fund in order to
ensure that the larger fund will provide
resources (in the form of services or money)
in return, when the local unit needs them.
See id. at 522-24. This arrangement,
therefore, differs in kind from unilateral,
non-reciprocal contributions to extra-unit
litigation (of the sort at issue in Ellis), for
which a bargaining unit would have no
reasonable expectation of any return benefit.
The funding mechanism used is critical to a
determination of which definition of
germaneness ought to apply. The Ellis
definition assumes, and thereby requires, a
direct source of funding, whereas the
Lehnert definition of germaneness assumes
the existence of an affiliation or pooling
relationship. As this case involves extra-unit
litigation funded through a pooling
agreement, we conclude that the Lehnert
definition of germaneness should apply.
Therefore, we apply the Lehnert three-prong
test to determine whether MSEA's
contributions to SEIU's litigation efforts
were properly chargeable. If the SEIU
litigation was "germane" to MSEA's
collective bargaining duties, as that term
was defined in Lehnert, if it was justified by
the government's interests in labor peace
and prevention of free riders, and if it did
"not significantly add to the burdening of
free speech that is inherent in the allowance
of an agency or union shop," 500 U.S. at
519, the costs of MSEA's contribution to
that litigation were chargeable to the
appellants.
The appellants have not, before the district
court or on appeal, argued that the particular
expenditures for which they were charged
failed to satisfy this test. Instead, relying on
Ellis, and Justice Blackmun's treatment of
extra-unit litigation costs in Lehnert, they
have argued only that, as a matter of law,
extra-unit litigation could not be deemed
"germane," and hence the costs associated
with it could not be charged to nonmembers.
Having rejected that argument, we are
bound to conclude that the costs at issue
here do satisfy the chargeability test, as there
has been no dispute regarding the second
and third prongs of the test.
In addressing this extra-unit litigation issue,
the district court held "as a matter of law[,]
that the inclusion of the cost of extra-[unit]
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litigation does not violate Plaintiffs'
constitutional rights." 425 F. Supp. 2d at
147. Viewed in isolation, apart from the
arguments framed by the parties, that
language might be read to endorse a per se
rule that all extra-unit litigation can be
charged to nonmembers. However, as we
have noted, the parties did not dispute
whether the litigation charges were
"germane," as that term was defined in
Lehnert. Therefore, the district court must
have assumed, consistent with the
representations made to it, that the extra-unit
litigation charges before it were "germane"
within the meaning of Lehnert. On the basis
of that understanding, we agree with the
district court's disposition of the extra-unit
litigation issue.
AFFIRMED.
LYNCH, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
joining and
The very narrow issue raised by this case is
whether Local 1989's agency shop fees must
exclude SEIU's extra-unit litigation
expenses from the usual rule for calculating
chargeable extra-unit expenses. Lehnert
ruled that chargeability of extra-unit
expenses is subject to "a case-by-case
analysis." 500 U.S. at 519. Chargeable
activities must "(1) be 'germane' to
collective bargaining activity; (2) be
justified by the government's vital policy
interest in labor peace and avoiding 'free
riders'; and (3) not significantly add to the
burdening of free speech that is inherent in
the allowance of an [agency shop]." Id.
There is no dispute that the extra-unit
litigation by SEIU was "germane" in that
pertinent sense. The question plaintiffs
present is a categorical one-are extra unit
litigation expenses so different from other
extra-unit expenses that they should per se
be treated differently for agency fee
purposes? As described well in Judge
Lipez's opinion, Lehnert did not directly
answer the question. I think the answer is,
clearly, "No."
The First Amendment is not violated by
allowing extra-unit litigation expenses to be
charged according to the same criteria of
germaneness as other extra-unit expenses.
Extra-unit litigation expenses are not
analytically different from other pooled
extra-unit expenses. The National Labor
Relations Board, an administrative body
with particularized expertise in
administering labor disputes under the
NLRA, has so held for over a decade.
The free rider problem, which justifies both
local and extra-unit agency fees, exists
equally for litigation costs as for other extra-
unit costs. Extra-unit litigation can create
common benefits or avoid common
detriments. Litigation conducted by national
unions frequently establishes precedent that
redounds to the benefit of a union local and
the employees it represents, even when the
local is not a named party. For example,
terms within a collective bargaining
agreement may not yet have been
established as having a particular meaning,
and extra-unit litigation could establish a
union-friendly definition. Or a local may
believe that a particular practice common to
its segment of an industry is an actionable
unfair labor practice and contractual
violation, but the national may decide for
strategic reasons that a lawsuit is better
brought with an extra-unit plaintiff. In return
for these considerable benefits, a local union
need pay an affiliation fee to the national.
There is no reason to think, and no evidence
presented by the plaintiffs to prove, that the
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free rider problem is eliminated simply
because the common extra-unit benefit is
obtained through litigation. In fact, such a
position "overlooks the economic
interdependence of bargaining units." Int'1
Ass'n of Machinists, 133 F.3d at 1016.
Further, if a particular extra-unit lawsuit is
too remote and indirect in benefit to a local
bargaining unit, or if a national union brings
a suit for purposes totally unrelated to its
collective bargaining duties, that problem
may be addressed by a particularized
germaneness inquiry. The existence of this
mechanism to determine germaneness itself
argues against any per se exclusion of extra-
unit litigation expenses. If a case is brought
to advance a political position, then the
Lehnert rule itself will exclude that litigation
from the agency fee.
A contrary rule would result in
practical detriment for both
national unions. Adopting
proposed rule would lead to reducing
unions' ability to draw on funds for
litigation related to collective bargaining.
There would be a concomitant reduced
capacity to bargain effectively on behalf of
all employees. Ultimately, chipping away at
the scope of properly chargeable expenses
could jeopardize the income stream of
unions.
Under Lehnert, the marginal burden on the
First Amendment rights of non-union
employees imposed by adding germane
extra-unit litigation fees to the agency fee is
minimal. On the facts here, the financial
burden for extra-unit litigation costs is very
small. The added burden on the plaintiffs'
expressive and associative rights could not
amount to any significant diminution-let
alone infringement-of First Amendment
rights.
significant
local and
plaintiffs'
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"Court Will Hear Labor Union Fee Dispute"
The Associated Press
February 19, 2008
The Associated Press
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court on
Tuesday stepped into a dispute over a labor
union's use of fees paid by nonunion
employees to finance the labor
organization's court battles in other states.
Twenty state workers in Maine are
challenging the expenditure by the labor
union that bargains on their behalf.
The nonmembers are required to pay a
service fee for the union's collective
bargaining efforts and contract
administration.
The Service Employees International Union
relies on portions of the fees to subsidize
lawsuits concerning SEIU units other than
Local 1989 to which the 20 current and
former state employees belong.
At issue is whether a state can condition
public employment on the paying of fees for
such purposes.
This case is the latest instance of the justices
addressing issues that could erode the power
of labor unions. Last June, the court ruled
that states may force public sector labor
unions to get consent from workers before
using their fees for political activities.
Three months ago, the court agreed to
decide the validity of a state law that limits
employers' ability to weigh in on union
organizing.
Union officials have no legal authority to
make nonunion public servants in Maine pay
for union activity across the nation, said
Stefan Gleason, vice president of the
National Right to Work Foundation.
The group's legal arm is representing the
Maine workers and has had 14 of its cases,
all targeting labor unions, heard at the
Supreme Court.
The case is Locke v. Karass, docket number
07-610.
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"First U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Rules Nonmembers
Can Be Charged for National Union's Litigation Costs"
Rhode Island Lawyers Weekly
August 20, 2007
Eric T. Berkman
A state employees' union could charge
nonmembers a "service fee" for litigation
expenses incurred by its national affiliate
and funded through a pooling arrangement,
the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has
held.
A group of nonmember employees-for
whom the union was their exclusive
bargaining agent-argued that the service
fee was unconstitutional because the
national affiliate's litigation activities were
not germane to their local unit.
But the 1st Circuit disagreed, finding that
this "extra-unit litigation" satisfied the
"germaneness" test articulated in the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Lehnert v.
Ferris Faculty Ass'n.
"Where litigation is funded through a
pooling arrangement [between national and
local affiliates], the Lehnert definition of
germaneness applies and the affiliation
relationship between the national union and
the local unit will be sufficient to
demonstrate that the expenditures will 'inure
to the benefit' of the local unit," wrote Judge
Kermit V. Lipez for the court.
"The extra-unit litigation costs [in this case]
were substantially related to the bargaining
process," Lipez continued. "Those costs are
chargeable to the nonmember appellants
without offending the First Amendment."
W. James Young of the National Right to
Work Legal Defense Foundation in
Springfield, Va., and Stephen C. Whiting of
Portland, Maine,
nonmember employees.
represented
Washington lawyers Robert W. Alexander
and Jeremiah Collins represented the union.
Extra-Unit Litigation Fees
The Maine State Employees Association, a
union representing state workers in Maine,
is designated under state law as the
exclusive bargaining agent for certain
employees in Maine's executive branch.
As the exclusive bargaining agent, MSEA is
required to provide administrative services
to all employees in that unit, whether or not
they are members of the union.
In 2005, the state and MSEA negotiated a
new collective bargaining agreement that
included a provision requiring all
nonmember employees to begin paying a
"service fee" to cover expenditures related
to bargaining and contract administration.
These service fees could not be used for
political activities or for benefits provided
only to members.
MSEA also maintained a "pooling
arrangement" with the Service Employees
International Union, a national organization,
under which MSEA paid SEIU an
"affiliation fee" in return for services,
personnel and resources when MSEA might
need them.
As part of the service fee it collected from
nonmembers, MSEA included a proportion
the
360
of the affiliation fee it paid to SEIU covering
activities it deemed relevant to the services
it provided to nonmembers. Included in this
calculus were litigation costs incurred by
SEIU that MSEA considered germane to
collective bargaining.
As a result, nonmembers were contributing,
through their service fees, to "extra-unit
litigation" that was not necessarily
conducted for their own benefit, but for the
benefit of other units and SEIU itself. Some
of this litigation, they alleged, involved out-
of-state matters.
A group of 20 nonmember employees
challenged this service fee and the case went
to arbitration in December 2005.
In May 2006, the arbitrator upheld the
service fee calculation.
The nonmembers subsequently filed suit
against MSEA and SEIU in U.S. District
Court, claiming that the inclusion of extra-
unit litigation costs in their service fees
violated their First Amendment freedom-of-
association rights because the state had no
compelling state interest in SEIU's national
litigation activities.
U.S. District Court Judge George Z. Singal
granted summary judgment for the unions,
and the nonmembers appealed.
'Lehnert' Test
On appeal, the 1st Circuit acknowledged
that no U.S. Supreme Court decision directly
addressed whether nonmembers could be
charged a "service" fee to help cover extra-
unit litigation conducted by a national
affiliate but funded in part by the local unit
through a pooling arrangement.
The nonmember employees urged the 1 st
Circuit to follow the 10th Circuit's 1991
decision in Pilots Against Illegal Dues v. Air
Line Pilots Ass 'n (PAID).
In that case, the 10th Circuit held that
litigation conducted by a national affiliate
was not germane to the local unit-and thus
not chargeable to nonmembers-because it
did not directly concern or benefit the local
unit.
However, the 1st Circuit felt this approach
went too far.
"This approach effectively prevents unions
from charging nonmembers for any extra-
unit litigation because, by definition, extra-
unit litigation will not directly involve or
concern the nonmembers' unit," said Lipez.
Instead, the court looked to the 6th and 3rd
circuits, which ruled in 1995 and 2003
respectively, that under the germaneness test
laid out by the Supreme Court in Lehnert,
extra-unit litigation was chargeable to
nonmembers as long as such expenses are
shown to be related to collective bargaining
and thus potentially "inure to the benefit" of
the local unit.
The 1 st Circuit
germaneness test-as
prongs of Lehnert 's
this case.
then applied the
well as the other two
chargeability test-to
"If the SEIU litigation was 'germane' to
MSEA's collective bargaining duties, as that
term was defined in Lehnert, if it was
justified by the government's interests in
labor peace and if it did not 'significantly
add to the burdening of free speech that is
inherent in the allowance of an agency or
union shop,' the costs of MSEA's
361
contribution to that litigation were
chargeable to the [nonmembers]," said
Lipez, quoting from Lehnert.
Because the nonmembers had not alleged
that the extra-unit litigation expenses failed
to satisfy any of these criteria-instead
arguing that extra-unit litigation expenses
could not be considered germane as a matter
of law-the 1st Circuit concluded that the
costs were indeed chargeable.
362
"Justices Curb Unions' Use
of Fees for Politics"
Los Angeles Times
June 15, 2007
David Savage
WASHINGTON-In a setback for
organized labor, the Supreme Court ruled
Thursday that states may bar public
employee unions from using compulsory
dues for political purposes unless
individuals give their explicit approval. The
9-0 ruling opens the door for states to pass
laws restricting use of union dues.
Nationwide, 12 million workers in public-
and private-sector jobs are required to pay
dues or fees to a union even if they elect not
to join, and the National Right to Work
Committee and other opponents of unions
have fought these forced dues as
unconstitutional.
President Bush and other conservatives have
campaigned in favor of "paycheck
protection" laws to limit the political use of
union dues, long a major source of funding
for Democratic candidates. Thursday's
ruling in favor of such a law in Washington
state implicitly endorsed those efforts.
But these laws have gained little traction in
Congress or around the nation. Twice in the
last decade, California voters have rejected
ballot initiatives that would have required
unions to ask the permission of employees
before using their dues for politics. The most
recent defeat came in 2005, when
Proposition 75, strongly backed by Gov.
Arnold Schwarzenegger, lost by 7
percentage points.
While some union foes called the court's
ruling an important victory and predicted it
would lead to other such laws, the National
Right to Work Committee acknowledged
that the court decided a narrow issue and
that its direct effect figures to be limited.
The justices did not say it was
unconstitutional to require schoolteachers
and other public employees to pay dues to a
union, as anti-union groups had hoped.
Rather, it said only that states that allow
public sector unions may also protect the
rights of dissidents.
At issue before the court was a unique
Washington state law that said unions may
not collect fees from a nonmember and
spend this money on politics unless
"affirmatively authorized by the individual."
The state's largest teachers union challenged
this rule in court, and the Washington
Supreme Court struck down the restriction
as a violation of the union's rights.
The Supreme Court had no difficulty
overturning that decision in Davenport vs.
Washington Education Assn.
"Unions have no constitutional entitlement
to the fees of nonmember employees,"
Justice Antonin Scalia said.
"It is undeniably unusual for a government
agency to give a private entity the power, in
essence, to tax government employees," he
said, referring to the "agency shop" laws in
many states that permit such arrangements
in the public sector.
Nationwide, 28 states authorize public
unions to collect mandatory fees from all
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employees, while 22 states forbid it.
Requiring unions to obtain an explicit
approval from dissident teachers before
spending their dues money is a "modest
limitation . . . on the union's exercise of this
extraordinary power" to collect forced dues
from all teachers, Scalia continued.
The decision maintains the uneasy
compromise that the court set in the 1970s
when unions took hold in the public sector,
organizing schoolteachers, firefighters,
police officers and other public employees.
On the one hand, unions can require all
employees to pay fees or dues to cover the
cost of collective bargaining, at least in
states that authorize "agency shop" rules.
But in 1977 the court said dissident
employees have a free-speech right not to be
forced to pay for political causes they
oppose.
But reconciling those two principles
continues to pose problems. Union leaders
prefer a rule that allows them to use dues
money except when dissidents object and
seek a refund in writing. Anti-union activists
have fought this approach, saying it gives
unions too much leeway to spend the money
of dissidents.
Anti-union activists and union officials were
divided on whether Thursday's decision
would prove significant.
"We are thrilled. This is a clear victory for
the 1 st Amendment rights of teachers not to
fund political activity against their will,"
said Michael Reitz, a lawyer for the
Evergreen Freedom Foundation in Olympia,
Wash., which supported the dissident
teachers. The ruling "paves the way for state
legislatures to adopt paycheck protection
across the country."
However, Stefan Gleason, a vice president
of the National Right to Work Committee,
called the decision a disappointment.
"America's workers laboring under
compulsory unionism are little better off
after today's ruling," he said.
He said he hoped the high court would go
further and say it was unconstitutional to
force nonmembers to pay hundreds of
dollars a year to a union. "The solution is to
stop forced union dues in the first place," he
said in an interview. "The paycheck
protection laws are misguided and
ineffective. It's not a good strategy to
pursue."
The nation's largest teachers union said the
decision "will have little or no practical
impact." Indeed, Washington's law was the
only one of its kind, and it no longer applies,
as the Legislature later amended it in favor
of the unions.
Bob Chanin, general counsel for the
National Education Assn., said, "It is rare
that I can honestly say we are pleased with a
unanimous Supreme Court decision
reversing our win in the court below, but
this is one of those occasions."
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"Court Ruling Stipulates Kinds of Fees Public
Unions Can Assess Nonmembers"
Washington Post
May 31, 1991
Ruth Marcus
Public employee unions cannot charge
nonmembers for political lobbying and
public relations campaigns that are not
directly related to efforts to secure a
contract, the Supreme Court ruled yesterday.
The case concerned teachers at a Michigan
college who were not members of the union
but were required by state law to pay a fee
for union services.
The teachers challenged the use of that
money for activities such as lobbying the
legislature to increase spending on
education; public relations efforts devoted to
the same end; and activities of the parent
unions not undertaken directly on behalf of
the individual union.
The court ruled 8 to 1 that the use of the
money for political lobbying and public
relations, except those needed to ratify a
contract and obtain the funds to pay for it,
violated the free speech rights of the
employees who were forced to pay the union
for it.
But five justices said it was legal to charge
the employees for "their share of the
collective bargaining costs of the state or
national parent union" even if the activities
of the parent unions do not directly produce
a "tangible benefit" for the local.
The other four agreed that nonmembers
could be charged for some of the costs of
parent unions.
Both sides claimed victory in Lehnert v.
Ferris Faculty Association.
"Public employee unions spend millions of
dollars lobbying state legislatures and
Congress and the executive branches on the
state and federal level on all sorts of matters,
and they can no longer do that with the
money of dissenting nonunion public
employees," said Raymond LaJeunesse of
the National Right to Work Legal Defense
Fund, which represented the nonunion
teachers.
From now on, he said, "That money will
have to come from those members that
voluntarily agree to pay full union dues."
Money spent on lobbying is an important
part of the expenditure of public employee
unions because they rely on government
funding of their members' jobs.
But union lawyers said they had dodged a
potentially lethal bullet with the court's
ruling on the use of nonmember funds to
support the activities of state and national
unions.
All nine justices agreed that nonmembers
could be charged for some of those
activities.
This was the kind of a case if it went the
wrong way it could have been a disaster. It
could have wiped us out," said Robert
Chanin, the lawyer for the union. "The most
important issue was whether local
bargaining units can charge for the expenses
of state and national parent unions. . . . If
that had gone the other way, we could have
been in serious difficulty."
In this case, for example, the $ 284 service
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fee charged to Ferris State College teachers
who were not members of the union was
broken down as $ 24.80 to the Ferris Faculty
Association, $211.20 to the Michigan
Education Association and $ 48 to the
National Education Association.
Had all but the $ 24.80 been deemed off-
limits for the union to charge nonmembers,
Chanin said, large numbers of employees
would have had a new financial incentive to
quit the union and pay much less, a
potentially devastating threat to the survival
of public employee unions. Now, he said,
"well over two-thirds of our dues will be
chargeable."
The ruling was splintered. Justice Harry A.
Blackmun wrote an opinion joined by Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Byron R. White and John Paul Stevens;
Justice Thurgood Marshall joined those
parts of the opinion upholding the union
expenditures.
Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Sandra
Day O'Connor, Anthony M. Kennedy and
David H. Souter, agreed with the court's
handling of many of the items. But he said
the court was using the wrong test, and that
"contributions can be compelled only for the
costs of performing the union's statutory
duties as exclusive bargaining
representative."
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14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett
07-581
Ruling Below: Pyett v. 14 Penn Plaza, 498 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 14 Penn
Plaza v. Pyett, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 1418 (2008).
Plaintiffs were employed by defendants as night watchmen in a commercial office building. In
August 2003, the company contracted with a security service company and moved plaintiffs into
less desirable positions, such as porters and light duty cleaners. Claiming age discrimination and
other violations, the plaintiffs filed grievances with their Union. The Union submitted some
claims to arbitration and denied other claims. Plaintiffs then filed a grievance with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission on the age discrimination claim. Defendants moved to
dismiss the claims, arguing that the plaintiffs' Collective Bargaining Agreement contained a
clause requiring all claims of discrimination be submitted to arbitration. The Second Circuit held
that mandatory arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements are unenforceable to the
extent that they deny covered workers the right to a judicial forum for federal statutory claims.
Question Presented: Is an arbitration clause contained in a collective bargaining agreement,
freely negotiated by a union and an employer, which clearly and unmistakably waives the union
members' right to a judicial forum for their statutory discrimination claims, enforceable?
Steven PYETT, Thomas O'Connell, and Michael Phillips,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
Pennsylvania Building Co., 14 PENN PLAZA, LLC, and Temco Service
Industries, Inc., Defendants-Appellants.
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Decided August 1, 2007
JOSE A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, defendants challenge an order
of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Naomi
Reice Buchwald, Judge) denying their
motion to compel arbitration of plaintiffs'
age discrimination claims in accordance
with the collective bargaining agreement
between plaintiffs' union and their
employer. Defendants argue that the District
Court, which relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), and our Court's
decision in Rogers v. New York University,
220 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2000), failed to take
into account the Supreme Court's decisions
in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991), and Wright v. Universal
Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
We disagree, and reaffirm our decision in
Rogers that mandatory arbitration clauses in
collective bargaining agreements are
unenforceable to the extent they waive the
rights of covered workers to a judicial forum
for federal statutory causes of action.
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BACKGROUND
The following facts are not disputed by the
parties.
Plaintiffs are employees of Temco Services
Industries ("Temco"), a building service and
cleaning contractor. Before August 2003,
they worked as night watchmen in a
commercial office building owned by
Pennsylvania Building Company and 14
Penn Plaza LLC (jointly, the "Company").
Since that time, they have been working as
night porters and light duty cleaners in the
same building.
Plaintiffs are members of Local 32BJ of the
Service Employees International Union
("Union"), and they are covered by the
collective bargaining agreement ("CBA")
between the Union and the Realty Advisory
Board on Labor Relations, Inc. ("RAB"), the
multi-employer bargaining association of the
New York City real estate industry. The
CBA contains a mandatory arbitration
clause for discrimination claims, which
provides as follows:
There shall be no discrimination
against any present or future
employee by reason of race, creed,
color, age, disability, national
origin, sex, union membership, or
any characteristic protected by
law, including, but not limited to,
claims made pursuant to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, the
Americans with Disabilities Act,
the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, the New York
State Human Rights Law, the New
York City Human Rights Code,
New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination, New Jersey
Conscientious Employee
Protection Act, Connecticut Fair
Employer Practices Act, or any
other similar laws, rules or
regulations. All such claims shall
be subject to the grievance and
arbitration procedure (Articles V
and VI [of the CBA]) as the sole
and exclusive remedy for
violations. Arbitrators shall apply
appropriate law in rendering
decisions based upon claims of
discrimination.
In or about August 2003, the Company
engaged Spartan Security, a security
services contractor and affiliate of Temco, to
provide certain security personnel, including
night watchmen, for the building. Spartan
brought in new employees, and plaintiffs,
who had been employed as night watchmen,
were reassigned to different locations and
less desirable positions as night porters and
light duty cleaners within the building.
Plaintiffs filed grievances with the Union
under the CBA. They claimed that, as the
only building employees over the age of 50,
they were wrongfully transferred and denied
overtime in violation of various provisions
of the CBA, including the provision that
prohibited discrimination on the basis of
age. Plaintiffs' grievances were submitted to
arbitration before the Contract Arbitrator,
Earl Pfeffer, who held hearings on eight
occasions between February 2, 2004, and
March 7, 2005. Shortly after arbitration
began, the Union declined to pursue
plaintiffs' claims of wrongful transfer and
age discrimination, electing to pursue only
the claims regarding denial of overtime on
behalf of all plaintiffs and wrongful denial
of promotion on behalf of plaintiff Pyett.
According to plaintiffs, the Union's counsel
explained to them that "since the Union had
consented to Spartan Security being brought
into the building," the Union could not
contest their replacement as night watchmen
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by personnel of Spartan Security. On August
10, 2005, the Contract Arbitrator issued his
Opinion and Award, denying plaintiffs'
arbitrated claims in their entirety.
On May 26, 2004, while the arbitration was
ongoing, but after the Union declined to
submit the age discrimination claims,
plaintiffs filed charges of discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC"). The EEOC issued a
Dismissal and Notice of Rights on June 29,
2004 for plaintiffs Phillips and O'Connell
and on September 14, 2004, for plaintiff
Pyett. In each case, the EEOC determined
that its "review of the evidence . .. fail[ed]
to indicate that a violation ha[d] occurred,"
and notified each plaintiff of his right to sue.
On September 23, 2004, plaintiffs
commenced this action against the Company
and Temco in the District Court, pursuing
those claims that the Union did not submit to
arbitration. Plaintiffs alleged that they had
been transferred from their positions and
replaced by younger security officers in
violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §
621 et seq., the New York State Human
Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq.,
and the New York City Administrative code,
N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107.
Defendants moved for dismissal for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
and, in the alternative, to compel arbitration,
pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 4. In an order
dated May 31, 2006, the District Court
denied both motions. With respect to
defendants' motion to compel arbitration,
the District Court referred to its decision in
Granados v. Harvard Maintenance, Inc.,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6918 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
22, 2006), where it "concluded based largely
on binding Second Circuit precedent that
even a clear and unmistakable union-
negotiated waiver of a right to litigate
certain federal and state statutory claims in a
judicial forum is unenforceable." Pyett v.
Pennsylvania Building Co., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 35952, *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2006).
In Granados, the District Court relied
principally on our Court's opinions in Fayer
v. Town of Middlebury, 258 F.3d 117 (2d
Cir. 2001), and Rogers. The District Court
recognized the distinction our Court has
drawn between arbitration clauses in
individual contracts, which are governed by
a line of Supreme Court cases represented
by Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, (1991), and arbitration clauses
in CBAs, which are governed by a line of
Supreme Court cases represented by
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36 (1974). The District Court, following
Rogers, held that union-negotiated waivers
of statutory rights in CBAs were
unenforceable and denied defendants'
motion to dismiss. Pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §
16(a)(1)(A) and (B), defendants timely
appealed the District Court's May 31, 2006
order denying their motion to compel
arbitration.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Rogers left open the
question of whether an arbitration clause in
a CBA that clearly waives a covered
worker's right to a judicial forum with
respect to statutory claims is enforceable.
They contend that such waivers are
enforceable under Gilmer, which, they
argue, overturned the holding in Gardner-
Denver. While conceding that in Gilmer the
Supreme Court dealt only with contracts
signed by individuals and not CBAs,
defendants claim, see Appellants' Br. 12,
that in Wright the Supreme Court made clear
its abandonment of Gardner-Denver's rule
that a union may only "waive certain
statutory rights related to collective activity,
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such as the right to strike," Gardner-Denver,
415 U.S. at 51. We disagree. Our Court in
Rogers squarely decided that a union-
negotiated mandatory arbitration agreement
purporting to waive a covered worker's right
to a federal forum with respect to statutory
rights is unenforceable. We took full
account of both Gilmer and Wright and
concluded that the Supreme Court's decision
in Gardner-Denver remains good law. Our
conclusion in Rogers was an alternative
holding, not dicta, and continues to bind our
Court. In any event, none of the cases relied
upon by defendants persuades us that this
holding in Rogers was incorrect.
In Rogers, we considered two issues:
whether a mandatory arbitration clause in a
CBA is enforceable generally, and whether
the language of the particular clause at issue
was a "clear and unmistakable waiver"
under Wright, 525 U.S. at 80. We held first
that Gardner-Denver still governed
arbitration provisions in CBAs,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's
holding in Gilmer that an employee who
agreed to waive his individual right to a
federal forum could be compelled to
arbitrate an age discrimination claim. See
Rogers, 220 F.3d at 75 (discussing Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 23). Second, we held that the
language of the waiver at issue in that case
was not "clear and unmistakable" under
Wright. See id. at 77. We explained that
Gardner-Denver had not been overruled by
Wright. Rogers, 220 F.3d at 75 ("[W]hile
Wright may have called Gardner-Denver
into question, it did not overrule it."); see
also Wright, 525 U.S. at 82 ("We do not
reach the question whether such a waiver
[under a CBA] would be enforceable.").
Defendants focus on our comment in Rogers
that Wright "could be taken to suggest that,
under certain circumstances, a union
negotiated waiver of an employee's
statutory right to a judicial forum might be
enforceable." But they ignore our holding, in
reliance on Wright and Gardner-Denver,
that arbitration provisions contained in a
CBA, which waive employees' rights to a
federal forum with respect to statutory
claims, are unenforceable. Defendants argue
that our statements regarding the
enforceability of arbitration provisions in
CBAs were dicta because we also concluded
that the clause at issue in Rogers was not
"clear and unmistakable." This argument is
without merit. We explicitly stated in
Rogers that "the rule in Gardner-Denver
was sufficient" to decide the case. Rogers,
220 F.3d at 75. An alternative conclusion in
an earlier case that is directly relevant to a
later case is not dicta; it is an entirely
appropriate basis for a holding in the later
case. Our reliance on Gardner-Denver in
Rogers was an alternative holding; it was
thus not dicta.
None of the other Supreme Court cases on
which defendants rely casts doubt on our
holding in Rogers. For example, they draw
our attention to Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 460 U.S. 693 (1983), and Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001). Metropolitan Edison held that union
officials may be bound by union-negotiated
agreements to enforce no-strike agreements,
and thus waive their right, guaranteed by the
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), to be free of anti-union
discrimination. Metropolitan Edison, 460
U.S at 708. However, rather than supporting
the notion that individual rights may be
waived by CBAs, as defendants claim, that
holding is in line with the Supreme Court's
observation in Gardner-Denver that unions
"may waive certain statutory rights related
to collective activity, such as the right to
strike." Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51
(emphasis added). Circuit City addressed an
individual's employment contract, rather
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than a CBA, and therefore likewise does not
address the issue before us now.
In short, there is nothing that has changed in
the nine years since Wright or the seven
years since Rogers that compels us to
reverse our ruling in Rogers that arbitration
provisions contained in a CBA, which
purport to waive employees' rights to a
federal forum with respect to statutory
claims, are unenforceable.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the
District Court is affirmed.
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"Arbitration of Bias Claims"
The National Law Journal
April 21, 2008
Michael Starr and Christine M. Wilson
Unionized employers have long been eager
to bring their employees' statutory
discrimination claims within the ambit of
mandatory labor arbitration. But the U.S.
Supreme Court's 30-year-old decision in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. has long
been understood as the breakwater against
any requirement that unionized employees
bring their federal discrimination claims to
arbitration under their labor agreements,
even if those agreements themselves ban
discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
ethnicity or other protected classification.
While the high court's jurisprudence has for
almost 20 years staunchly supported
arbitration of statutory discrimination
complaints if so required by individual
employment agreements, labor agreements
have been thought by most courts to be a
different kettle of fish.
As a result, unionized employers have been
required to defend such claims in two
forums: first, in labor arbitration as an
alleged breach of the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) with the union
representing the employees and then again
in a court action asserting federal statutory
discrimination claims arising from the same
operative facts. With the Supreme Court's
recent grant of certiorari in 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett, No. 07-581, those days may
be coming to an end.
Second Circuit Found Judicial Forum
Waiver Unenforceable
In Pyctt, a group of unionized employees
were transferred from night watchmen to
less desirable positions as night porters
when the building they worked for engaged
a professional security company and they
were transferred to other buildings subject to
the same multiemployer CBA--other
buildings that, apparently, did not have night
watchmen openings. Because the workers
replacing them appeared to have been
younger, the employees alleged illegal
discrimination based on their age. The CBA
governing their employment banned
discrimination, expressly gave the arbitrator
authority to apply statutory discrimination
law and asserted that the CBA's grievance
and arbitration process was the sole and
exclusive remedy for resolving such claims.
The displaced employees filed grievances.
While the union brought certain contract-
based claims to arbitration, it initially
declined to pursue the age discrimination
portion of the employees' grievance. The
employees filed charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and
the union shifted ground saying that they
could pursue their discrimination claims in
the arbitration forum on their own, with
private counsel, and at their own expense.
This was, it seems, too little too late. The
workers filed a discrimination action in
federal court, and the court denied the
employer's motion to compel arbitration of
those claims, ruling that even though the
CBA contained a clear and unmistakable
waiver of a judicial forum for statutory
discrimination claims, such union-negotiated
waivers in labor agreements were
unenforceable as a matter of law. The 2d
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
Judicial hostility to mandatory arbitration of
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statutory discrimination claims came to an
end in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., when the Supreme Court held that an
employee's age discrimination claim was
subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to
an agreement he had signed when he had
registered as a securities representative. In
holding the arbitration clause enforceable,
the court reiterated its then-recent position
that generalized attacks on arbitration were
outdated, being "far out of step with our
current strong endorsement of the federal
statutes favoring this method of resolving
disputes." The court saw no principled
difference between statutory discrimination
claims and other statutory claims, such as
under federal antitrust and securities laws,
which it had previously held were subject to
arbitration if that is what the parties
contractually agreed to do. The court also
favorably noted particular protections in the
arbitration procedures at issue in Gilmer,
including checks to avoid biased arbitration
panels, discovery devices and a written
arbitration award.
The court's growing acceptance of
arbitration in Gilmer and its progeny is in
apparent tension with its 1974 decision in
Gardner-Denver, but not quite. In Gardner-
Denver, the court held that a discharged
employee's arbitration of his contract-based
wrongful discharge claim under the CBA
did not foreclose litigation over his statutory
race discrimination claim, even though they
arose from the same employer action. While
the CBA in Gardner-Denver prohibited race
and other discrimination, the labor
arbitrator, as the court saw it, had authority
only to serve as "proctor of the bargain"
between labor and management and to apply
the industrial "law of the shop" to the
individual employee's circumstance, but not
to resolve his statutory rights conferred by
Congress in passing Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
Because the CBA in Gardner-Denver did
not itself apply to statutory discrimination,
all the court actually held was that the
pursuit of contractual rights in labor
arbitration did not foreclose subsequent
pursuit of statutory rights in federal court.
Yet the court also made a more sweeping
pronouncement: "Of necessity, the rights
conferred [by Title VII] can form no part of
the collective-bargaining process since
waiver of these rights would defeat the
paramount congressional purpose behind
Title VII" that each employee, individually,
be free from invidious discrimination.
The possibility that unions might, in
bargaining for a group of employees,
negotiate a waiver of their statutory right to
a judicial forum of employment
discrimination claims was considered by the
Supreme Court seven years after Gilmer in
Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.
There, it ruled that such waivers would not
be enforced if they were not "clear and
unmistakable," but it expressly left
unresolved whether such waivers would, if
"clear and unmistakable," be enforceable by
federal courts. Because the CBA in Pyett
expressly made labor arbitration the
exclusive remedy for statutory
discrimination claims, the issue left open in
Wright is now squarely before the court.
The unresolved question is whether there is
anything inherent in the relationship of a
union to the workers it represents that would
foreclose such waivers, when they are now
fully recognized if made by such workers
individually. Gardner-Denver, with its
hostility to such union-negotiated waivers,
was decided in the early years after passage
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Unions were
not then very compliant, and there was
legitimate concern about union antipathy to
minority interests. As the court put it
trenchantly in a case that, following
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Gardner-Denver, denied preclusive effect to
labor arbitration of an individual's claim of
statutory right: "For federal courts to defer
to arbitral decisions reached by the same
combination of forces that had long
perpetuated invidious discrimination would
have made the foxes guardians of the
chickens." Perhaps, those sentiments are
outdated, as minorities and women have
risen to leadership positions in many unions,
and unions have had 40 years to accept the
strictures of Title VII. Perhaps, courts
should no longer presume every union
leader is potentially a closet bigot. . ..
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"Mandatory Arbitration Is Raising Challenges"
Fort-Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel
November 25, 2002
T. Shawn Taylor
Five weeks after he quit his old job to work
as a business solutions architect for a
Chicago software company, Darryl Cheeks
of Des Plaines, Ill., said his new employer
asked him to sign an agreement waiving his
right to sue.
Job-related disputes, the document
explained, would be resolved through
mandatory binding arbitration. Cheeks said
he felt he had no choice and signed.
"I had already accepted the position. So, at
that point, I kind of had to sign it," said
Cheeks, 34, an African-American who is
currently pursuing a race discrimination
claim against the software company before
the Illinois Human Rights Commission
because, he said, he believed arbitration
wouldn't be fair.
"[My attorney] told me arbitrators do not
tend to be very versed in the law. They are
not as keen as judges, [and] they tend to
favor big business," he said.
Cheeks' experience is just one of several
reasons mandatory arbitration has come
under attack by workers' lawyers and
employee advocate groups since 1991, when
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
enforceability of such policies.
The agreements are usually presented to
employees the first day on the job among a
slew of other work papers they are asked to
sign. Many people aren't even aware what
they have given up until a dispute arises,
critics say. Others argue the process can be
cost-prohibitive to workers who may be
asked to pay half the arbitrator's fee, which
averages $1,000 a day.
Other critics go even further: Employers
paying bribes. Arbitrators reluctant to find
against employers or award large damages
for fear of not being invited back, commonly
known as "repeat player syndrome." But
many critics mainly object to one word:
mandatory.
"If it were voluntary and fair, arbitration
would be a blessing," said Lewis Maltby,
president of the National Workrights
Institute in Princeton, N.J., and a national
arbitration expert. "If employers think it's so
wonderful, why don't they give [workers]
the right to choose it?"
Cliff Palefsky, a partner with a San
Francisco law firm and co-chairman of the
Alternative Dispute Resolution board for the
National Employment Lawyers Association,
said arbitration sends a message that "if you
want to get a job in America, you have to
waive your constitutional rights."
Proponents of mandatory arbitration say
concerns about payoffs and collusion are
unfounded. They hail the benefits of
mandatory arbitration as a cheaper, faster
way to settle employment disputes. And
they say it takes an average of 30 to 60 days
to get a forum date and the process usually
lasts no more than five days.
However, a study released in May by
watchdog group Public Citizen refutes that
claim, saying forum costs-the fee charged
by the tribunal that will decide the dispute-
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to initiate an arbitration can be up to 5,000
percent higher than the costs of initiating a
lawsuit. According to the study, the forum
fee for a $60,000 employment
discrimination claim in Cook County ( Ill.)
Circuit Court is $221. The forum fee for the
same claim in arbitration would be in excess
of $10,000.
Jackson Williams, legislative counsel for
Public Citizen and author of the study, said
arbitration saves businesses money in two
ways: lower attorney's fees and smaller
employee awards.
"[Arbitration awards] are 20 percent the
amount a court would award," he said.
Unlike in court, though, claims cannot be
dismissed in arbitration, supporters point
out. There are no legal restrictions such as
time-barred evidence or hearsay rules, which
may also benefit the employee, said Larry
Lorber, a partner for Proskauer Rose in
Washington, which represents management.
However, an arbitrator's decision is final.
Those who attempt to appeal an arbitration
ruling in court usually fail, Lorber said.
Otherwise, in accordance with a due-process
protocol established in 1995 by a group of
arbitrators and attorneys, arbitration must
provide all the rights and remedies the
plaintiff would have received in court,
including a discovery process, the right to an
attorney and damages. Both sides must have
a say in selecting the arbitrator.
"If [the policies] are not mutual in every
way, they're not enforceable," Lorber said.
Mandatory arbitration of employment
disputes once was unique to the securities
industry.
After the 1991 Supreme Court ruling opened
the door to other industries, employers
seeking a cheaper way to litigate on-the-job
disputes and avoid publicity began adopting
mandatory arbitration clauses and making
them a condition of employment, which the
court also upheld.
Maltby said arbitration shouldn't be
"rammed down employees' throats," but he
believes employees who are educated about
the process would choose it if given the
option.
Though juries are described as sympathetic
to plaintiffs in employment cases, many
cases are thrown out before they ever get to
a jury, Maltby said. Jury awards tend to be
larger, he said, but only one in .six
employees get any monetary relief. The cost
of retaining an attorney and the long wait for
a trial-sometimes years-can deter
employees from filing lawsuits. Some can't
even get a lawyer to take their case if
potential damages are less than $75,000, he
said.
However, Williams said that people who
cannot get a lawyer to take their case can get
assistance through state human rights boards
and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission for free. Also, in a ruling hailed
as a victory for employees, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled earlier this year that
the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission could seek court relief on
behalf of workers bound by mandatory
arbitration agreements.
Williams argues that without the threat of
bad publicity or large jury awards, there is
no deterrent for businesses from allowing
discrimination to occur.
"If the civil rights community were
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discrimination, we wouldn't have a problem
with it," he said.
There are some other downsides employees
should be aware of. One is fee sharing. Most
mandatory arbitration clauses provide that
the employer and employee split the
arbitrator's fee. Some require their money
upfront. For the employee, the costs could
be enough reason to forget the whole thing.
However, court challenges to fee-sharing
confident arbitration
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would deter provisions have seen success if the cost of
an arbitrator would prevent the employee
from pursuing the claim. Employees should
be sure the arbitrator comes from a reputable
agency such as AAA; JAMS, formerly
Judicial, Arbitration and Mediation
Services; or the National Arbitration Forum.
"If it's not one of the big three, you're
taking a chance. The solo mom-and-pop
arbitrators are the ones that are subject to
serious conflicts of interest," Maltby said.
"High Court Upholds Forced Arbitration"
Washington Post
March 22, 2001
Sarah Schafer and Charles Lane
Employers can require most workers to
waive their right to file job-related lawsuits,
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled yesterday in a
decision that could encourage an
increasingly popular practice among
companies trying to hold down their legal
costs.
The court ruled 5 to 4 that a gay former
employee of Richmond-based Circuit City
Stores Inc. could not sue the company over
alleged harassment at work because he had
signed an agreement requiring him to submit
such claims to an arbitrator rather than filing
a lawsuit.
The agreement is enforceable even though
the company required the man to sign the
agreement as a condition of being hired, and
even though he said he had signed it
unwittingly, the court decided.
About 10 percent of American workers are
covered by similar agreements, which are
increasingly used by Wall Street firms, high-
tech companies, retailers and other
employers seeking to avoid the cost and
risks of court cases.
In an arbitration proceeding, the two sides
agree to submit their arguments to an
independent third party, or arbitrator, who
renders a legally binding judgment.
Proponents say workplace arbitration helps
both employers and employees by reducing
legal expenses and leading to quicker
resolution of disputes. Many unions agree in
contract negotiations to use arbitration to
resolve a variety of workplace disputes.
The Supreme Court ruling applies only to
nonunion employees.
But unions and other critics oppose forcing
employees to accept broad arbitration
agreements as a condition of employment.
They argue that those agreements typically
favor the employers, who dictate the terms.
Often those terms allow the employer to
choose the arbitrator, require workers to pay
for the process, limit damages and restrict
the fact-finding process. Many employees
end up dropping their claims rather than
paying hefty fees, critics say.
For example, Robert Howe, 68, a former
general manager for a Prince George's
County car dealer, said he withdrew a job-
related complaint after he talked to the
American Arbitration Association, which
told him it would cost him thousands of
dollars to handle his case.
"This does appear to be a dark day for
people with employment claims," Paul
Bland, a staff attorney for Trial Lawyers for
Public Justice, said of the Supreme Court
decision.
But business groups hailed the court's
decision. "We think that this is good for
business, and we think it's good for
employees, too," said Stephen Bokat of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Arbitration
"resolves disputes much more quickly with
far less cost for most parties," he said.
Contracts such the one the Circuit City
employee signed have become more
common as businesses wrestle with the 1991
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federal civil rights statute, which allows
workers to bring anti-discrimination
complaints before juries and to seek punitive
damages and damages for emotional
distress.
Many states have moved to bar employers
from forcing workers to sign agreements to
get hired. In the Circuit City case, 22 states'
attorneys general filed briefs asking the
court not to rule in favor of the company.
Experts said yesterday's ruling would limit
states' ability to enact such laws.
"This will put a damper on the movement to
reform state arbitration law," said Michael
Rubin, the lawyer who represented the
Circuit City employee, Saint Clair Adams.
But Rubin added that states can use some of
their existing laws to help throw out some
mandatory arbitration agreements. The
Circuit City case will now go back to the 9th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in California.
Adams did not know the details of the
agreement when he signed it, Rubin said.
Adams does not want to submit his
complaint to arbitration, because he believes
the terms of the agreement would hurt his
chances, Rubin added.
The court's ruling also left unresolved a
related issue that has been the source of
several lawsuits: whether some federal anti-
discrimination laws override the federal
arbitration act. Lower courts have issued
mixed rulings on that point.
In 1991, however, the Supreme Court did
rule that some employees cannot sue for age
discrimination if they earlier agreed to
arbitrate such disputes. Yesterday's
Supreme Court decision hinged on the
interpretation of a clause in the 75-year-old
Federal Arbitration Act, which made
contractual agreements that call for
arbitration of disputes binding under federal
law.
The statute says that provision does not
apply to the employment contracts of
"seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign and
interstate commerce."
Adams's attorneys urged the court to
conclude that this "exclusion clause" was
meant to cover the broadest possible notion
of interstate commerce, which, in today's
terms, would include the employment
contracts of people who work at retailers
such as Circuit City.
The company, however, had argued that the
statute meant that only transportation
workers' contracts were meant to be
excluded from coverage. That would include
airline and railroad employees.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a
majority made up of the court's conservative
members, adopted Circuit City's view.
Adams's interpretation, he argued, "would
contradict our earlier cases and bring
instability to statutory interpretation."
In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens, wrote
that the history of the act supports the view
that the disputed language "was an
uncontroversial provision" that clearly
showed that no one "intended or expected
that" the law would apply to employment
contracts.
Stevens accused the majority of "misusing"
the court's authority to suit their own policy
preferences, producing a "sad result" that
will hurt employees.
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"High Court Backs Workers' Right to Sue"
Los Angeles Times
November 17, 1998
David Savage
WASHINGTON-Workers generally have
a right to go to court to sue their employers
for discrimination , the Supreme Court said
Monday, even when their unions or
companies have a policy calling for
arbitration of disputes.
By a 9-0 vote, the justices reversed two
lower courts that had blocked a South
Carolina longshoreman, who previously had
been injured on the job but recovered, from
suing his employer.
The shipping firm had refused to rehire
Ceasar Wright, the longshoreman, because
of his back injury, and he sued for damages
under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
But the case came to the Supreme Court to
test another issue, one that has divided
American corporations and civil rights
lawyers for much of this decade.
Since 1991, companies have been pressing
for the adoption of mandatory arbitration
policies as an alternative to costly federal
court battles. Some of these are written into
union contracts. In other instances, they are
included in papers signed by newly hired
employees.
Corporate lawyers rely on a 1991 high court
ruling that touted the virtues of arbitration as
quick and convenient.
But civil rights lawyers have resisted this
move as fundamentally unfair to workers.
Companies choose the arbitrators who will
hear a dispute, and the plaintiffs cannot
gather the evidence they need to prove their
claims of discrimination, lawyers say. They
rely on the federal civil rights laws that,
since 1964, have made it illegal for
employers to discriminate based on race,
sex, religion and ethnicity as well as age and
disability.
Two Rulings Against Arbitration
In the last week, the foes of arbitration have
won two important court decisions. Neither
case finally resolves the issue, however.
Last week, the Supreme Court refused to
hear an employer's appeal in a closely
watched California case that rejected
"compulsory arbitration" for new
employees.
Tonyja Duffield went to work as a stock
broker in 1988 and signed a standard
industry form requiring arbitration of all
disputes. In 1995, she said that she was a
victim of sexual harassment at work and
sued her employer.
The company sought to have her case
thrown out of court and sent to arbitration.
But the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that federal civil rights laws trump the
binding arbitration clauses. Companies
cannot "as a condition of employment,
compel persons to forego their right" to go
to court, wrote Judge Stephen Reinhardt of
Los Angeles. Workers can agree voluntarily
to arbitration, but they cannot be forced to
do so without their knowledge or consent, he
said.
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The securities company, backed by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and several other
employer groups, appealed to the high court.
But the justices turned down the appeal
(Robertson, Stephens & Co. vs. Duffield, 98-
237) last week.
Meanwhile, in the case of the South
Carolina longshoreman, the more
conservative U.S. court of appeals based in
Richmond, Va., had ruled that employers
can enforce binding arbitration clauses on
unwilling workers.
In Wright's case, his union contract said that
"any dispute" over the "terms and conditions
of employment" shall be resolved by a
grievance committee made up of
management and labor representatives. The
appeals court said that this clause is
"binding" and barred Wright from suing in
federal court.
All nine justices voted to reverse that ruling
(Wright vs. Universal Maritime Services
Corp., 97-889), although Justice Antonin
Scalia's opinion focused on a narrow reason
for doing so.
The union contract "does not contain a clear
and unmistakable waiver" of the
longshoreman's right to sue, Scalia said.
"The right to a federal judicial forum is of
sufficient importance," he said, that it cannot
be casually waived.
But the court stopped short of deciding
whether the worker could sue had the
contract gone further and absolutely barred
employees from going to court.
Predictably, lawyers for plaintiffs and
corporations interpreted the outcome
differently.
Cliff Palefsky, a San Francisco employment
lawyer, said that the decisions show
arbitration is falling out of favor.
"I think there is a clear trend here. The court
is backing away from Gilmer," he said,
referring to the 1991 ruling that endorsed
arbitration.
By contrast, a lawyer for a group of 300 of
America's largest private companies said
that Monday's ruling "was very narrow" and
did not disturb the trend toward arbitration.
"I don't think this is really an anti-
arbitration decision," said Ann Reesman of
the Equal Employment Advisory Council.
"Gilmer is still alive and well," she added.
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal
07-1015
Ruling Below: Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 13911 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2007),
cert. granted, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 4906 (U.S., June 16, 2008).
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Javid Iqbal was detained on suspicion
of being involved in terrorist activities and was confined in the Metropolitan Detention Center in
Brooklyn. For several months during his detention, Iqbal was detained in the Administrative
Maximum Special Housing Unit where he alleges he was abused. After being cleared of any
terrorism charges but convicted of identity fraud and deported to Pakistan, Iqbal brought suit
against several current and former officials from the Department of Justice, the Board of Prisons,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for violating his constitutional rights. The officials
challenged the lawsuit, claiming qualified immunity for their actions. The U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals both ruled that the
suit could continue.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether a conclusory allegation that a cabinet-level officer or other
high-ranking official knew of, condoned, or agreed to subject a plaintiff to allegedly
unconstitutional acts purportedly committed by subordinate officials is sufficient to state
individual-capacity claims against those officials under Bivens.
(2) Whether a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking official may be held personally liable
for the allegedly unconstitutional acts of subordinate officials on the ground that, as high-level
supervisors, they had constructive notice of the discrimination allegedly carried out by such
subordinate officials.
Javid IQBAL, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
Dennis HASTY, former Warden of the Metropolitan Detention Center; Michael Cooksey,
former Assistant Director for Correctional Programs of the Bureau of Prisons, John
ASHCROFT, former Attorney General of the United States, Robert Muller, Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, David Rardin, former Director of the Northeast Region of
the Bureau of Prisons, Michael Rolince, former Chief of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's International Terrorism Operations Section, Counterterrorism Division,
Kathleen Hawks Sawyer, former Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Kenneth
Maxwell, former Assistant Special Agent in Charge, New York Field Office, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Defendants-Appellants
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Decided June 14, 2007
[Expert: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
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JON 0. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge
These interlocutory appeals present several
issues concerning the defense of qualified
immunity in the aftermath of the events of
9/11. Several current and former
government officials from the Department
of Justice, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI"), and the Bureau of
Prisons ("BOP") appeal from the September
27, 2005, Order of the District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (John
Gleeson, District Judge) denying in part
their motions to dismiss on the ground of
qualified immunity. See Elmaghraby v.
Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 1409, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21434, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 2005) ("Dist. Ct. op."). Plaintiff-
Appellee Javaid Iqbal alleges that the
Defendants-Appellants took a series of
unconstitutional actions against him in
connection with his confinement under
harsh conditions at the Metropolitan
Detention Center ("MDC") in Brooklyn,
after separation from the general prison
population. We conclude that the defense of
qualified immunity, to the extent rejected by
the District Court, cannot be sustained as to
any Defendants at this preliminary stage of
the litigation except as to the claim of
violation of procedural due process rights,
and we therefore affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand.
Background
Parties. Iqbal is a Muslim
currently residing in Pakistan....
Pakistani
Four groups of Defendants have filed
appeals from Judge Gleeson's order. The
first group consists of former Attorney
General John Ashcroft and current FBI
Director Robert Mueller. The second group
consists of Michael Rolince, former Chief of
the FBI's International Terrorism Operations
Section, Counterterrorism Division, and
Kenneth Maxwell, former Assistant Special
Agent in Charge of the FBI's New York
Field Office (the "FBI Defendants"). The
third group consists of former BOP officials:
Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, former BOP
Director; David Rardin, former Director of
the Northeast Region of the Bureau of
Prisons; and Michael Cooksey, former
Assistant Director for Correctional Programs
of the Bureau of Prisons (the "BOP
Defendants"). The fourth appeal was filed
by Dennis Hasty, former MDC Warden.
Other Defendants include Michael Zenk,
MDC Warden at the time the lawsuit was
filed, other MDC staff, and the United
States.
Factual allegations. The complaint alleges
the following facts, which are assumed to be
true for purposes of the pending appeals, as
we are required to do in reviewing a ruling
on a motion to dismiss. See Hill v. City of
New York, 45 F.3d 653, 657 (2d Cir. 1995).
The Plaintiff was arrested by agents of the
FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service on November 2, 2001. Following his
arrest, he was detained in the MDC's
general prison population until January 8,
2002, when he was removed from the
general prison population and assigned to a
special section of the MDC known as the
Administrative Maximum Special Housing
Unit ("ADMAX SHU"), where he remained
until he was reassigned to the general prison
population at the end of July 2002. On this
appeal, we consider only claims concerning
the Plaintiffs separation from the general
prison population and confinement
thereafter in the ADMAX SHU. We do not
consider the legality of his arrest or his
initial detention in the MDC.
[The court noted that the complaint further
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alleged a standard policy of classifying
every Arab Muslim man arrested as "of high
interest" and creating the ADMAX SHU
specifically for these individuals. It also
contains allegations of mistreatment of
individuals held in ADMAX SHU
(including Plaintiff), consisting of physical
and psychological abuse, including beatings,
repeated cavity searches, and interference
with religious practices.]
The Plaintiff pled guilty on April 22, 2002,
and was sentenced on September 17, 2002.
He was released from the ADMAX SHU at
the end of July 2002, after pleading guilty
but before sentencing. Judge Gleeson
considered the Plaintiff to be a pretrial
detainee throughout his entire time in the
ADMAX SHU., Dist. Ct. op., 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21434, at *15 n.14. The
Plaintiff was released from the MDC on
January 15, 2003, and thereafter was
removed to Pakistan (a fact not in the
complaint but undisputed).
Litigation in the District Court. The Plaintiff
(and his co-plaintiff) commenced this action
in May 2004. Their complaint asserted
twenty-one causes of action, including both
statutory claims and constitutional tort
claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29
L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971). The causes of action,
and the Defendants against whom they were
asserted, are set forth [as follows:]
2. Fifth Amendment procedural due
process claim based on
confinement in the ADMAX SHU:
Ashcroft and Mueller, FBI
Defendants, BOP Defendants,
Hasty, and MDC staff.
3-4. Fifth and Eighth Amendments
excessive force claims: Hasty and
MDC staff.
5. Sixth Amendment interference
with right to counsel claim: Hasty
and MDC staff.
10. First Amendment claim based
on interference with religious
practice: Hasty and MDC staff.
11. First Amendment claim based
on religious discrimination:
Ashcroft and Mueller, FBI
Defendants, BOP Defendants,
Hasty, and MDC staff.
12. Fifth Amendment race-based
equal protection claim: Ashcroft
and Mueller, FBI Defendants, BOP
Defendants, Hasty, and MDC staff.
Ashcroft and Mueller, the FBI Defendants,
the BOP Defendants, Hasty, the MDC
Warden, and an MDC medical assistant filed
motions to dismiss on the grounds that (1) a
Bivens action was precluded by "special
factors," (2) they were protected by
qualified immunity, (3) the supervisory
defendants were not alleged to have
sufficient personal involvement, and (4)
Ashcroft, Mueller, the FBI Defendants, and
the BOP Defendants were not subject to
personal jurisdiction in New York. ...
With a few exceptions, Judge Gleeson
denied the motions to dismiss. ..
Discussion
The Defendants appeal from the District
384
Court's order denying their motions to
dismiss on the ground of qualified
immunity. Their arguments with respect to
qualified immunity fall into several broad
categories: (1) the Plaintiffs allegations do
not allege the violation of a clearly
established right, (2) do not allege sufficient
personal involvement of the Defendants in
the challenged actions, (3) are too
conclusory to overcome a qualified
immunity defense, and (4) the Defendants'
actions were objectively reasonable.
Permeating the Defendants' assertion of a
qualified immunity defense is the contention
that, however the defense might be
adjudicated in normal circumstances, the
immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack
created a context in which the defense must
be assessed differently and, from their
standpoint, favorably.
Because many of the Defendants' grounds
for asserting an immunity defense overlap
with respect to several of the Plaintiffs
allegations, it will be convenient to consider
separately each of the Plaintiffs causes of
action with respect to the one or more
Defendants against whom it is asserted,
rather than consider separately the claims
asserted against each Defendant. Before
turning to each of the Plaintiff's allegations,
we first consider the legal standards that
apply to nearly all of the Plaintiffs claims
and to most of the grounds on which the
Defendants assert their qualified immunity
defense.
I. General Principles of Qualified
Immunity
(a) Standard of review. When a district court
denies qualified immunity on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "we review the
district court's denial de novo, accepting as
true the material facts alleged in the
complaint and drawing all reasonable
inferences in plaintiffs' favor." Johnson v.
Newburgh Enlarged School District, 239
F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2001).
(b) Appealability. A district court's denial of
qualified immunity is appealable as a
collateral order if it turns on an issue of law.
See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530
(1985). Thus, a defendant may appeal a
district court's ruling denying qualified
immunity when, if a plaintiffs allegations
are assumed to be true, the only question is
whether the alleged conduct violated a
clearly established right. See Locurto v.
Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 2001).
(c) The qualified immunity defense.
Qualified immunity is an immunity from
suit and not just a defense to liability. See
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).
The first step in a qualified immunity
inquiry is to determine whether the alleged
facts demonstrate that a defendant violated a
constitutional right. See id. at 201; see also
Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1774
(2007). If the allegations show that a
defendant violated a constitutional right, the
next step is to determine whether that right
was clearly established at the time of the
challenged action-that is, "whether it
would be clear to a reasonable officer that
his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted." See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. A
defendant will be entitled to qualified
immunity if either (1) his actions did not
violate clearly established law or (2) it was
objectively reasonable for him to believe
that his actions did not violate clearly
established law. See Johnson, 239 F.3d at
250.
In determining whether a right was clearly
established, the court must assess whether
"the contours of the right [were] sufficiently
clear in the context of the alleged violation
such that a reasonable official would
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understand that what he [was] doing
violate[d] that right." Id. at 250-51 (internal
quotation marks omitted). To that end, the
court should consider what a reasonable
officer in the defendant's position would
have known about the lawfulness of his
conduct, "not what a lawyer would learn or
intuit from researching case law." Id. at 251
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, the court need not identify
"legal precedent addressing an identical
factual scenario" to conclude that the right is
clearly established. Id.; see also Tellier v.
Fields, 280 F.3d 69, 84 (2d Cir. 2000)
(noting that a law is "clearly established" so
long as a ruling on the issue is "clearly
foreshadow[ed]" by this Circuit's decisions).
(d) Personal involvement. Many of the
Defendants claim qualified immunity on the
ground that the Plaintiff has failed to allege
their personal involvement in the challenged
actions. All of the appealing Defendants are
supervisory officials. The personal
involvement of a supervisor may be
established by showing that he (1) directly
participated in the violation, (2) failed to
remedy the violation after being informed of
it by report or appeal, (3) created a policy or
custom under which the violation occurred,
(4) was grossly negligent in supervising
subordinates who committed the violation,
or (5) was deliberately indifferent to the
rights of others by failing to act on
information that constitutional rights were
being violated. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58
F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing
section 1983 liability).
Although a lack of personal involvement
may be grounds for dismissing a claim on
the merits (a ruling that would not be subject
to an interlocutory appeal), such a lack is
also relevant to a defense of qualified
immunity because it goes to the question of
whether a defendant's actions violated a
clearly established right. See McCullough v.
Wyandanch Union Free School District, 187
F.3d 272, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Where there
is a total absence of evidence of [a
violation], there is no basis on which to
conclude that the defendant seeking
qualified immunity violated clearly
established law."). "[O]ur task is to consider
whether, as a matter of law, the factual
allegations and all reasonable inferences
therefrom are insufficient to establish the
required showing of personal involvement."
Johnson, 239 F.3d at 255.
(e) Pleading requirements. The parties
dispute the extent to which a plaintiff must
plead specific facts to overcome a defense of
qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss
stage. Although most of the Defendants
disclaim requiring the Plaintiff to meet a
heightened pleading standard, beyond the
requirement of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957), that a complaint "give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs
claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), all the
Defendants make the somewhat similar
argument that "conclusory allegations" will
not suffice to withstand a qualified
immunity defense, especially with respect to
allegations of supervisory involvement,
racial and/or religious animus, or
conspiracy. BOP Defendant Cooksey
explicitly urges us to adopt a heightened
pleading standard in Bivens actions.
The pleading standard to overcome a
qualified immunity defense appears to be an
unsettled question in this Circuit. Four
Supreme Court opinions provide guidance,
although the guidance they provide is not
readily harmonized. In Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993), the
Court rejected a heightened pleading
standard in a civil rights action alleging
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municipal liability, applying instead only the
traditional requirement of "'a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."' Id. at 168
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). In reaching
this conclusion, the Court distinguished
between municipalities' immunity from
respondeat superior liability and government
officials' qualified immunity from suit. See
id. at 166. Arguably, this distinction could
permit requiring a plaintiff to satisfy a
heightened pleading standard of a cause of
action in order to overcome a government
official's defense of qualified immunity.
However, the Court's opinion in
Leatherman suggests that heightened
pleading standards are never permissible
except when authorized by Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at
168 (noting that Rule 9(b) "do[es] not
include among the enumerated actions any
reference to complaints alleging municipal
liability under § 1983"). Indeed, the Court
observed that, in the absence of amendment
to Rules 8 or 9, the courts could rely only on
control of discovery and summary judgment
to "weed out unmeritorious claims." Id. at
168-69.
A more pertinent precedent is Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), which
concerned the adequacy of pleading a Title
VII complaint. The Court rejected what had
been this Circuit's rule requiring
employment discrimination plaintiffs to
allege facts constituting a prima facie case
of employment discrimination. See id. at
515. The Court again emphasized that the
judicially imposed heightened pleading
standard conflicted with Rule 8(a) and that a
heightened pleading standard could be
attained only "by the process of amending
the Federal Rules, and not by judicial
interpretation." Id.
Leatherman and especially Swierkiewici-
with their insistence that courts cannot
impose heightened pleading standards in the
absence of statutory authorization-indicate
that a court cannot impose a heightened
pleading standard in Bivens (or other civil
rights) actions against individual officials, a
precept we have heeded since the Supreme
Court's decision in Swierkiewicz.
However, a third Supreme Court case,
decided between Leatherman and
Swierkiewicz, cryptically suggests that, in
some circumstances, a court could require
"specific, nonconclusory factual allegations"
at the pleading stage in claims against
government officials. In Crawford-El v.
Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998), the D.C.
Circuit had recognized a heightened burden
of proof in cases against government
officials alleging unconstitutional motive.
See id. at 582-83. The Court observed that
the D.C. Circuit had adopted the heightened
standard in an attempt "to address a
potentially serious problem: Because an
official's state of mind is easy to allege and
hard to disprove, insubstantial claims that
turn on improper intent may be less
amenable to summary disposition than other
types of claims against government
officials." Id. at 584-85. Although the
Supreme Court recognized this problem, it
rejected the heightened standard of proof.
The Court held that the D.C. Circuit's rule
was not compelled by either the holding or
the reasoning of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800 (1982). In Harlow, the Court had
stated that "bare allegations of malice should
not suffice to subject government officials
either to the costs of trial or to the burdens
of broad-reaching discovery." Id. at 817-18.
However, as the Court explained in
Crawford-El, this statement merely
concerned a plaintiffs attempt to overcome
a legitimate qualified immunity defense by
alleging malicious intent; this holding was
irrelevant to a plaintiffs burden in alleging a
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constitutional violation of which improper
motive is an essential element. See 523 U.S.
at 588-89. Neither did Harlow's reasoning
require a heightened burden of proof: the
Court observed that there existed other
mechanisms for protecting officials from
unmeritorious actions, such as the
requirement that the officials' conduct
violate clearly established law, the need to
prove causation, and procedural protections.
See id. at 590-93.
The Court acknowledged that the usual
pleading standard would sometimes not
preclude at least limited discovery to
amplify general allegations. The Court
observed that Harlow only "sought to
protect officials from the costs of 'broad-
reaching' discovery" and that limited
discovery is sometimes necessary to
adjudicate a qualified immunity defense. See
id. at 593 n.14. The Court concluded by
observing that "broad discretion" in the
discovery process is more "useful and
equitable" than categorical rules such as that
of the D.C. Circuit. See id. at 601.
What Crawford-El gave civil rights
plaintiffs with respect to traditional notice
pleading, however, it might have modified
by permitting some post-complaint detailing
of a claim. In discussing the procedural
mechanisms available to judges in civil
rights actions, at least those alleging
wrongful motive, the Court observed that,
before permitting discovery, a court could
require a plaintiff to "put forward specific,
nonconclusory factual allegations that
establish improper motive causing
cognizable injury in order to survive a
prediscovery motion for dismissal or
summary judgment." Id. at 598 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Perhaps
significantly, the Court quoted the phrase
"put forward specific, nonconclusory factual
allegations" from Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion in Siegert v. Gilley, 500
U.S. 226 (1991), in which he had explicitly
advocated a heightened pleading standard
for civil rights actions requiring a showing
of malice. See id. at 235-36 ("There is
tension between the rationale of Harlow and
the requirement of malice, and it seems to
me that the heightened pleading requirement
is the most workable means to resolve it.").
The First Circuit has remarked that
"[w]hatever window of opportunity [it]
thought remained open after Crawford-El
has been slammed shut by the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in
Swierkiewicz." Educadores Puertorriquenos
en Accion v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61, 65
(1st Cir. 2004). Most Circuits appear to have
rejected a heightened pleading standard. See
Doe v. Cassel, 403 F.3d 986, 988-89 & n.3
(8th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases); Galbraith
v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119,
1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).
Considerable uncertainty concerning the
standard for assessing the adequacy of
pleadings has recently been created by the
Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). If
we were to consider only a narrow view of
the holding of that decision, we would not
make any adjustment in our view of the
applicable pleading standard. Bell Atlantic
held that an allegation of parallel conduct by
competitors, without more, does not suffice
to plead an antitrust violation under 15
U.S.C. § 1. See id. at 1961. The Court
required, in addition, "enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement
was made." Id. at 1965. However, the
Court's explanation for its holding indicated
that it intended to make some alteration in
the regime of pure notice pleading that had
prevailed in the federal courts ever since
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S. Ct. 99,
2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957), was decided half a
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century ago. The nature and extent of that
alteration is not clear because the Court's
explanation contains several, not entirely
consistent, signals, which we consider (not
necessarily in the order set forth in the
Court's opinion).
Some of these signals point toward a new
and heightened pleading standard. First, the
Court explicitly disavowed the oft-quoted
statement in Conley of "'the accepted rule
that a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief."' Bell Atlantic,
127 S. Ct. at 1968 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S.
at 45-46). Bell Atlantic asserted that this "no
set of facts" language "has earned its
retirement" and "is best forgotten." Id. at
1969.
Second, the Court, using a variety of
phrases, indicated that more than notice of a
claim is needed to allege a section 1
violation based on competitors' parallel
conduct. For example, the Court required
''enough factual matter (taken as true) to
suggest that an agreement was made," id. at
1965; "enough fact to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of illegal agreement," id.; "facts
that are suggestive enough to render a § 1
conspiracy plausible," id.; "allegations of
parallel conduct . . . placed in a context that
raises a suggestion of a preceding
agreement," id. at 1966; "allegations
plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent
with) agreement," id.; a "plain statement"
(as specified in Rule 8(a)(2)) with "enough
heft" to show entitlement to relief, id.; and
''enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face," id. at 1974, and also
stated that the line "between the factually
neutral and the factually suggestive . .. must
be crossed to enter the realm of plausible
liability," id. at 1966 n.5, and that "the
complaint warranted dismissal because it
failed in toto to render plaintiffs' entitlement
to relief plausible," id. at 1973 n.14.
Third, the Court discounted the ability of
"'careful case management,"' "to weed[] out
early in the discovery process" "a claim just
shy of a plausible entitlement." Id. at 1967
(quoting id. at 1975 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
Fourth, the Court encapsulated its various
formulations of what is required into what it
labeled "the plausibility standard." Id. at
1968. Indeed, the Court used the word
"plausibility" or an adjectival or adverbial
form of the word fifteen times (not counting
quotations).
On the other hand, some of the Court's
linguistic signals point away from a
heightened pleading standard and suggest
that whatever the Court is requiring in Bell
Atlantic might be limited to, or at least
applied most rigorously in, the context of
either all section 1 allegations or perhaps
only those section 1 allegations relying on
competitors' parallel conduct. First, the
Court explicitly disclaimed that it was
"requir[ing] heightened fact pleading of
specifics," id. at 1974, and emphasized the
continued viability of Swierkiewicz, see id.
at 1973-74, which had rejected a heightened
pleading standard....
Second, although the Court faulted the
plaintiffs' complaint for alleging "merely
legal conclusions" of conspiracy, Bell
Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1970, it explicitly
noted with approval Form 9 of the Federal
Civil Rules, Complaint for Negligence,
which, with respect to the ground of
liability, alleges only that the defendant
"negligently drove a motor vehicle against
plaintiff who was then crossing [an
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identified] highway," Fed. R. Civ. P. App.
Form 9. See Bell Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1970
n.10. The Court noted that Form 9 specifies
the particular highway the plaintiff was
crossing and the date and time of the
accident, see id., but took no notice of the
total lack of an allegation of the respects in
which the defendant is alleged to have been
negligent, i.e., driving too fast, crossing the
center line, running a traffic light or stop
sign, or even generally failing to maintain a
proper lookout. The adequacy of a
generalized allegation of negligence in the
approved Form 9 seems to weigh heavily
against reading Bell Atlantic to condemn the
insufficiency of all legal conclusions in a
pleading, as long as the defendant is given
notice of the date, time, and place where the
legally vulnerable conduct occurred.
Third, the Court placed heavy emphasis on
the "sprawling, costly, and hugely time-
consuming" discovery that would ensue in
permitting a bare allegation of an antitrust
conspiracy to survive a motion to dismiss,
see id. at 1967 n.6, and expressed concern
that such discovery "will push cost-
conscious defendants to settle even anemic
cases," id. at 1967. These concerns provide
some basis for believing that whatever
adjustment in pleading standards results
from Bell Atlantic is limited to cases where
massive discovery is likely to create
unacceptable settlement pressures.
Fourth, although the Court expressed doubts
about the ability of district courts to "weed[]
out" through case management in the
discovery process "a claim just shy of a
plausible entitlement to relief," id.
(emphasis added), the Court did not disclaim
its prior statement that "federal courts and
litigants must rely on summary judgment
and control of discovery to weed out
unmeritorious claims sooner rather than
later." Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168-69
(emphasis added). Leaving Leatherman and
Crawford-El undisturbed (compared to the
explicit disavowal of the "no set of facts"
language of Conley) further suggests that
Bell Atlantic, or at least its full force, is
limited to the antitrust context.
Fifth, just two weeks after issuing its
opinion in Bell Atlantic, the Court cited it
for the traditional proposition that
"[s]pecific facts are not necessary [for a
pleading that satisfies Rule 8(a)(2)]; the
statement need only "'give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests."' Erickson, 127
S. Ct. at 2200 (quoting Bell Atlantic's
quotation from Conley) (omission in
original).
These conflicting signals create some
uncertainty as to the intended scope of the
Court's decision. We are reluctant to assume
that all of the language of Bell Atlantic
applies only to section 1 allegations based
on competitors' parallel conduct or, slightly
more broadly, only to antitrust cases. Some
of the language relating generally to Rule 8
pleading standards seems to be so integral to
the rationale of the Court's parallel conduct
holding as to constitute a necessary part of
that holding. See Pierre N. Leval, Judging
under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta,
81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249, 1257 (2006) ("The
distinction [between holding and dictum]
requires recognition of what was the
question before the court upon which the
judgment depended, how (and by what
reasoning) the court resolved the question,
and what role, if any, the proposition played
in the reasoning that led to the judgment.").
After careful consideration of the Court's
opinion and the conflicting signals from it
that we have identified, we believe the Court
is not requiring a universal standard of
heightened fact pleading, but is instead
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requiring a flexible "plausibility standard,"
which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim
with some factual allegations in those
contexts where such amplification is needed
to render the claim plausible. We will say
more about this approach as we apply it
below to some of the Plaintiffs specific
allegations.
Notwithstanding what we understand to be
the essential message of Bell Atlantic, we
acknowledge that we see some merit in the
argument in favor of a heightened pleading
standard in this case for two reasons. First,
qualified immunity is a privilege that is
essential to the ability of government
officials to carry out their public roles
effectively without fear of undue harassment
by litigation. In this respect, the factors
favoring a heightened pleading standard to
overcome a qualified immunity defense are
distinguishable from the purely prudential
and policy-driven factors that the Supreme
Court found inadequate to justify a
heightened pleading standard in the Title VII
context. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-
15.
Second, some of the allegations in the
Plaintiffs complaint, although not entirely
conclusory, suggest that some of the
Plaintiffs claims are based not on facts
supporting the claim but, rather, on
generalized allegations of supervisory
involvement. Therefore, allowing some of
the Plaintiffs claims to survive a motion to
dismiss might facilitate the very type of
broad-ranging discovery and litigation
burdens that the qualified immunity
privilege was intended to prevent.
Nevertheless, although Swierkiewicz was
decided in the context of Title VII, we are
mindful of the Supreme Court's statement in
that decision that heightened pleading
requirements "must be obtained by the
process of amending the Federal Rules, and
not by judicial interpretation." Id. at 515
(internal quotation marks omitted). Absent
any indication from the Supreme Court that
qualified immunity might warrant an
exception to this general approach and the
explicit disclaimer of a heightened pleading
standard in Bell Atlantic, reinforced by the
reversal of the Tenth Circuit's use of a
heightened pleading standard in Erickson,
we conclude that a heightened pleading rule
may not be imposed....
With these general principles in mind, we
turn to the Plaintiff's specific claims.
II. Procedural Due Process
The Plaintiff alleges that Ashcroft and
Mueller, the FBI Defendants, the BOP
Defendants, and Hasty adopted a policy
under which he was deprived of a liberty
interest without any of the procedural
protections required by due process of law.
His allegation of the deprivation of a liberty
interest, even while lawfully confined
without bail on criminal charges, is based on
his placement in solitary confinement, where
he was subjected to needlessly harsh
restrictions that were atypical and significant
when compared to those in the rest of the
MDC population. The Defendants contend
that (1) the Plaintiff did not allege that the
confinement was punitive; (2) no procedural
due process right was violated because the
Plaintiff did not have a liberty interest in
avoiding extended confinement in the
ADMAX SHU and, even if he did, he
received all the process that was due; (3)
even if the Plaintiffs procedural due process
right was violated, the contours of this right
were not clearly established at the time of
the events in question; (4) the Defendants'
actions were objectively reasonable in the
391
post-9/1 1 context; and (5) the Plaintiff has
failed to allege personal involvement.
We are required by the Supreme Court's
decision in Saucier to assess these
arguments within a two-part framework,
asking first whether the alleged facts show a
violation of a constitutional right, see
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, and, if so,
"whether the right was clearly established
. . . in light of the specific context of the
case," see id. The first, second, and fifth of
the Defendants' arguments bear on the
initial issue of whether a violation has been
alleged; the third argument-whether the
right was clearly established-is precisely
the second issue under Saucier; and the
fourth argument is often a further
component of a qualified immunity defense
because even if the law was clearly
established, it might have been objectively
reasonable, on the facts of a particular case,
for a defendant to believe that the actions
taken did not violate that established law,
see Johnson, 239 F.3d at 250.
(a) Has a Violation of a Procedural Due
Process Right Been Adequately Pleaded?
In assessing the adequacy of the Plaintiffs
pleading of a procedural due process
violation we first consider the basic question
of whether the Plaintiff has pleaded the
existence of a liberty interest and entitlement
to procedures that were not provided
and then consider the Defendants'
arguments that punitive intent and
personal involvement were not adequately
pleaded....
[Discussion leading to the conclusion that,
given the length of the Plaintiffs
incarceration in the ADMAX SHU and his
status as a pretrial detainee, he was entitled
to some procedural review.]
(iii) Lack of personal involvement.
Defendants Ashcroft and Mueller contend
that the Plaintiff has not adequately alleged
their personal involvement in the denial of
procedural due process because the
continued detention decision was made by
FBI subordinates. Applying the standards
applicable to personal involvement outlined
above, we reject this claim at this stage of
the litigation. Ashcroft and Mueller are
alleged to have condoned the policy under
which the Plaintiff was held in harsh
conditions of confinement until "cleared" by
the FBI. Since the complaint adequately
alleges, for purposes of a motion to dismiss,
that procedural due process required some
procedures beyond FBI clearance, the
allegation of condoning the policy of
holding the Plaintiff in the ADMAX SHU
until cleared suffices, at the pleading stage,
to defeat dismissal for lack of personal
involvement.
At the other end of the leadership chain,
Defendant Hasty asserts his lack of personal
involvement because the continued
detention decision was made far above his
level of responsibility. But this defense also
cannot prevail at this stage of the litigation.
Cf Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F.3d
129, 138 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Plausible
instructions from a superior . . . support
qualified immunity where, viewed
objectively in light of the surrounding
circumstances, they could lead a reasonable
officer to conclude that the necessary legal
justification for his actions exists (e.g.[,] ...
exigent circumstances)."). Hasty is alleged
to have known of the continued detention in
the ADMAX SHU and the absence of
procedural protections for the Plaintiff.
Whether his conduct as a subordinate was
objectively reasonable under all the
circumstances is an issue distinct from the
adequacy of the pleading of personal
involvement.
392
Between these extremes in the official
hierarchy, the lack of adequate allegations of
personal knowledge of, or involvement in,
the Plaintiffs continued detention is also
asserted by the FBI Defendants and the BOP
Defendants. However, the complaint at least
implicitly alleges the knowledge of the FBI
Defendants by stating that they "failed to
approve post-September 11 detainees'
release to general population." With respect
to the BOP Defendants, the complaint
alleges that BOP Defendant Cooksey
"directed that all detainees 'of high interest'
be confined in the most restrictive
conditions possible until cleared by the
FBI," that BOP Defendant Sawyer approved
this policy, and that BOP Defendant Rardin,
along with others, designed the policy of
arbitrary confinement in the ADMAX SHU.
The FBI Defendants also dispute their
personal involvement in a procedural due
process violation by arguing that they could
not reasonably be expected to know about
the BOP regulations. However, some factual
development of this claim would have to
precede its determination. Moreover, even
absent the FBI Defendants' knowledge of
the BOP regulation, the complaint can
support the inference that the FBI
Defendants understood that their alleged
role in the clearance procedure was linked to
a detainee's release to the general
population. This suffices to overcome the
defense of no personal involvement at this
stage of the litigation.
It is arguable that, under the plausibility
standard of Bell Atlantic, some subsidiary
facts must be alleged to plead adequately
that Ashcroft and Mueller condoned the
Plaintiffs continued confinement in the
ADMAX SHU, that Hasty had knowledge
of that confinement, or that the mid-level
Defendants knew the relationship between
their clearance procedure and the Plaintiffs
release to the general population. However,
all of the Plaintiffs allegations respecting
the personal involvement of these
Defendants are entirely plausible, without
allegations of additional subsidiary facts.
This is clearly so with respect to Hasty and
the mid-level Defendants. Even as to
Ashcroft and Mueller, it is plausible to
believe that senior officials of the
Department of Justice would be aware of
policies concerning the detention of those
arrested by federal officers in the New York
City area in the aftermath of 9/11 and would
know about, condone, or otherwise have
personal involvement in the implementation
of those policies. Sustaining the adequacy of
a pleading of personal involvement in these
circumstances runs no risk that every
prisoner complaining of a denial of rights
while in federal custody anywhere in the
United States can survive a motion to
dismiss simply by alleging that the Attorney
General knew of or condoned the alleged
violation. And, like the Form 9 complaint
approved in Bell Atlantic, Iqbal's complaint
informs all of the Defendants of the time
frame and place of the alleged violations.
(b) Was the Plaintiffs
Procedural Due Process
Established?
Right to
Clearly
Although we conclude that the Plaintiff has
adequately pleaded a violation of a
procedural due process right, we also
conclude that in this case "officers of
reasonable competence could [have]
disagree[d]," Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335
(1986), whether their conduct violated a
clearly established procedural due process
right. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs right to
additional procedures was not clearly
established with the level of specificity that
is required to defeat a qualified immunity
defense. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S.
194, 199-200 (2004).
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* . . Accordingly, we will direct dismissal of
the portions of the Plaintiffs complaint
alleging violations of procedural due process
rights.
IV. Excessive Force
The only argument of a Defendant directed
to the claim of excessive force is Hasty's
contention that the complaint does not allege
his personal involvement.
The complaint alleges that Hasty knew or
should have known of the MDC practice of
beating detainees in the ADMAX SHU, that
he knew or should have known of the
propensity of his subordinates to beat the
Plaintiff unnecessarily, and that he was
deliberately indifferent in failing to take
action to curtail the beatings. The complaint
also alleges that Hasty chose the officers
who worked in the ADMAX SHU.
Applying the standards for supervisory
liability, outlined above, see Part I(d), the
Plaintiff's allegations, on a notice pleading
standard, see Part I(e), suffice to state a
claim of supervisory liability for the use of
excessive force against the Plaintiff. See
Phelps, 308 F.3d at 187 n.6 ("[A] plaintiffs
allegation of knowledge is itself a
particularized factual allegation, which he
will have the opportunity to demonstrate at
the appropriate time in the usual ways.").
The plausibility standard requires no
subsidiary facts at the pleading stage to
support an allegation of Hasty's knowledge
because it is at least plausible that a warden
would know of mistreatment inflicted by
those under his command. Whether such
knowledge can be proven must await further
proceedings.
VIII. Racial and Religious Discrimination
The Defendants argue that they are entitled
to qualified immunity on the Plaintiffs First
Amendment claim of religious
discrimination and Fifth Amendment claim
of racial or ethnic discrimination on three
grounds: (1) the Plaintiff has failed to state a
violation of clearly established rights, (2) the
Plaintiffs allegations of discriminatory
intent are too conclusory, and (3) the
Plaintiff has not alleged the personal
involvement of Ashcroft and Mueller.
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs
allegations of racial, ethnic, and religious
animus are too conclusory. But, as discussed
above, see Part I(e), Crawford-El indicates
that courts cannot require a heightened
pleading standard for civil rights complaints
involving improper motive. In Phillip, 316
F.3d at 298-99, this Court held that
Swierkiewicz's notice pleading standard
applied to a civil rights complaint alleging
racial animus. Although recognizing that the
complaint did not "contain many evidentiary
allegations relevant to intent," see id. at 299,
we found the allegations sufficient to state a
claim, observing that the complaint alleged
that the plaintiffs were African-American,
described the defendants' actions in detail,
and alleged that the plaintiffs were selected
for maltreatment "solely because of their
color," id. at 298.
The Plaintiffs allegations suffice to state
claims of racial, ethnic, and religious
discrimination. He alleges in particular that
the FBI Defendants classified him "of high
interest" solely because of his race, ethnic
background, and religion and not because of
any evidence of involvement in terrorism.
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He offers additional factual support for this
allegation, stating that "within the New
York area, all Arab Muslim men arrested on
criminal or immigration charges while the
FBI was following an investigative lead into
the September 11th attacks-however
unrelated the arrestee was to the
investigation-were immediately classified
as 'of interest' to the post-September 11th
investigation." We need not consider at this
stage of the litigation whether these
allegations are alone sufficient to state a
clearly established constitutional violation
under the circumstances presented because
they are sufficient to state a violation when
combined with the Plaintiffs allegation that
he was singled out for mistreatment and for
unnecessarily punitive conditions of
confinement based on his racial, ethnic, and
religious characteristics.
Finally, Ashcroft and Mueller argue that the
Plaintiff failed to allege their personal
involvement in any discrimination.
However, the complaint alleges broadly that
Ashcroft and Mueller were instrumental in
adopting the "policies and practices
challenged here." The complaint also alleges
that the FBI, "under the direction of
Defendant Mueller," arrested thousands of
Arab Muslims and that Ashcroft and
Mueller "knew of, condoned, and willfully
and maliciously agreed to subject Plaintiff[]
to these conditions of confinement as a
matter of policy, solely on account of [his]
religion, race, and/or national origin and for
no legitimate penological interest." The
Plaintiff acknowledges that the FBI
Defendants made the determination that
Plaintiff was "of high interest," but this
allegation does not necessarily insulate
Ashcroft and Mueller from personal
responsibility for the actions of their
subordinates under the standards of
supervisory liability outlined above, see Part
I(d). As with the procedural due process
claim, the allegation that Ashcroft and
to the
discrimination that the Plaintiff alleges
satisfies the plausibility standard without an
allegation of subsidiary facts because of the
likelihood that these senior officials would
have concerned themselves with the
formulation and implementation of policies
dealing with the confinement of those
arrested on federal charges in the New York
City area and designated "of high interest"
in the aftermath of 9/11. Whether or not the
issues of personal involvement will be
clarified by court-supervised discovery
sufficient to support summary judgment
remains to be determined.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the
District Court is affirmed as to the denial of
the Defendants' motions to dismiss all of the
Plaintiffs claims, except for the claim of a
violation of the right to procedural due
process, as to which we reverse. In affirming
almost all of the District Court's ruling, we
emphasize that we do so at an early stage of
the litigation. We recognize, as did Judge
Gleeson in ruling on the Plaintiffs
procedural due process claim, that carefully
limited and tightly controlled discovery by
the Plaintiff as to certain officials will be
appropriate to probe such matters as the
Defendants' personal involvement in several
of the alleged deprivations of rights. We are
mindful too that, for high-level officials, this
discovery might be either postponed until
discovery of front-line officials is complete
or subject to District Court approval and
additional limitations. We also recognize
that the Defendants will be entitled to seek
more specific statements as to some of the
Plaintiffs claims and perhaps renew their
claims for qualified immunity by motions
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for summary judgment on a more fully
developed record.
In sum, the serious allegations of gross
mistreatment set forth in the complaint
suffice, except as noted in this opinion, to
defeat the Defendants' attempt to terminate
the lawsuit at a preliminary stage, but,
consistent with the important policies that
justify the defense of qualified immunity,
the defense may be reasserted in advance of
trial after the carefully controlled and
limited discovery that the District Court
expects to supervise.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part,
and REMANDED.
JOSE A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur fully in Judge Newman's
characteristically careful and comprehensive
opinion, which seeks to hew closely to the
relevant Supreme Court and Second Circuit
precedents, including the Supreme Court's
decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 127 S.
Ct. 1955 (2007). That said, it is worth
underscoring that some of those precedents
are less than crystal clear and fully deserve
reconsideration by the Supreme Court at the
earliest opportunity; to say the least, "the
guidance they provide is not readily
harmonized."
Most importantly, the opinion's discussion
of the relevant pleading standards reflects
the uneasy compromise-forged partially in
dicta by the Supreme Court in Crawford El
v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998)-between a
qualified immunity privilege rooted in the
need to preserve "the effectiveness of
government as contemplated by our
constitutional structure," Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 820 n.35 (1982),
and the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Here, that uneasy compromise presents itself
in a case brought by Javaid Iqbal, a federally
convicted felon now residing in his native
Pakistan. Iqbal does not challenge his arrest
in the aftermath of 9/11, his detention, his
conviction, or his apparent subsequent
deportation. Iqbal instead challenges his
separation from the general prison
population at the Metropolitan Detention
Center and his treatment during that
separation. He claims that his separation
stemmed from a general policy authorized at
the highest levels of government in the wake
of 9/11. But most, if not all, of the assertedly
unlawful actions in his complaint-
including the decision to place plaintiff in
the ADMAX SHU and the abuses which
purportedly ensued there-are alleged to
have been carried out by defendants much
lower in the chain of command.
Nevertheless, as a result of the Supreme
Court's precedents interpreting Rule 8(a),
even as modified by the "plausibility
standard" established in Bell Atlantic, 127 S.
Ct. at 1968, it is possible that the incumbent
Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and a former Attorney General
of the United States will have to submit to
discovery, and possibly to a jury trial,
regarding Iqbal's claims. If so, these
officials-FBI Director Robert Mueller and
former Attorney General John Ashcroft-
may be required to comply with inherently
onerous discovery requests probing, inter
alia, their possible knowledge of actions
taken by subordinates at the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and the Federal Bureau of
Prisons at a time when Ashcroft and Mueller
were trying to cope with a national and
international security emergency
unprecedented in the history of the
American Republic. In Bell Atlantic, the
Supreme Court has quite rightly expressed
concern that "careful case management"
might not be able to "weed[] out early in the
discovery process" an unmeritorious claim
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in private civil antitrust litigation, see Bell
Atlantic, 127 S. Ct. at 1967, and might have
limited success in "checking discovery
abuse," id. This concern is all the more
significant in the context of a lawsuit
against, inter alia, federal government
officials charged with responsibility for
national security and entitled by law to
assert claims of qualified immunity. Even
with the discovery safeguards carefully laid
out in Judge Newman's opinion, it seems
that little would prevent other plaintiffs
claiming to be aggrieved by national
security programs and policies of the federal
government from following the blueprint
laid out by this lawsuit to require officials
charged with protecting our nation from
future attacks to submit to prolonged and
vexatious discovery processes.
The decision in this case may be required by
the faithful application of the relevant
precedents by a court of inferior jurisdiction.
But a detached observer may wonder
whether the balance struck here between the
need to deter unlawful conduct and the
dangers of exposing public officials to
burdensome litigation-a balance compelled
by the precedents that bind us-jeopardizes
the important policy interest Justice Stevens
aptly described as "a national interest in
enabling Cabinet officers with
responsibilities in [the national security]
area to perform their sensitive duties with
decisiveness and without potentially ruinous
hesitation." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 541 (1985).
397
"Court to Hear Challenge from Muslims Held After 9/11"
New York Times
June 17, 2008
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court on
Monday agreed to decide whether top
government officials can be sued for
damages by the Muslim men who were
rounded up and imprisoned under harsh
conditions in the immediate aftermath of the
terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
The case is an appeal by the Bush
administration on behalf of John D.
Ashcroft, who at the time was attorney
general, and Robert S. Mueller III, then as
now the director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
The federal appeals court in Manhattan, in a
pretrial decision last June, rejected the
claims of immunity raised by the two
officials, as well as by other defendants,
including the former head of the Bureau of
Prisons and the former warden of the
Metropolitan Detention Center, where many
of the men were held. The lower-ranking
officials also appealed that ruling to the
Supreme Court, but the justices took no
action on their petitions on Monday.
The lawsuit was filed by two men, Javaid
Iqbal, a Pakistani, and Ehad Elmaghraby, an
Egyptian, both of whom were deported after
months of confinement in a section of the
Brooklyn prison known as Admax-Shu,
which stands for administrative maximum
special housing unit. Mr. Elmaghraby settled
his claims for a $300,000 payment from the
government and is no longer in the case.
Mr. Iqbal, who has not settled, was a 33-
year-old cable television installer on Long
Island at the time of his arrest on Nov. 2,
2001. He lived in Hicksville with his wife, a
United States citizen, and had an application
pending for a green card. He was charged
with document fraud for using a Social
Security card that belonged to someone else.
Mr. Iqbal pleaded guilty after several
months of confinement in the special unit,
where he was subjected to daily body-cavity
searches, sometimes several times a day, as
well as to beatings and to extremes of hot
and cold. He was kept in solitary
confinement with the lights in his cell
constantly on. He lost 40 pounds during six
months in the special unit, before he was
placed in the general prison population.
Mr. Iqbal's lawsuit maintains that he was
treated as a "high interest" prisoner solely
because of his religion and national origin,
under policies and procedures directed by
Mr. Ashcroft and Mr. Mueller and carried
out by the other defendants. The suit also
maintains that the conditions of confinement
in the special unit violated minimal
constitutional standards, of which the
defendants should have been aware.
Although Mr. Iqbal is now the sole plaintiff
in his case, the Supreme Court's decision
will affect another lawsuit that raises similar
claims on behalf of seven named plaintiffs
and a class of hundreds of others. That case,
Turkmen v. Ashcroft, was argued before the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in February.
In refusing the defendants' request to
dismiss the Iqbal case, the Second Circuit
found that the accusations, although not yet
proven, were at least "plausible." That was
sufficient to permit Mr. Iqbal's lawyers to
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proceed to pretrial discovery to establish the
facts, Judge Jon 0. Newman wrote for the
appeals court.
The government's appeal maintains that the
case against the two high officials should
have been dismissed because it was based
on nothing but "bare and conclusory
allegations" and lacked evidence that the
two condoned or even knew about the
treatment Mr. Iqbal alleges to have occurred.
The standard for allowing the case to go
forward should be higher than mere
plausibility, the government said, pointing to
recent Supreme Court decisions, including
one in an antitrust case last year, that raised
the standard for the evidence that plaintiffs
must provide at the initial stage in order to
withstand a motion to dismiss their lawsuit.
The government's brief said the "vital
importance" of the case, Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
No. 07-1015, was "amplified in the context
of high-ranking officials charged with
responding to an extraordinary national-
security crisis like the September 11
attacks."
In his opinion for the appeals court last June,
Judge Newman discounted the relevance of
the Sept. 11 context for the rights that Mr.
Iqbal was asserting. "The strength of our
system of constitutional rights derives from
the steadfast protection of those rights in
normal and unusual times," he wrote.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the
Supreme Court majority last week in the
decision on the rights of the Guantinamo
detainees, expressed a similar sentiment
when he said that "the laws and Constitution
are designed to survive, and remain in force,
in extraordinary times."
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"U.S. Officials Fail to Win Release from 9/11 Suit"
New York Law Journal
June
Mark
15, 2007
Hamblett
A lawsuit challenging the alleged beating
and abuse of a Pakastani man at the
Metropolitan Detention Center following his
arrest in the post-Sept. 11, 2001 roundup of
Arab and Muslim men accused of criminal
or immigration violations will continue.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit yesterday broke new ground in the
area of qualified immunity as it ruled that
former U.S. Attorney General John
Ashcroft, FBI Director Robert Mueller and
several FBI officials and Bureau of Prisons
personnel must continue to litigate the case
of Javaid Iqbal before Eastern District Judge
John Gleeson.
The circuit suggested that the immunity
defense could be reasserted before trial but
only after "carefully controlled and limited"
discovery supervised by Judge Gleeson.
Mr. Iqbal claimed that his rights were
violated when he was placed in solitary
confinement from Jan. 8, 2002 until June
2002, beaten by correctional officers,
subjected to extreme temperatures,
repeatedly stripped and subjected to body
cavity searches, shackled whenever he left
his cell, and subjected to discrimination
based on his racial, ethnic and religious
background.
He charged that the decision of the Justice
Department to arrest persons "of high
interest" after the Sept. 11 attacks led to his
segregation in solitary confinement, where
he languished while awaiting FBI
"clearance" via an order to the Bureau of
Prisons, and that his segregation and
mistreatment
without the
officials.
would never have happened
approval of high-ranking
Those officials, including Mr. Mueller, Mr.
Ashcroft and Dennis Hasty, then warden of
the detention center, as well as FBI and
federal Bureau of Prisons personnel, claimed
qualified immunity for the decision to
segregate Mr. Iqbal. They also claimed that
the special context of post 9/11, specifically
the national emergency and the desperate
need to track down terror leads, should free
them from civil suit even if the qualified
immunity privilege did not apply.
Judge Gleeson rejected the bulk of those
claims. Yesterday, a panel of Judges Jon
Newman, Jose Cabranes and Robert Sack
accepted almost all of Judge Gleeson's
findings in this respect when they decided
the appeal in Iqbal v. Hasty, 05-5768-cv.
Judge Newman wrote for the court as it sent
almost all of the claims back to the Eastern
District. The thorniest question facing the
panel was what it considered the prevailing
confusion over pleading standards for
qualified immunity. The privilege is
recognized because of the need for public
officials to be able to do their jobs without
fear of vexatious litigation.
For this reason, issues of qualified immunity
are usually decided upfront by judges before
burdensome litigation can get under way,
and appeals courts hear denials of claims of
qualified immunity before discovery gets
under way.
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Flexible Standard
Judge Newman said the "pleading standard
to overcome a qualified immunity defense
appears to be an unsettled question in this
circuit," and considerable uncertainty
concerning the standard for assessing the
adequacy of pleadings has recently been
created by the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 127
S.Ct. 1955 (2007).
Bell Atlantic, Judge Newman said,
"indicated that it intended to make some
alteration in the regime of pure notice
pleading that had prevailed in the federal
courts ever since Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41 (1957)."
And "some of these signals," he said, "point
toward a new and heightened pleading
standard." But some the signals pointed in
the other direction, including the possibility
that the court was requiring more than
simple notice pleading in the limited context
presented by the case-antitrust.
Judge Newman said "We are reluctant to
assume that all of the language of Bell
Atlantic applies only to Section 1 allegations
based on competitors' parallel conduct or,
slightly more broadly, only to antitrust
cases."
In the end, he said "we believe the Court is
not requiring a universal standard of
heightened fact pleading, but is instead
requiring a flexible 'plausibility standard,'
which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim
with some factual allegations in those
contexts where such amplification is needed
to render the claim plausible."
That said, Judge Newman added, "we see
some merit in the argument in favor of a
heightened pleading standard in this case for
two reasons."
"First, qualified immunity is a privilege that
is essential to the ability of government
officials to carry out their public roles
effectively without fear of undue harassment
by litigation," he said.
"Second, some of the allegations in the
plaintiffs complaint, although not entirely
conclusory, suggest that some of the
plaintiffs claims are not based on facts
supporting the claim but, rather, on
generalized allegations of supervisory
involvement," he said.
"Therefore, allowing some of the plaintiffs
claims to survive a motion to dismiss might
facilitate the very type of broad-ranging
discovery and litigation burdens that the
qualified immunity privilege was intended
to prevent."
The U.S. Supreme Court has warned that a
decision on heightened pleading standards
requires an amendment to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and should not be done
through "judicial interpretation."
So the circuit concluded that "a heightened
pleading standard may not be imposed."
Limited Discovery
Nonetheless, and it is a big nonetheless, the
court said that under "the plausibility
standard of Bell Atlantic, a conclusory
allegation concerning some elements of
plaintiffs claims might need to be fleshed
out by a plaintiffs response to a defendant's
motion for a more definite statement."
A district court, while mindful of the policy
considerations underlying the qualified
immunity privilege, "may nonetheless
consider exercising its discretion to permit
some limited and tightly controlled
reciprocal discovery so that a defendant may
probe for amplification of a plaintiffs
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claims and a plaintiff may probe for such
matters as a defendant's knowledge of
relevant facts and personal involvement in
challenged conduct."
Here, where some defendants are current or
former senior government officials, Judge
Newman said, the district court might want
to "structure such limited discovery by
examining written responses to
interrogatories and requests to admit before
authorizing depositions, and by deferring
discovery directed to high-level officials
until discovery of front-line officials has
been completed and has demonstrated the
need for discovery higher up in the ranks."
The circuit quickly rejected defendants'
arguments that the special context of post
9/11 America required dismissal of the case,
even as it recognized the "gravity" of the
situation and noted emergencies can give
officials latitude to take action that would
not be constitutional "in normal times,"
"But most of the rights that the plaintiff
contends were violated do not vary with
surrounding circumstances, such as the right
not to be subjected to needlessly harsh
conditions of confinement, the right to free
from the use of excessive force, and the
right not to be subjected to ethnic or
religious discrimination," Judge Newman
said. "The strength of our system of
constitutional rights derives from the
steadfast protection of those rights in both
normal and unusual times."
Due Process Claims
The circuit agreed with Judge Gleeson's
position on Mr. lqbal's procedural due
process claim-that Mr. Iqbal had a
"protected liberty interest" to be free from
his placement in solitary and subjected to
needlessly harsh restrictions compared to the
rest of the prison population. Significantly,
Judge Newman said, "for at least half (if not
all) of plaintiff's confinement" in what was
called the ADMAX Special Housing Unit,
he was a pretrial detainee not a convicted
prisoner.
Mr. Ashcroft and Mr. Mueller claimed Iqbal
had failed to allege their personal
involvement in the denial of procedural due
process because the decision to continually
detain him was made by lower ranking FBI
officials. The circuit rejected that argument
"at this early stage of the litigation."
Mr. Hasty had made a similar argument, but
from a different perspective, that the
decisions were made by higher-ups. That
argument was also rejected by the circuit.
And under its reading of Bell Atlantic, the
circuit said the personal involvement of FBI
and Bureau of Prisons defendants "are
entirely plausible."
But on another question critical to qualified
immunity analysis-whether Mr. Iqbal's
right to procedural due process was in this
context was "clearly established"-the court
said, in this case, and in light of the case
law, "officers of reasonable competence"
could disagree over whether their conduct
violated clearly established procedural due
process rights.
On Mr. Mueller's and Mr. Ashcroft's
assertion of immunity on Mr. Iqbal's
discrimination claims, the circuit said it was
too early in the case to dismiss them.
"As with procedural due process claim, the
allegation that Ashcroft and Mueller
condoned and agreed to the discrimination
that the plaintiff alleges satisfies the
plausibility standard without an allegation of
subsidiary facts because of the likelihood
that these senior officials would have
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concerned themselves with the formulation
and implementation of policies dealing with
the confinement of those arrested on federal
charges in the New York City area and
designated 'of high interest' in the aftermath
of 9/11," Judge Newman said.
"In sum," he said, "the serious allegations of
gross mistreatment set forth in the complaint
suffice . . . to defeat the defendants' attempt
to terminate the lawsuit at a preliminary
stage, but, consistent with the important
policies that justify the defense of qualified
immunity, the defense may be reasserted in
advance of trial after a carefully controlled
and limited discovery that the district court
expects to supervise."
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"Top Officials Told to Testify in Muslims' Suit"
New York Times
September 29, 2005
Nina Bernstein
A federal judge in Brooklyn ruled yesterday
that former Attorney General John Ashcroft,
the director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and other top government
officials will have to answer questions under
oath in a lawsuit that accuses them of
personally conspiring to violate the rights of
Muslim immigrants held in a federal
detention center in Brooklyn after 9 / 11.
The officials had sought to have the lawsuit
dismissed without testimony, arguing in part
that they had governmental immunity from
its claims, that the court lacked jurisdiction
because they live outside New York State,
and that the Sept. 11 attacks created "special
factors" outweighing the plaintiffs' right to
sue for damages for constitutional
violations.
But the judge, John Gleeson, of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York, rejected those arguments,
allowing the case to proceed-and opening
the door to depositions of Mr. Ashcroft and
the F.B.I. director, Robert S. Mueller III, by
lawyers for the two plaintiffs: Ehab
Elmaghraby, an Egyptian immigrant who
ran a restaurant in Times Square, and Javaid
Iqbal, a Pakistani immigrant whose Long
Island customers knew him as "the cable
guy."
The lawsuit charges that, solely because of
their race, religion or national origin, the
two men were physically abused and
deprived of due process while being
detained for more than eight months in the
harsh maximum-security unit of the
Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn.
The men, who eventually pleaded guilty to
minor criminal charges unrelated to
terrorism and were deported, charged that
they were repeatedly slammed into walls
and dragged across the floor while shackled
and manacled.
They said they were kicked and punched
until they bled, cursed as "terrorists" and
"Muslim bastards," and subjected to
multiple unnecessary body-cavity searches,
including one in which correction officers
inserted a flashlight into Mr. Elmaghraby's
rectum, making him bleed.
"Our nation's unique and complex law
enforcement and security challenges in the
wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks do not
warrant the elimination of remedies for the
constitutional violations alleged here,"
Judge Gleeson wrote in his decision.
Charles Miller, a spokesman for the United
States Attorney's office, said the ruling was
under review. "The government has made
no determination yet as to what the
government's next step will be," he said.
The decision was hailed as significant by the
plaintiffs' lawyers, Alexander A. Reinert, of
Koob & Magoolaghan, and Haeyoung
Yoon, of the Urban Justice Center.
It was also celebrated by lawyers at the
Center for Constitutional Rights, which
brought a companion lawsuit as a class
action on behalf of other immigrant
detainees in 2002. The government's motion
to dismiss that suit, using many of the same
arguments, is pending before the same
judge.
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"The fact that Judge Gleeson ruled that this
case can keep Ashcroft on the hook-that
would never happen in a regular prison-
abuse case," said Rachel Meeropol, a lawyer
for the Center for Constitutional Rights.
"The judge understood that this isn't just a
case about individuals being abused in
detention. These are people who were
singled out according to a policy created on
the highest levels of government."
Judge Gleeson cited a scathing 2003 report
by the Justice Department's inspector
general that found widespread abuse of
detainees at the Brooklyn center.
The report said that Mr. Ashcroft's policy
was to hold detainees on any legal pretext
until the F.B.I. cleared them, even though
such clearances took months and many had
been picked up by chance, not because they
were legitimate terrorism suspects.
"The post-Sept. 11 context provides support
for the plaintiffs' assertions that defendants
were involved in creating and/or
implementing the detention policy under
which plaintiffs were confined without due
process," the judge wrote.
In effect, the judge gave the plaintiffs an
opportunity to try to establish the personal
involvement of Mr. Ashcroft and other high-
ranking defendants through discovery, rather
than simply accepting the defense's
argument of immunity at this early stage of
the litigation.
The "qualified immunity" that shields
government officials "will not allow the
attorney general to carry out his national
security functions wholly free from concern
for his personal liability," Judge Gleeson
wrote, quoting a Supreme Court decision
that involved then-Attorney General John N.
Mitchell's unauthorized wiretap of a radical
group. "He may on occasion have to pause
to consider whether a proposed course of
action can be squared with the Constitution
and laws of the United States."
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"Prison Tapes Show Abuse of Terrorism Suspects"
Washington Post
December 19, 2003
Dan Eggen
WASHINGTON-The Justice Department's
inspector general announced yesterday that
investigators had found hundreds of prison
videotapes that confirm reports of serious
physical and verbal abuse of immigrants
detained after the Sept. 11 attacks.
Inspector General Glenn Fine found that
''some officers slammed and bounced
detainees against the wall, twisted their arms
and hands in painful ways, stepped on their
leg-restraint chains and punished them by
keeping them restrained for long periods of
time," according to a report released
yesterday.
The report also found that jail personnel
improperly taped meetings between
detainees and lawyers and overused strip
searches.
Fine's office concluded that as many as 20
guards at the Metropolitan Detention Center
(MDC) in Brooklyn, N.Y., were involved in
the abuse and recommended discipline or
counseling for 12 of those who remain
employed there. Four guards no longer work
at the prison, but the report said their new
employers should be told of the Justice
Department findings. The inspector general
could not identify the others involved.
Justice Department spokesman Mark
Corallo said the agency's civil-rights
division and the U.S. attorney for the
Eastern District of New York will review
the report and the videotapes to determine if
anyone should be prosecuted.
"We agree with the inspector general that
even the intense emotional atmosphere
surrounding the attacks, particularly in New
York City where smoke was still rising from
the rubble of Ground Zero, is no excuse for
abhorrent behavior by Bureau of Prisons
personnel," Corallo said.
The report said that many of the allegations
were confirmed through the viewing of more
than 300 videotapes recorded from October
to November 2001 that showed detainees
being moved around the facility and within
cells.
MDC officials repeatedly had told Fine's
investigators that such tapes no longer
existed, and many of those interviewed
earlier had denied conduct that was
confirmed on the tapes. The report also
found, however, that many tapes remain
missing and that there are unexplained gaps
in the footage, despite a requirement to keep
such material for two years under U.S.
Bureau of Prisons policies.
Yesterday's findings follow a June report
that found "excessively restrictive and
unduly harsh" conditions for Sept. 11
detainees.
The earlier report also found "a pattern of
physical and verbal abuse," but concluded
that further investigation was necessary. At
the time, Justice Department prosecutors had
declined to pursue criminal prosecutions.
A federal dragnet after the attacks resulted
in the detention of more than 1,200 foreign
nationals, including 762 immigration cases
examined by Fine. None was ever charged
with terrorism-related crimes.
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Negusie v. Mukasey
07-499
Ruling Below: Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 Fed. Appx. 325 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, Negusie
v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 1695 (U.S. 2008).
Negusie, a citizen of Eritrea, was conscripted into the army. Negusie was released from service,
but then recalled. Upon his refusal to fight the Eritrean government incarcerated Negusie. After
two years of incarceration Negusie was released into military service, in which he worked for
four years. During that time he worked on a rotating basis as a prison guard. Negusie managed
to stow away on a shipping container bound for the U.S. and upon arrival requested asylum. The
Immigration Judge denied Negusie's request for asylum under numerous sections of the
immigration code that state a person is not eligible for asylum if they assisted or participated in
the persecution of others because of race, religion, or other specific categories. The Immigration
Judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals all denied
Negusie's petition for asylum, stating that he admittedly participated in the persecution of
individuals when he acted as a prison guard. The Fifth Circuit's opinion is in line with the view
of the Second Circuit and contradictory to the view taken by the Eighth Circuit. The
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) prohibits the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Attorney General from granting asylum to, or withholding removal of, a refugee who has
"ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." INA
§ 208(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A).
Question Presented: Whether this "persecutor exception" prohibits granting asylum to, and
withholding of removal of, a refugee who is compelled against his will by credible threats of
death or torture to assist or participate in acts of persecution.
Daniel Girmai NEGUSIE, Petitioner,
V.
Alberto R GONZALES, US Attorney General, Respondent.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Decided May 15, 2007
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
PER CURIAM: denying his application for asylum and
withholding of removal.
Eritrean citizen Daniel Girmai Negusie
petitions for review of the decision of the Negusie contends that the BIA erroneously
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that he assisted in the
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persecution of others on the basis of a
protected ground, rendering him ineligible
for asylum or withholding of removal,
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) and
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i). Negusie argues
both that he did not assist in persecution
when he worked as a guard in a military
prison and that the record did not indicate
that he was involved in any persecution of
others on a protected ground.
In his brief to the BIA, Negusie stated that
he "did not . . . assist or otherwise
participate in the persecution of any person
on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. In fact, he risked his life
on numerous occasions to help those who
were facing such persecution." Negusie thus
conceded that the prisoners were persecuted
on protected grounds. See Campbell v. Sonat
Offshore Drilling, Inc., 979 F.2d 1115, 1119
(5th Cir. 1992) (a litigant's factual assertions
ordinarily are binding). Moreover, Negusie
testified that, during his own imprisonment,
he learned about Protestant Christianity
from people who were imprisoned because
of their religious beliefs. Additionally, a
State Department report from 2004 indicated
that the Eritrean government actively
persecuted numerous Protestant groups.
The question whether an alien was
compelled to assist authorities is irrelevant,
as is the question whether the alien shared
the authorities' intentions. Bah v. Ashcroft,
341 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2003). Rather,
the inquiry should focus "on whether
particular conduct can be considered
assisting in the persecution of civilians."
Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490,
512 n.34 (1981).
Negusie did not affirmatively, personally
injure the prisoners, and he objected to, and
occasionally disobeyed, orders to inflict
punishment, did favors for prisoners, and
was reprimanded for doing so. However, he
worked as an armed prison guard. He knew
about the forms of punishment used by his
superior officer. He stood guard while
prisoners were kept in the sun as a form of
punishment, and he acknowledged that his
job description included depriving prisoners
of access to showers and fresh air. He also
stated that he hated his job because he saw
prisoners suffer on a daily basis. The
Immigration Judge considered Negusie's
testimony about his redemptive acts of
assistance to prisoners and gave that
testimony little weight.
The evidence does not compel a conclusion
that Negusie did not assist in the persecution
of prisoners. See Bah, 341 F.3d at 350.
Negusie thus was ineligible for asylum or
withholding of removal.
PETITION DENIED.
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"Fresno Couple in Limbo After Court
Withdraws Eligibility for Asylum"
San Francisco Chronicle
April
Bob
12, 2008
Egelko
A federal appeals court withdrew its ruling
Friday that declared a Fresno couple eligible
for political asylum in the United States
despite the husband's background as a guard
in a Cambodian prison where inmates were
allegedly persecuted.
The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
San Francisco had ruled in August that
Pauline Im had played no more than a
marginal role in the mistreatment of
prisoners and thus should not be considered
a persecutor, which would require that he be
deported. The court said Im and his wife,
Ngin Sitha, were eligible for asylum because
they had shown Im would face political
persecution in Cambodia.
But the court withdrew the ruling Friday and
said the outcome of the case would depend
on another dispute that the U.S. Supreme
Court has agreed to hear in the term that
starts in October. That case involves a
former prison guard in Eritrea, where the
inmates included religious minorities who
were persecuted.
A federal appeals court in New Orleans
ruled last year that the Eritrean guard,
Daniel Negusie, had assisted in the
persecution and was ineligible for asylum
even though he had not injured any
prisoners and had opposed their
mistreatment. The court noted that Negusie
had been armed, had stood guard while
prisoners were kept in the sun for
punishment, and had denied them access to
showers and fresh air.
The Supreme Court agreed last month to
hear Negusie's appeal and is scheduled to
rule on his case[, Negusie v. Mukasey,] by
June 2009. In the meantime, the Fresno
couple are in limbo, said their lawyer,
Emmanuel Enyinwa.
Enyinwa said the two cases differed because
Im had not been armed, played no role in the
mistreatment of prisoners and had merely
followed superiors' instructions to lock and
unlock cell doors when prisoners were taken
for interrogation. The lawyer said he
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's decision
to withdraw its ruling but now expects the
court to order a new round of arguments
after the Supreme Court rules on Negusie.
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"Supreme Court Accepts African Prison Guard's Asylum Appeal"
ABA Journal
Mar 17, 2008
Debra Cassens Weiss
A former prison camp guard who says he
was forced to persecute others in Africa will
get a chance to press his case for asylum
with the U.S. Supreme Court in Negusie v.
Mukasey].
Daniel Girmai Negusie was denied asylum
because he helped operate a prison camp in
Eritrea during a war with Ethiopia,
SCOTUSblog reports. Federal law bars
asylum for those who participate or assist in
the persecution of others. But Negusie
claims in his cert petition . . . that the law
doesn't apply to him because he was forced
persecute others under threats of torture or
death.
Negusie served two years as a guard until he
was able to escape by hiding in a shipping
container.
The New Orleans-based 5th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals had ruled that coercion is
irrelevant. Its decision conflicts with the law
in at least one other circuit, the cert petition
says.
"In a world where the number of civil wars
is increasing, and both sides often coerce
individuals into military service, this issue is
arising with increasing frequency-as
demonstrated by the significant number of
judicial decisions addressing it," the petition
says. "Capricious variation in the application
of this nation's asylum laws with respect to
a frequently recurring issue cannot be
tolerated."
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"Courts Criticize Judges' Handling of Asylum Cases"
New York Times
December 26, 2005
Adam Liptak
Federal appeals court judges around the
nation have repeatedly excoriated
immigration judges this year for what they
call a pattern of biased and incoherent
decisions in asylum cases.
In one decision last month, Richard A.
Posner, a prominent and relatively
conservative federal appeals court judge in
Chicago, concluded that "the adjudication of
these cases at the administrative level has
fallen below the minimum standards of legal
justice."
Similarly, the federal appeals court in
Philadelphia said in September that it had
"time and time again" been forced to rebuke
immigration judges for their "intemperate
and humiliating remarks." Citing cases from
around the country, the court wrote of "a
disturbing pattern" of misconduct in
immigration rulings that sent people back to
countries where they had said they would
face persecution.
The harsh criticism may stem in part from a
surge in immigration cases before the
federal appeals courts. Immigration cases,
most involving asylum seekers, accounted
for about 17 percent of all federal appeals
cases last year, up from just 3 percent in
2001. In the courts in New York and
California, nearly 40 percent of federal
appeals involved immigration cases.
The increase occurred after Attorney
General John Ashcroft made changes in
2002 to streamline appellate review within
the immigration courts, which are part of the
Justice Department.
Many federal appeals court judges say those
changes essentially shifted work to their
courts. The Justice Department counters that
the increase is largely unrelated to the
Ashcroft changes and is instead the result of
a higher rate of appeals in the courts in New
York and California.
Jonathan Cohn, a deputy assistant attorney
general in the Justice Department, said the
quality of the decisions rendered by the
immigration courts on the whole was good,
noting that the government won more than
90 percent of the cases in the federal
appeals, or circuit, courts.
"The circuit courts do not see any of the tens
of thousands of correctly decided cases that
aliens choose not to appeal," Mr. Cohn said.
"They're only seeing a fraction of the cases,
and only a small fraction of those give rise
to criticism."
But that criticism can be very sharp,
particularly given the temperate language
that is the norm in the federal appellate
courts.
In the Philadelphia decision in September,
Judge Julio M. Fuentes of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had
this to say about Annie S. Garcy, an
immigration judge, or I.J., in Newark: "The
tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the
sarcasm of the I.J. seem more appropriate to
a court television show than a federal court
proceeding."
Judge Garcy ordered Qun Wang returned to
China, where he said his wife had been
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forcibly sterilized. "He's a horrible father as
far as the court's concerned," Judge Garcy
ruled, saying Mr. Wang was obsessed with
having a son and did not pay enough
attention to his daughter, who is disabled.
All of that was irrelevant to the issues before
Judge Garcy, Judge Fuentes wrote, returning
the case to the immigration system for a
rehearing before a different judge. "The
factual issue before" Judge Garcy, Judge
Fuentes wrote, had been only "whether
Wang's wife had been forcibly sterilized and
whether, if he returned to China, the Chinese
government would inflict improper
punishment on him for leaving the country."
Through a spokeswoman, Judge Garcy
declined to comment.
In another decision, Judge Marsha S. Berzon
of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in San Francisco, said a
decision by Nathan W. Gordon, an
immigration judge, was "literally
incomprehensible," "incoherent" and
"indecipherable." A crucial sentence in
Judge Gordon's decision, she said, "defies
parsing under ordinary rules of English
grammar."
Judge Gordon ordered Ernesto Adolfo
Recinos de Leon returned to Guatemala,
notwithstanding Mr. Recinos's testimony
that he would be persecuted there for his
political activities. Judge Berzon sent the
case back to the immigration system for
another hearing.
Judge Gordon, now retired, did not respond
to a request for comment.
A spokesman for the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, the unit of the Justice
Department responsible for immigration
adjudications, declined requests for
interviews with officials there but provided
answers to written questions.
"We would caution against drawing broad
conclusions," the statement said, "from a
small number of cases in the federal courts."
The nation's roughly 215 immigration
judges, the statement continued, "handle
more than 300,000 matters every year," and
"the vast majority of I.J.'s do an excellent
job given such a large caseload."
Denise Noonan Slavin, the president of the
National Association of Immigration Judges,
a union affiliated with the A.F.L.-C.I.O.,
said she was concerned about what she
called the rising number of "scathing
opinions" from federal appeals court judges.
Mary M. Schroeder, the chief judge of the
Ninth Circuit, which hears almost half of all
immigration appeals, said the current system
was "woefully inadequate."
Immigration judges, she said, "are very
unevenly qualified, and they work under
very bad conditions."
The people who appear before immigration
judges often do not speak English, and their
cases often turn in part on changing political
and social conditions around the world. In a
decision in March, Judge Posner wrote that
immigration judges' "lack of familiarity
with relevant foreign cultures" was
"disturbing."
Judge Slavin, who sits in Miami, disagreed,
saying she and her colleagues often had a
sophisticated understanding of conditions in
the most relevant countries, which are China
for immigration judges in New York and
Philadelphia; Eastern Europe for those in
Chicago; Haiti, Columbia and Venezuela for
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those in Miami; and Central and South
America for those in California.
"I know more about Haitian politics than the
people coming before me," Judge Slavin
said. But she acknowledged both the
difficulty and the importance of her work.
Judges at the top and bottom of the system
blame the administrative body between
them, the Board of Immigration Appeals, for
the surge in appeals and the mixed quality of
the decisions reaching the federal appeals
courts. The board is meant to act as a filter,
correcting erroneous or intemperate
decisions from the immigration judges and
providing general guidance. The losing party
can appeal the board's decision to the
federal courts.
But the board largely stopped reviewing
immigration cases in a meaningful way after
it was restructured by Mr. Ashcroft in 2002,
several judges said.
Mr. Ashcroft reduced the number of judges
on the board to 11 from 23. "They just
hacked off all the liberals is basically what
they did," said Ms. Rosenberg, who served
on the board from 1995 to 2002.
Mr. Ashcroft also expanded the number of
appeals heard by a single board member and
encouraged the use of one-word affirmances
in appropriate cases.
The goal of the changes, Mr. Ashcroft said,
was streamlining. The board had a backlog
of more than 56,000 cases, which fell to
32,000 by September 2004.
At a conference at New York Law School in
September, John M. Walker Jr., the chief
judge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, in New York, said
the changes at the board level served to
transfer its backlog to his court and other
federal appeals courts.
"He just moved the problem from one court
to another court," Judge Walker said of Mr.
Ashcroft.
In the two and a half years after April 2002,
said John R. B. Palmer, a staff lawyer at the
Second Circuit, his court received twice as
many appeals from immigration board
decisions as it had in the previous 30 years
combined.
Several federal appeals court judges said
they were frustrated by the quality of the
board's review of decisions from
immigration judges.
In his March decision, Judge Posner wrote
that the board often affirmed "either with no
opinion or with a very short, unhelpful,
boilerplate opinion even when" the
immigration judge had committed "manifest
errors of fact and logic."
As a consequence, Judge Walker said,
"We're the first meaningful review that the
petitioner has."
In its statement, the immigration review
office said "we absolutely disagree" with
Judge Walker's comment. "Each decision
that comes before the board is carefully
reviewed by a staff attorney and at least one
board member," the statement said.
According to the office, the number of one-
word affirmances dropped this year, to about
20 percent from about a third in previous
years.
The solution to some of what recent
criticisms identified as problems, several
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federal appeals court judges said, is to add
positions to the immigration board and to
require judges there to explain the reasons
for their decisions.
"At least write a couple of pages, three
pages," said Jon 0. Newman, a judge on the
Second Circuit. "It would really help us."
An article to be published early next year in
the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal
concludes that the shift toward the federal
appeals court "was triggered by the high
volume of B.I.A. decisions issued starting in
March 2002, and a general dissatisfaction
with the B.I.A.'s review."
In its statement, the immigration review
office disagreed.
"The surge in federal appeals," the statement
said, "is not related to the board's increased
number of decisions but the rate of appeal."
In some parts of the country, immigrants
appeal only 7 percent of the time, the
statement said. In the states covered by the
federal appeals courts in New York and
California, the appeals rate is now more than
30 percent.
At an argument in an appeal of an
immigration case in September in Chicago,
the three judges on the panel expressed
exasperation with the current state of affairs.
"Does the Justice Department have any idea
of what is happening to your cases in this
court?" Judge Posner asked Cindy S. Ferrier,
the government lawyer defending the
decision of the immigration judge.
She said yes.
A second judge, Ilana Rovner, offered Ms.
Ferrier a measure of sympathy.
"It is so cruel to send a lovely human being
like you in here to be a messenger of such
madness, such nonsense," Judge Rovner
said.
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